
Review by Tessie P. Liu, Northwestern University.

Folding back the cover of this volume, readers will be struck immediately by the diversity of subjects represented. The ten chapters center on the Caribbean as a privileged laboratory to study race relations at the crossroad of African, American, and European histories from the seventeenth to the twenty-first centuries. In the first section entitled “Les divers champs de la racialisation,” we find essays on the etiology of race in the treatment of captives and enslaved laborers in colonial medicine, on race and aesthetics in nineteenth-century Haiti, the racialization of Haitian refugees in contemporary Jamaica, the changing social classifications of the lesser Antilles in the seventeenth century society, and the role of race in the autobiographies of writers Maryse Condé and J.M. Coetzee. In the second part, entitled “Race et tabous,” the chapters focus on race as a political category in Martinique, the invisibility of race in Cuban literature, Black African slaves in eighteenth-century Spain, the origins and transformation of colonial racial thought, and the new sciences of race and racism in the late twentieth century.

Each essay brings an important perspective and extends the empirical knowledge of their respective subfields and disciplines. Given this dizzying array, one might ask what ties them together into one volume? From the outset, the editors, Marine Cellier, Amina Damerji, and Sylvain Lloret, suggest that their answer lies in contemporary French politics. They begin their introduction with a controversial recent vote in the French National Assembly on 12 July 2018 to remove the word “race” from the first article of the Constitution of the Fifth Republic. Proponents of the change had targeted the phrase: “equality before the law for all citizens without distinction of origin, race, or religion,” for undermining the antiracist spirit of the document.[1] The injunction against racial discrimination, the revisionists explained, had been added to the Constitution in 1946 (and reaffirmed in 1958) to condemn Nazi racial policies, as well as the hierarchies of French colonialism. For the reformers, not only have the imperatives of that historical moment passed, but in its current phrasing the first article of the Constitution paradoxically legitimates the existence of racial divisions when modern science maintains the unity of humanity. As former president, the socialist François Hollande had put it when he campaigned on the issue in 2012, “there is no place in the Republic for race.”[2]

Not surprisingly, the editors had opposed the 2018 revision. Whereas some opponents have alleged that the search for “pure” antiracist first principles was a cynical form of evasion, others
agree with the cluster of outspoken demographers who point to the inability to fight discrimination when there is no basic information.\footnote{3} For the editors and contributors, the 2018 vote was yet another galvanizing sign pushing them to consider the Caribbean as a space inviting more full-fledged and scientific investigations where race cannot be sidelined. In this move, the editors call for conceptualizing their field outside of the reductive confines of a “methodological nationalism” in which a “methodological metropolitanism” defines the tools of investigation.\footnote{4}

As Audrey Célestine suggests in the excellent preface, the shift is not simply a geographic displacement. The goal is to import the methods developed in Caribbean studies to examine race and race relations in the Hexagon. But although the preface and introduction propose powerful connections between how one studies race and specific forms of antiracist politics, the arc of this important proposition is difficult to map through the chapters. While there is a consistent standpoint in these chapters from which we can chart the contours of alternative methods and questions, it may not be clear why they would become so charged in the French context. Because Anglophone readers well versed in the techniques of critical race studies are familiar with these approaches, we risk underappreciating the struggles that our Francophone colleagues face within the complex terrain of French republican antiracism. Ironically, our problem may not be the legibility of this new scholarship, but the opaqueness of what it challenges. Admittedly, outside the Francophone world, mainstream French republican antiracism is often more easily caricatured than understood. For these reasons, I begin with what international readers may have missed about the push in 2018 to reform the French constitution.\footnote{5}

Despite the suspicions fomented in the international press about the 12 July vote, during the 27 June discussions within the Commission to study this question, we see that the deputies advocating for the revision did not avoid the problem of racial discrimination.\footnote{6} They were, however, clearly more motivated to correct a perceived offence against constitutional principles than they were concerned with impediments to fighting racism. As if the presence of the word “race,” even in the context of opposing discrimination, had defiled the capacity of Constitution of the Fifth Republic to enshrine true values and to mold citizens accordingly, the imperative for reformers was to rectify this wrong. Indeed, their engagement with political philosophy and the aesthetics of constitution writing stood out as legislators sought to model the first article of the present constitution after to the first article of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen of 1789. In other words, as guardians of the polity, they considered their solemn duty to protect the universality of the document by affirming the indivisibility of humanity. If race-blind equality articulated this latter ideal, then the Constitution should not encourage citizens to “see” racial divisions. By deleting race from the document, citizens are thereby encouraged to lift themselves to higher horizons.

