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Emmelyn Butterfield-Rosen, *Modern Art & the Remaking of Human Disposition*. University of Chicago Press, 2021. 341 pages. Colour plates, halftones, notes, and index. \$55.00 U.S. (cl). ISBN 9780226745046; \$54.99 U.S. (pdf & eb). ISBN 9780226745183.

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The historian George Mosse observed that the “rediscovery of the human body” became a preoccupation of European society during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[1] Recent scholarship in art history has increasingly explored corporeality as a feature of modernism. Most of this research, however, has focused its study within the framework of physiology, including anatomy, pathology, neurology, and hygiene. Emmelyn Butterfield-Rosen’s new book, *Modern Art & the Remaking of Human Disposition*, which was based on her dissertation, aims at something different.[2] Through a close analysis of figural representations in European art, primarily painting (George Seurat and Gustav Klimt) and dance (Vaslav Nijinsky), seen through period eyes, she convincingly argues that body language changed during this era in order to convey new biological (Darwinian) and psychological (Freudian) conceptions of human behavior. “Man,” as the experimental psychologist Wilhelm Wundt opined, “really thinks very little and very seldom” (p. 11).

What is unusual about Butterfield-Rosen’s study is that this condition (instinct and drive over intellect) is located exclusively in figural poses and facial expressions rather than the imagery of man in nature, as in so much Darwin-inspired art. Fundamental to her thesis is the conviction, stated in the introduction, that “pose or posture is a privileged locus for apprehending correspondences of concrete form and abstract content” (p. 5). Signaling this premise, she has chosen the word “disposition” for the title, derived from both classical rhetoric and Michel Foucault’s term *dispositif*. Accordingly, the “disposition of bodily poses...were a primary formal mechanism through which artists visualized...different ‘types of knowledge’ about the inner constitution of the subject” (p. 5).[3] These new figural “dispositions” included frontal and profile views from which oblique torsions were eliminated, stiffness and uniformity of gesture, the de-articulation of hands and feet, blank facial expressions, flattened forms, and ambiguous figure-ground spatial relationships. These characteristics are presented by the author as a strategic rejection of academic practices, originating in classical Greek sculpture and continued in the Renaissance, where turns of heads and *contrapposto* were introduced to convey human identity summarized by John Locke as “a thinking intelligent being, that has reason and reflection, and can consider itself as itself” (p. 11) or, as Leon Battista Alberti remarked, to picture “the movements of the soul” (p. 6).

The author stresses that the changes in modern figural presentations constituted an inverse of the original development from archaic to classical art. While it is well known that Seurat, Klimt, and Nijinsky (in his *L'Après-midi d'un faune*) were engaged with “primitive” aesthetics (Egyptian, Assyrian, and archaic Greek), Butterfield-Rosen delves into the understudied impact of research such as Julius Lange’s *The Representation of the Human Figure in Its Earliest Period until the Apogee of Greek Art* (1892) in chapter one and Emanuel Löwy’s psychological interpretation of archaic form, *The Rendering of Nature in Earlier Greek Art* (1900) in chapter three. Indeed, one of the most laudable aspects of this book—in addition to the rigorous logic with which arguments are developed and the layers of meanings uncovered—is the degree to which the author’s interpretations are generated by contemporary opinions, whether verbal or pictorial (often in caricatures).

Gesture, or its rejection in favor of a paradigm of pose, is central to the argument of *Modern Art*, and involves etymological investigations that are one of the author’s chief methodological tools, paired with formal exegesis. She notes that her book is indebted to Aby Warburg’s concept *Pathosformel* (first articulated in a lecture Warburg delivered in 1905) documenting the continuity of expressive forms, which serves as a counterpoint to her thesis and also reflects the period’s anxiety over the efficacy of inherited gestures and postures (Manet’s *Le Dejeuner sur l’Herbe* [1863] serves as a terminus point).^[4] Exemplifying the book’s approach, the author explains that gesture, associated with prehension and evolutionary advancement, derives from the Latin *gerere*, meaning “to carry,” and is localized in the upper body and forelimbs, while pose involves the entire physical self and is “a lower-order, more primary phenomenon,” and therefore more appropriate for the new conceptions of man/woman (p. 21). Butterfield-Rosen convincingly argues that the gesture of gripping fingers—as in the sculpture *Demosthenes* by Polyuktos (280 BCE), Auguste Rodin’s *Penseur* (1880s), or Max Klinger’s *Beethoven Monument* (1902)—pictures ponderous thought, based on the visual and etymological origin for the concept of *katalepsis* (“mental comprehension,” from the Greek “to grasp”) as practiced by Stoic philosophers. The opposite (an absence of conscious reflection) is conveyed by the “mitten hands” of figures in Seurat’s *La Grande Jatte* and Nijinsky’s choreographed *Faune*, while Klimt’s *Choir of Angels* display open palms with fingers that outline a circular void.

