With the proliferation of studies on popular opinion under Vichy, it was inevitable that the role of the parliament, which overwhelmingly voted to transfer full powers to Marshal Philippe Pétain on 10 July 1940 by a vote of 570 to 80, with 20 abstentions, would attract renewed attention. While the eighty parliamentarians who voted against full powers, together with the twenty-seven deputies and senators who set sail for North Africa on the *Massilia* to continue the battle against the Nazis, have been hailed as *résistants* of the first hour, those who voted in favor of full powers have been condemned either as outright collaborators or as *attentists* willing to sacrifice the values of republicanism and democracy in the false hope of securing a place for France in the new European order. Olivier Wieviorka’s new book provides a welcome opportunity to reassess the validity of this dualistic interpretation.

By using the recently opened dossiers of the Jury of Honor, the panel established by the provisional government of the Republic in 1945 to determine whether politicians who had supported Vichy deserved exoneration—and thus the right to resume political office—on the basis of subsequent resistance activities, Wieviorka seeks to achieve two goals. First, he hopes to interrogate the parliamentary vote of 10 July 1940 in order to highlight the diversity of factors that impelled individual parliamentarians to lend support to the Vichy regime. And second, he endeavors to look beyond the purview of the vote by examining the long-range itineraries of the parliamentarians up through the Liberation. By expanding our chronological horizons, Wieviorka shows that a significant portion of those who voted in favor of full powers in 1940—perhaps as many as 250 to 300—ultimately defected from Vichy and engaged in some sort of resistance activity. The author thus insists that the categories of collaborationists, *maréchalistes*, and *résistants* were not fixed and static; rather, they were fluid and changed over time in response to changing circumstances. Once we adopt this longer-term perspective, it becomes clear, according to Wieviorka, that a significant portion of parliament comported itself with honor and dignity, and he even suggests that these politicians merit a place in historical memory on par with the eighty and with those who attempted to leave on the *Massilia*.

In an effort to explain the stunning parliamentary vote of 10 July 1940, by which the nation’s elected representatives voluntarily ceded their prerogatives to an authoritarian leader, thus delivering the final death blow to the Third Republic, Wieviorka deemphasizes ideology in favor of pragmatic or structural explanations. Although he concedes that a tiny minority of parliamentarians may have been seduced by the fascist temptation in the 1930s, he concurs with the assessment of René Rémond and Pierre Milza that fascism made little headway in France during the interwar years, and he insists that the majority of parliamentarians, even on the far right, remained firmly committed to republican and democratic values. He similarly rejects the notion that any sizable number of parliamentarians—no more than 100—shared any ideological commitment to the goal of Franco-German collaboration. Rather, according to
Wieviorka, the outbreak of war in 1939-1940, by reinvigorating traditional patriotic and germanophobic sentiments, sharply dampened the pacifism and defeatism that had surfaced at the time of the Munich Crisis. And finally, despite the fierce maréchalisme, or intense loyalty felt by many parliamentarians toward the person of Pétain, Wieviorka insists that only a small minority—no more than 100 to 150—were ever truly committed to the National Revolution.

To the extent that ideology played any role in the vote of 10 July 1940, Wieviorka admits only the influence of traditional party affiliations. As he shows in a detailed analysis of voting behavior broken down along party lines, the two major left-wing parties—the Socialists and the Radicals (the Communists, except for a small minority of dissidents, had already been driven underground in the wake of the 1939 Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact)—were significantly overrepresented among the eighty who voted no, and they also constituted as many as four-fifths of those who left on the Massilia. Nevertheless, even the vast majority of Socialists and Radicals ultimately voted in favor of full powers, and here he maintains that a host of pragmatic or structural considerations need to be taken into account. These include a profound sense of obligation to one's electoral constituency; a widely shared belief that emigration was tantamount to desertion; generational factors (elderly representatives were most likely to vote no); prior military service (veterans and sons of veterans were most likely to vote no); and regional identity (representatives from regions under direct German occupation were most likely to vote yes). The reluctance of party leaders to give directives to their followers, as well as a legalistic mentality that encouraged compromise and adherence to procedural norms (behavior Wieviorka subsumes under the rubric "republican culture"), also encouraged political adhesion to Vichy. Most importantly, Wieviorka insists that the vast majority of parliamentarians, whether on the left or the right, simply saw no alternative. With the exception of Charles de Gaulle, French military commanders believed that it was futile to continue the war, and Pétain was offering assurances that his strategy alone would guarantee a modicum of French independence. Under these circumstances, Wieviorka suggests that most parliamentarians were willing, at least for the moment, to cast their lots with Vichy.