Significantly, some deputies (who also professed their abhorrence of the word) worried about the implications of their actions, concerned that excising the word might interfere with their capacity to ban hate speech, to outlaw discrimination, and other exclusionary practices. Advocates of the revision responded forcefully that a positive embrace of human indivisibility did not preclude the government from issuing negative sanctions on those who violated principles. In other words, advocates of the change situated the problem of racial discrimination and its redress within the universalist mandate that they were trying to strengthen. And, in this manner, they carried the vote inside the National Assembly, though many outside the chambers were not reassured.
While it is difficult to fault deputies for wishing to enact an idealized Hegelian vision of bureaucracy, this understanding of the state’s function holds important consequences that are rarely articulated. By locating the discovery and maintenance of the proper moral stance in state institutions, deputies implicitly exported responsibility for racism to individuals or groups of individuals in society who (consciously or unconsciously) cause the damage. Moreover, because legislators were willing to correct internal inconsistencies in the founding document, they demonstrated the capacity of the law and institutions to self-correct, to remain truly “neutral,” and thereby “innocent” of creating invidious distinctions. In so doing, they insulated the state (and themselves) from charges of systemic biases (which activists have increasingly called “le racisme d’état”).

At the core of this didactic project lies a highly delimited definition of the key term. As deputy after deputy declared on 27 June that “races do not exist,” they ironically harkened back to the mid-twentieth-century condemnation of the often-crude somatic characterizations of nineteenth-century and early twentieth-century physical anthropology and anthropometry (as was critiqued, for example, in the UNESCO Statement on Race [7]), even though proponents of the reform had cited their historical distance from 1946 to justify the need to update the Constitution. Yet, this return is not surprising. The seemingly unambiguous iniquity of the concept perpetrated by horrific state violence provided a reassuring foil for European and North American political and intellectual elites in the immediate years after the Second World War to establish the legitimacy of participatory government and universalist values.[8] Significantly, the notion that racism grows out of erroneous beliefs supports a state-centered, top-down, vision of antiracism. Through laws and policies, the state and its agencies instruct errant citizens on how to eliminate (their) racism.

It is, of course, this mid-twentieth-century constricted view of race and the sources of racism that the contributors to the present volume endeavor to complicate and de-center. In many respects, the teleological narrative of progress and regress that culminates ideally in the disappearance of race is easy to debunk. But in the complex triangulations of French republican antiracism, the contributors to this volume must position themselves carefully. Notably, while the editors (and the contributors) disagree with the specific arguments that led deputies to the 2018 vote, they do not discredit the universalist motivation behind the reform and concur with the need to assert the fundamental unity of humanity. Moreover, all parties agree on the necessity of legally prohibiting discrimination, and to negatively sanction hate speech along with other forms of exclusions. Still, despite these common values, the debate is asymmetrical. Politicians, journalists, and scholars in the republican mainstream frequently label those who study racial logics as “racists,” accusing them of reifying the category. While critical race scholars refuse to be disciplined or be pushed out of the antiracist camp, they must navigate the tight racist/nonracist binary imposed by the mainstream by circumventing the litmus test on who is the true antiracist.[9]

To avoid being trapped by false dichotomies, the contributors adopt a dual stance that simultaneously recognizes the moral and political illegitimacy of hierarchical racial logics and the social realities of racial reasoning and their multiple effects. This balancing act is captured by the word “fabrique” in the book’s title. While I have translated “la fabrique de la race” as “the construction of race,” following the conventional vocabulary of Anglophone critical race studies, I do not mean to suggest that the editors and contributors were primarily following academic trends established elsewhere. Rather, the notion of “fabrication” as in “manufacture” or
“production” does significant analytical and political work. It allows researchers to study empirically the social processes that create or materialize human differences without ceding to the position that only racists believe that race is real. While the constructivist stance is not new—having been a part of critical race studies since at least the publication of the influential volume “Race, Writing, and Difference” in 1985,[10] not only does the notion of fabrication remain salient, in the current context, it feels urgent.