Objections should be raised at this point in consideration of the flourishing of gestural movement at this time in German and Viennese Expressionism whose artists were also engaged with Darwinian and Freudian theories.^[5] Indeed, a broader criticism of *Modern Art* is the degree to which alternative models to the central thesis are not presented, even for the purpose of critiquing them (as will be discussed further). In this case, Butterfield-Rosen mentions in an endnote that, given the “newly pathological status of gesture in contemporary culture as expressive body movements increasingly became linked to the human being’s animal genealogy or to neuroses, such as hysteria,” “the dynamics of gesture can be described in terms of a loss of middle ground” (p. 255, n. 54). This statement—that gestures were either exaggerated or suppressed—is significant and should have been included in the central body of the text.

Butterfield-Rosen develops her material in three rigorously detailed case studies (the endnotes number nearly seventy pages), which are structured around pairs of works in which the artists grappled with the formation of the “new paradigms of pose and a new epistemology of the subject” (p. 9): Seurat’s *Un Dimanche à La Grande Jatte* (1884–1886) and *Poseuses* (1884–1886), Klimt’s *Philosophie* (1900) and the *Beethovenfries* (1902), and Nijinsky’s *Faune* (1912) and *Spectre de la rose* (1911). Rodin also makes an appearance in each chapter, where his sculptures serve as a foil to

more innovative models but in works that do test the limits of traditional corporeal expression. The chapters expand chronologically and “episodically,” from themes of daily life to mythology and with increasing complexity culminating, as the author asserts, in Nijinsky’s choreography that represents “the mind itself as structure” interpreted comparatively through principles of psychoanalysis (p. 9).

The crux of Butterfield-Rosen’s book is that these new figural dispositions became “commonplace” and that the art studied here, while “exceptional,” is relevant to numerous other works in various mediums and different movements (pp. 1, 7). Klimt’s mural paintings, for example, are discussed as representative of Art Nouveau design. Other examples she mentions include Ferdinand Hodler, Pablo Picasso, Paul Gauguin, and Oskar Schlemmer, but without further elaboration (p. 7). However, it is the opinion of this reader that such a broad assertion can not be fully supported, in view of artists who presented figures in this new manner but were not especially engaged with Darwin and the unconscious (such as Schlemmer) or with those who were impacted by Darwin and/or Freud but retained traditional figuration (Alfred Kubin, Max Klinger, Ferdinand Khnopff, and the Expressionists, to name only a few).

Chapter one begins with an analysis of the figures in Seurat’s *La Grande Jatte* which establish a prototype for the formal innovations that are developed throughout the book. Butterfield-Rosen convincingly argues that the distinguishing features that provoked the ire of so many viewers—stiff repetitive forms in profile and frontal views, blank faces, and the absence of visible hands and feet—were crafted to reject academic practices and depict the inner nature of man, in the words of critic Joris-Karl Huysmans, as “void; no soul, no thought, nothing” (p. 43).

Inspiration for the painter’s revolt is traced to within the Academy itself, where anatomy lectures were delivered by Mathias Duval, a proponent of evolutionary theory and physiological psychology, who taught that gestures and facial expressions were “automatic and instinctive” in the wake of Darwin’s *Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals* (1872).

Butterfield-Rosen expands on familiar scholarly ground in contextualizing Seurat’s innovations of pose within discourses of primitive art, fashion mannequins, and tin soldiers. She is able to relate Seurat’s display of figures to the unconscious through the analysis of the social psychologist, Gabriel Tarde.^[6] Based on his study of the nervous system and human brain operating through unconscious and involuntarily mimicry, Tarde defined society as groups of individuals who imitate each other, which he regarded as a form of somnambulism and, in its purest manifestation, hypnotism. The inclusion of the monkey reinforces this notion of mindless imitation and, in conjunction with the woman holding her simian pet, also signals Darwinian matters of animality (at a time when the bustle was compared to a tail), sexual selection (ornamental displays and modern fashion), and mating rituals (her male companion) (pp. 62, 66).^[7]