If we look beyond the vote of 10 July 1940, however, Wieviorka shows that this broad-based consensus, precisely because it reflected so diverse a range of expectations, began to collapse in 1942 in the face of mounting German demands for collaboration and increased repression at home. On the left, the regime's brutal and vindictive campaigns against its internal enemies—communists, socialists, masons, and Jews, which ultimately targeted even many parliamentarians—propelled the majority into the ranks of the Resistance. On the conservative right, even among those who evinced some sympathy for Pétain's National Revolution, Pierre Laval's readiness to make concessions to the Germans matched by his utter inability to protect French autonomy, as evidenced by the deportations of the Jews, the implementation of the Service du Travail Obligatoire (STO), and ultimately the German invasion and occupation of the entire southern zone in November 1942, compelled many to reevaluate their commitments. In the wake of the roundups of Jews from the unoccupied zone in the summer of 1942, the prefect of the Tarn-et-Garonne, for example, complained that the seizure of French citizens "solely because they are Jews" constituted a grave infringement upon French sovereignty, and he warned that any further erosion of national sovereignty would make it impossible for him to continue his mission (p. 262). Similarly, by the summer of 1943, as the tide of war seemed to be shifting decisively in the Allies' favor, François Valentin, who had already quit his post as director of the Legion, issued a scathing denunciation of the regime. In a statement transmitted by Maurice Schumann over the BBC, Valentin declared: "Our error was to believe that we could restore a country before liberating it. When a government has neither an army nor navy [...]; when it no longer has means to protect its citizens against the violent acts committed by a foreign police installed everywhere on its soil.... [t] is nothing more than a facade of a government. Not only does it no longer have a right to obedience, but it is an obligation to disobey it each time it deviates from the general well being of the nation" (pp. 281-82).
To be sure, not all parliamentarians who became disaffected opted in favor of armed resistance. Many remained in their posts and engaged in less risky clandestine activities, such as the delivery of false papers to Jews or French youths subject to labor service in Germany. Nevertheless, such opposition frequently led to more overt forms of resistance, and by 1944 Wieviorka estimates that as many as two-thirds of all parliamentarians had broken with the regime. He therefore concludes that "the majority of elected officials refused to sacrifice on the altar of vichysme the republican principles for which they had long fought..." (p. 435).

Wieviorka's emphasis on the diversity of motives that influenced the parliamentary vote of 10 July 1940, as well as on the divergent itineraries traveled by French representatives during these years, greatly enhances our understanding of the range of political options available. Nevertheless, this study is marred by several methodological flaws that severely undermine some of its conclusions. First, the author's tendency to deconstruct all generalizations regarding the behavior of these parliamentarians completely atomizes their experiences. It also ignores the fact that party affiliation, and more importantly broader political ideologies, played a decisive role in determining political behavior. While one can always cite a few exceptions to show that some politicians on the right, such as Henri de Kérillis or Georges Mandel, rejected Vichy from the start, or that some on the left, such as Gaston Bergery (if one can really consider him a leftist by 1940), endorsed it, the evidence adduced here substantiates the traditional view that those who opposed Vichy, in 1940 and in subsequent years, were overwhelmingly recruited from the left. Only five of the eighty parliamentarians who voted no on 10 July 1940, and only three of the twenty-seven who left on the Massilia came from the ranks of the right. Left-wing parliamentarians also defected sooner and in far greater numbers than their colleagues on the right: nine of the eleven parliamentarians who joined de Gaulle prior to 1942 came from the Socialist and Radical parties, and twenty of the twenty-five members of the Consultative Assembly of Algiers were recruited from the left. And finally, 70 percent of the parliamentarians Wieviorka labels résistants parlementaires—those who engaged in the most active forms of resistance—came from the ranks of the left, while only three left-wing parliamentarians, including one neo-socialist, participated in the Vichy Legion. Hence, while Wieviorka is correct to point out that political ideology was not the sole determinant of behavior, it was nevertheless of paramount importance and cannot be dismissed as a mere epiphenomenon.

Wieviorka is also too quick to dismiss the influence of deep-seated ideological factors linked to the bitter partisan conflicts of the 1930s. First, it is unclear how evidence compiled in 1945-46 by the Jury of Honor can tell us much about motives of individuals in 1940, let alone whether or not they were loyal republicans. Hence, assertions regarding the republican or democratic credentials of those who voted in favor of full powers in 1940, including even that Pétain himself was a "resolute patriot and loyal republican" (p. 54), need be taken with a huge grain of salt. Furthermore, it is not clear why the author is so reluctant to attribute significance to the numerous anti-republican sentiments he cites throughout this work. Can we really consider Louis Gailleman, a conservative senator from the Vosges, a loyal republican when he explained to the Jury of Honor in 1945 that he had supported Vichy in 1940 because "all of France at that time desired a new constitution and a radical change of our institutions" (p. 128)? And what about the conservative deputy Augustin du Tertre de la Coudre, who in 1942 described universal male suffrage as "a mortal plague" (p. 181) or the Radical deputy Jean Mistler who told Pétain in 1941 that France needed a "detoxification cure" after the "abuse of universal suffrage" (p. 180) during the Popular Front? And finally, although Laval was not a fascist, his anti-republican sympathies cannot be much in doubt in light of his declaration at the meeting of the Constitutional Commission on 10 July 1940. There he proclaimed that the regime had no intention of protecting individual liberty if such liberty meant "the right of all the métèques and foreigners" to participate in the political process. Only those who could prove their ancestors had been "French for several generations" merited a place in the French political family, and he added: "This is our way [.] here of making racial policy" (pp. 63-64).