Demonstrating the constructedness of race requires putting multiple examples before readers in one setting. The collection achieves this goal by explicating race-thinking at many historical conjunctures, within economic structures, power relations, political ideologies, institutions of knowledge making, and notions of self. Most importantly, they emphasize change over time. For example, Éric Roulet’s chapter, “‘Habitants,’ ‘Nègres’ et ‘Sauvages’: La naissance de la société coloniale des Petites Antilles françaises dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle” documents that, at the beginning of the century when the laboring population was primarily of European origins, the French called themselves “habitant” or “planter” in order to claim the land from the indigenous people whom they labeled “sauvage,” following Church authorities who had hoped for conversions. By the mid-century, however, as the economy increasingly relied on enslaved African labor, the category “Nègres” transformed the master/servant distinction into master/slave, white/Black hierarchies. Following the rise of plantation slavery, Elsa Dorlin’s chapter, “Naissance de la race: Médicine esclavagiste, clinique négrière et étiologie raciale (XVIIe-XIXe siècles),” argues that local Europeans understood their differences from Africans through the observations of European doctors and surgeons in charge of the viability of human cargo and the minimal survival of captured labor. Blatant economic calculations on the profitability of slavery and the slave trade drove the reports on the physical and emotional dispositions of Africans, as medical professionals weighed the susceptibility of captives to disease and their capacity to endure enslavement.

Reversing the typical understanding of how knowledge travels, Jean-Luc Bonniol’s chapter, “Nature, identité, hiérarchie: Genèse et destin de la pensée coloniale de la race,” discusses the transfer of colonial knowledge based on chattel slavery and plantation monoculture to European intellectuals and political elites, particularly to members of scientific communities in the early nineteenth century. He traces how the focus on visible distinctions and the naturalization of differences to justify social hierarchies in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries shaped the enduring elements of racist thought in the nineteenth century. In “Pour une généalogie des nouvelles sciences de la race et du racisme,” Matthieu Renault follows Bonniol’s synthesis into the twentieth and twenty-first centuries to discuss the rise of a new scientific discourse on human differences that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s, led by human genetics and medicine, after such projects were supposedly repudiated decades before. Renault thus specifically deflates any progressive expectation that race as a category for discussing human diversity would eventually disappear.

These chapters demonstrate why scholars need to revise received timelines and teleologies, as well as rupture old myths. Importantly, Arturo Morgado-García in his chapter, “Les réflexions sur l’esclavage noir-africain en Espagne à la fin du XVIIIe siècle,” counters the belief that slavery did not exist in Europe. By studying the Spaniards who joined the broader abolitionist discussions spreading across Europe, historians have discovered the presence of enslaved Africans in Spanish households. In my view, however, the main contribution of these chapters is
not necessarily a new developmental story of race-thinking in Europe and its settler and colonial extensions. Rather, they offer a crucial alternative approach.

The constructionist analysis of race examines racial differentiation as the result of social processes, as distinct from mainstream republicans who view racism primarily through the intent to harm. In this sense, the latter’s history of racism is a documentation of this motive and the injuries it causes over time. Of course, one approach does not replace the other. After all, it is crucial to identify purposeful discrimination and prejudice. And, certainly, there is no shortage of heinous hatred either historically or in the contemporary world. Yet, there are subtle differences, and they are important. A constructionist focus on documenting outcomes more readily engages patterns and experiences where there are no readily identifiable perpetrators and where the problems developed by omission or emerged as the unintended consequences of other processes—particularly when actors or institutions understand themselves to be neutral and fair, even when they explicitly fight for equality and justice.

For example, in “Entre négation, prétérition et racialisation de l’ordre politique,” Justin Daniel explains the difficulties of delineating how race structures the political order of Martinique. While notions of universality and citizenship pay homage to the rights of the Black majority, the same principles also hide the privileges of an economically and socially dominant white creole minority (the Béké) who rule without being visible in electoral politics. In other words, the legacies of plantation slavery remain palpable everywhere in Martinican society, but their continuing impact can only be referenced preteritively—that is, only talked about as what “should not” be discussed.

In “Le poète blanc et la Révolution décharnée: Invisibilisation de la race dans le champs littéraire cubain: les effets du matérialisme abstrait,” Amina Damerdji analyzes a surprising privileging of whiteness in Cuban literary culture as the product of Marxist-Leninist campaigns for equality and justice. Despite the initial embrace of a Black heterodox identity within revolutionary poetry, the supposed resolution of class and racial inequalities inherited from Cuba’s past created a disembodied institutional culture that paradoxically favored an eroticized white femininity as the metaphor of transcendence.