Wieviorka also severely underestimates the degree to which the pacifism of the 1930s paved the way for acceptance of the armistice and a willingness to embrace the possibility of Franco-German
collaboration. While it may be true, as William D. Irvine has argued, that most conservatives and even many on the far right rallied to the patrie in 1939-1940, it is far less clear that they were fighting to save democracy and the republic.\[^{1}\] As the Action française commented during the war, it was "the destiny of the nationalist right to give their men even for a cause that they do not consider their own" (p. 33). Moreover, it is difficult to believe that this pacifism was not largely motivated by ideology, notwithstanding Wievioroka's repeated assertions to the contrary. While fears of repeating the experiences of World War I obviously played a role, by the 1930s political factors, and especially anti-communist sentiments, had became inextricably bound up with these fears. As Michael J. Carley has recently shown, France's diplomatic isolation by the 1930s was primarily the fault of political leaders like Laval and Pierre-Etienne Flandin, who throughout the decade had shunned alliances with the USSR because of their fierce anti-communism despite pleas from more hard-headed conservatives like Mandel and Kérillis that only a Franco-Soviet pact could stave off the Nazi threat.\[^{2}\] Furthermore, as Irvine, Anthony Adamthwaite, Serge Berstein, and others have argued, the fear that war would lead to social revolution at home, a fear that was greatly exacerbated by the 1936 Popular Front victory, ultimately persuaded not only many conservatives but even many Radicals and Socialists that a negotiated settlement with the Germans was vastly preferable to an alliance with the Soviets.\[^{3}\] Lamenting this state of affairs at the time of the Munich Crisis, the conservative journalist Pertinax criticized his colleagues on the right for "having come to feel that the social peril takes precedence over the German peril, that the totalitarian states must be regarded as an assurance against Moscow, that Adolf Hitler and Benito Mussolini possess the depository of our civilization and that a war waged against them would result in an irreparable social upheaval."\[^{4}\] That recriminations against the "enemy within"—Jews, foreigners, communists and socialists—for having dragged France into a war unprepared resurfaced immediately after the debacle of June 1940 suggests that the union sacrée of 1939-1940 was more illusory than real.

Finally, Wievioroka underestimates the extent to which parliamentarians actually supported the program of the National Revolution. While many were attentists, as Wievioroka suggests, others evinced real enthusiasm for Vichy's domestic program. The fact that the regime proclaimed itself to be both anti-capitalist and anti-communist elicited support on both the left and the right, and its emphasis on corporatism and Catholic family values evoked fervent hopes among conservatives that the labor policies and anticlerical traditions of the Third Republic, particularly with regard to education, would soon be overturned. Moreover, the regime's xenophobia and antisemitism (especially insofar as it targeted foreign Jews) were also initially welcomed by many parliamentarians. Influential deputies, such as Robert Schuman, Jean Fernand-Laurent, and Louis Marin had long been demanding rollbacks in naturalization, and the parliament had already passed stringent measures in 1934-1935 restricting the rights of recently naturalized citizens to practice law and medicine. In light of these precedents, it is not surprising that Vichy's early measures against foreigners and Jews elicited scant criticism. Moreover, as Wievioroka admits, widespread demands for constitutional revision and especially for the creation of a stronger executive branch may have conditioned many elected officials to greet Vichy as the long-awaited antidote to parliamentary instability. Hence, the fact that many parliamentarians who voted yes on 10 July 1940 eventually turned their backs on Vichy does not necessarily signify that their initial support was lackluster; rather, it frequently reflected their disillusionment with the regime because it had not fulfilled its original promises.

In sum, not all of Wievioroka's conclusions can be supported by the evidence presented here. Above all, his sweeping conclusions that the parliamentarians "as a whole... remained loyal to patriotic or republican values" (p. 435) and that subsequent resistance activities should erase the "crime" (p. 336) of 10 July 1940 seem ahistorical and fly in the face of his broader project of challenging such facile and overarching generalizations. While a multiplicity of motives impelled parliamentarians to vote yes on 10 July 1940, a similar multiplicity of motives conditioned them to embark on resistance, and some of these were less honorable than others. What Wievioroka's book does successfully accomplish, however, is to highlight the diversity of factors that inspired deputies and senators to lend initial support to Vichy and
to show that their behavior changed over time. While this book would have benefited from more careful editing (there are far too many inconsistencies in the figures cited and the tables are not always presented in a clear fashion) and a broader reading of secondary sources in English (not a single one is cited in the bibliography!), it nevertheless constitutes an important contribution to French political history and will undoubtedly stimulate renewed debate about the role of French political elites in the collapse of the Third Republic and the coming to power of Vichy.

NOTES


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