In another unexpected return to older racial tropes, in “Mise à l’agenda des réfugiés haïtiens et racialisation des répertoires d’action du pouvoir politique en Jamaïque,” Sébastien Nicolas examines the reactions of Jamaican newspapers responding to the influx of Haitian refugees in 2004 and 2005. While Jamaicans initially expressed solidarity with fellow Caribbeans from the first sovereign Black nation of the hemisphere, as this population grew, editorials and articles increasing reported on widespread fears of cholera and malaria that identified Haitians as carriers of disease. In fomenting a public health crisis, newspapers invoked race through contagion to imply that Haitians were not assimilable into Jamaican society.

These examples demonstrate clearly that a narrow focus on correcting intentional discrimination is not sufficient as a formula for ending racism (assuming, of course, that state bureaucracies possessed the data to chart the problem) because the scope of the problem is much wider. Admittedly, addressing racial differentiation through these broad discursive fields (where race is not named directly) is inconvenient. It proliferates the sites of contention and requires a wider and different range of ameliorative policies. Equally troubling is our inability to know in advance where or when problems will surface. One solution may be more powerful theories that anticipate
a greater range of phenomena, but a more manageable (and less daunting) alternative lies in empirical investigations that capture the varied manifestations of racial divides, injuries, identities, and paradoxes.

By bracketing a reliance on expert predictions, however, scholars must turn to how affected populations articulate their concerns. Similarly, governmental agencies must trust in people’s experiences and testimonies to guide policies. In this important sense, a constructionist understanding of race helps popular political movements formulate concrete agendas that give specificity to general commitments to racial equality.[11] But here, we arrive at the most baffling aspects of contemporary racial discourse and race-relations. Many mainstream republican antiracists simply do not hear the voices of self-organized racialized minorities because of the unique way that race has become a proxy for relitigating (if only rhetorically) conflicts over how French republicanism conceptualizes political community.

When deputies during the 27 June discussion asserted that “races do not exist,” they championed the indivisibility of humanity as an occasion to underscore their belief in the unity of the people. This vision of sovereign power (originating in the declaration of nationhood in 1789 against a hierarchical monarchy segmented by privileged estates) has long buttressed the legitimacy of representative government. But as historian and philosopher Pierre Rosanvallon has argued, this justification of political power turns “the people” into an authorizing abstraction, whose “collective will” could be represented by an elected governing elite but who, as an undifferentiated entity, is not able to act for itself.[12]

For advocates of representative democracy, like Rosanvallon, citizens and residents must create deliberative institutions and demand accountability such that “the people” in their sociological heterogeneity can operate effectively as constituencies to advance their own agendas and enact themselves as sovereign. But when pluralists suggest procedural or discursive methods for cultivating more open-ended visions of the collective, republican formalists, fearing a fragmentation of sovereignty and a corresponding loss of legitimacy, insist on the inherent indivisibility of the people.[13] Significantly, they turn to the dystopic history of racism to bolster their argument that pluralism constitutes the first step towards the horrific consequences of racial divided societies. Notably, as formalists, they assume that prohibiting the category would redress the injustice that racism produces. Further, by viewing racial identification as a threat to republican unity, they stigmatize how racial minorities within France and majorities in the Francophone Caribbean come to self-understanding and political consciousness.[14]

As might be expected, however, those seeking to excise the word “race” frequently overestimate its power on the self-conception of the people affected. They assume that racializing discourses are totalizing forces to which targeted populations either must surrender or heroically deny. Countering this crimped notion of identity by highlighting the processes of “fabrication,” Carlo Célius’s chapter on nineteenth-century Haitian portraiture examines the public face of self-fashioning. “Race, art et esthétique: Haïti, XIXe siècle” studies how Haitian elites co-opted the aesthetic judgments of early nineteenth-century racial theorists like Julien-Joseph Virey for their own use. To present themselves with dignity in the world, these leaders commissioned portraits of themselves with the physiognomic signs of beauty and intelligence from classical antiquity that Europeans claimed for themselves, only with darker skin.
Exploring the intimate side of public personae, Tina Harpin, in “Repenser l’identité au-délà de la ‘race’: Des insolentes autobiographies de Maryse Condé à l’énigmatique J.M. Coetzee,” examines Condé’s narration of her life as a dynamic process of situating herself in relation to family, place, and travel. Like the South African white writer J.M. Coetzee, the Guadeloupean novelist rejects race as the primary locus of identity, but history and phenotype remain inextricable, if ever-changing elements as the author navigates obstacles, sheds old habits, and imagines new horizons. As writers, both Condé and Coetzee must communicate their specificities in ways that readers across the globe can appreciate. The constructions of identity in autobiographical writing thus produce a universality that is accessed through particulars. In this sense, Harpin’s chapter more broadly describes how people survive and thrive in a world where race matters.

In profound and expansive ways, the chapters in the volume exemplify the methodological underpinnings of an alternative, more democratically based antiracist politics. As we have seen, overly simplified definitions of race and the sources of racism facilitate a bounded notion on the state’s obligation to act (lackluster enforcement and a refusal to collect relevant data notwithstanding). At the same time, politicians and public intellectuals raise the stakes by debating race (and thereby diverting pragmatic solutions) through foundational questions of sovereignty, political representation, and national identity. Undoubtedly the 2018 decision exposed yet again the difficulties and frustrations of studying race in contemporary France. Though the arguments put forward were not new, they reinforced tendencies against which the volume’s contributors have long struggled. However, situating these methodological and interpretative perspectives on how to study race in the context of a debate over constitutional reform clarifies the scale of political investment. Interpreting these essays through this prism attest to the volume’s achievement, as well as to the fortitude of the contributors. Their goals are not easily attained. Collectively, the contributors must work around the rigid binaries imposed by mainstream republican antiracism, attenuate their assumptions (but agree with many stated goals) and, finally, devise other ways to measure and interpret phenomena. In their commitment to shifting the political discourse which rests importantly on epistemological interventions, it is good for us to know that they possess the scholarly acumen to accomplish the task.

LIST OF ESSAYS

Audrey Célestine, “Préface: La race dans la Caraïbe”


Part One, Les Divers champs de la racialisation

Elsa Dorlin, “Naissance de la race: Médicine esclavagiste, clinique négrière et étiologie raciale (XVIIe-XIXe siècles)”

Carlo Célius, “Race, art et esthétique”

Sébastien Nicolas, “Mise à l’agenda des réfugiés haïtiens et racialisation des répertoires d’action du pouvoir politique en Jamaïque”
Éric Roulet, “‘Habitants,’ ‘Nègres’ et ‘Sauvages’: La naissance de la société coloniale des Petites Antilles françaises dans la première moitié du XVIIe siècle”

Tina Harpin, “Repenser l’identité au-dela de la ‘race’: Des insolentes autobiographies de Maryse Condé à l’énigmatique J.M. Coetzee”

Part Two, Race et tabous

Justin Daniel, “Entre négation, prétérition et racialisation de l’ordre politique”

Amina Damerdji, “Le poète blanc et la Révolution décharnée: Invisibilisation de la race dans le champs littéraire cubain: les effets du matérialisme abstrait”

Arturo Morgado-García, “Les réflexions sur l’esclavage noir-africain en Espagne à la fin du XVIIIe siècle”

Jean-Luc Bonniol, “Nature, identité, hiérarchie: Genèse et destin de la pensée coloniale de la race”

Matthieu Renault, “Pour une généalogie des nouvelles sciences de la race et du racisme”

NOTES

[1] The new phrasing for Article One dropped “race” but substituted “gender” to read “shall ensure the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction of gender, origin, or religion….” Though lauded by many feminists for elevating gender equality, proponents of the new language did not explain why the injunction against sex discrimination does not repeat the earlier problem created by reference to race. If our received racial classifications distort the actual range and nuances of human diversity while de-emphasizing the underlying similarities, surely a binary gender system similarly imposes a false dichotomy onto a biological continuum. Yet in the 27 June 27 discussions, deputies uniformly asserted the “realness” of gender in contrast to “nonexistence of race.” Idris Fassassi, “Removing ‘Race’ and Adding ‘Gender’ to the French Constitution: On Constitutional Redundancy and Symbols,” ConstitutionNet (24 August 2018), https://constitutionnet.org/news/removing-race-and-adding-gender-french-constitution-constitutional-redundancy-and-symbols.

[2] “Présidentielle: Hollande veut supprimer le mot "race" de la Constitution,” Le Point (10 March 2012), https://www.lepoint.fr/presidentielle/hollande-supprimera-la-mention-de-race-dans-la-constitution-10-03-2012-1439981_3121.php. Although the 2018 reform was introduced during Macron’s presidency, the original initiative was Socialist with broad support from other left coalitions, as well as from the center right. In this review, I call this broad collection the “republican antiracist mainstream.” (See also note 5.)


[13] Critics of this view of universality point out that, in practice, it normalizes whiteness.

[14] For an excellent overview of the liberal and republican turns in French political culture since the 1970s, see Emile Chabal, *A Divided Republic: Nation, State, and Citizenship in Contemporary*

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