The chapter next turns to *Poseuses*, set in the artist’s studio, where Butterfield-Rosen’s interpretation makes a significant contribution to understanding a painting that has been less frequently studied.^[8] Her point of departure is the comment by Gustave Kahn that, in the wake of the criticism directed at *La Grande Jatte*, Seurat embarked on a “fraught reexamination” of the painting, which is partially visible in *Poseuses* (p. 21). It is Butterfield-Rosen’s contention, based on an observation by Henry van de Velde in 1891, that Seurat reintroduced some academic figural norms—a tilted head, delicate facial features, shifted weight, more articulated hands and

interlaced fingers—to indicate a state of thoughtful contemplation (p. 73). Seurat also returned to traditional practices of deriving poses from classical sculptures. Butterfield-Rosen impressively and unexpectedly links the central figure in *Poseuses* with her clasped hands and serious expression to the Hellenistic statue of the Athenian orator *Demosthenes*, two copies of which were displayed in the Academy. According to contemporary scholarship, the statue famously projected inward life and what Adolf Michaelis in 1882 characterized as “the exertion of thought and the energy of will” (p. 82). So too, critics found similar qualities in the central figure of *Poseuses*: she is “alert” and “ready to will,” according to Paul Adam (p. 86).

Seurat’s painting, therefore, contrasts “primitive” (in *La Grande Jatte*) and “classical” postures, but not for the purpose of a return to convention. It is Butterfield-Rosen’s singular insight that Seurat’s staged presentation of the three models was done ironically as a travesty of depictions of deep thought, which also called attention to the formulaic nature of inherited academic poses. The conclusion is reached, following a review of the literature on the modelling profession, that the “pretense of contemplation” is undercut by the identity of the modern model (untrained in academic poses) with her discarded “department store” clothing, the ambiguous quality of her facial expression, and the inclusion of the “bag” hanging on the wall, which Butterfield-Rosen has now identified as a bustle’s “false ass” padding (pp. 69, 91). The impression of rational cogitation is also subverted by suggestions that the figure’s glazed expression resembles a hypnotic state, evidently not unusual at the time during posing sessions. For Butterfield-Rosen, conscious and unconscious thought “coexist in tension” within the central figure in *Poseuses* (p. 98).

This chapter relies predominantly on evidence from period art critics and historians, rather than analyses of books on science and experimental psychology. It would have been useful to mention earlier relevant publications, such as Alfred Maury’s *Le Sommeil et les rêves: études psychologiques sur ces phénomènes* (1861), discussed extensively by Nancy Locke in *Manet and the Family Romance*, and to previous art, such as Cezanne’s paintings from the 1860s.[9] These portray, according to André Dombrowski, animalized human behavior “in which subjects do not think and consciously act, but follow what their physical apparatus dictates.”[10] Cezanne’s figural postures provide an alternative formal strategy of resistance to academic norms which still retain foreshortening and expressive gestures.

The subject of chapter two is the Vienna Secession exhibition of spring 1902 featuring Klinger’s polychromed marble sculpture *Beethoven* and Klimt’s four murals, the *Beethovenfries* (*Longing for Happiness, Hostile Forces, Ode to Joy, and Choir of Paradise*). These paintings construct a narrative that traces the emotional arc of the composer’s Ninth Symphony. The central argument in this chapter is the disjunction between the sculpture, representing “preexisting corporeal conventions for expressing the inner activities of the intellect...a clenched hand, a heavy head [thought-filled], and a seated posture” (p. 110) and Klimt’s hieratic and levitating ornamental female figures that reflect new conceptions of nonconscious states and evolutionary principles of animal descent and sexuality. In Austria, these transformations were heralded by the prominent Viennese cultural critic Hermann Bahr, cited frequently in this chapter, in his essay “The New Psychology” in his book *The Overcoming of Naturalism* (1890). Bahr, it should be noted, was equally enthusiastic about the art of both Klinger and Klimt. In Butterfield-Rosen’s terminology, metaphors of grasp and gravity oppose the “unfilled” (outlined and flat) and “ungrounded” (buoyant) figures in the *Beethovenfries* (p. 145).

Rodin, through his sculpture *Penseur* (begun in the early 1880s), is enlisted to serve as a kindred spirit of Klinger's who worked in an inherited classical tradition of expressive poses to convey "the pride of being man," but one whose art was more innovative, according to the author, in part because he depicted the effort of thinking as engaging the entire body, which "could appear to be a parody of the dignity of intellectual activity" (p. 116).^[11] Rodin's subsequent sculpture, the *Monument to Balzac* (1891-1898), is interpreted as a turn to the "new psychology" in which the genitals (he is believed to be masturbating under his coat) are the primary focus and the standing body is leaning backwards where, in the words of the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, "all heaviness had become light" (p. 122).

While Butterfield-Rosen convincingly contrasts the corporeal language and implied psychological meaning between Klinger's *Beethoven*, Klimt's murals, and Rodin's sculptures, this chapter reveals the dangers of teleological and binary frameworks, where earlier methods are deemed anachronistic in the face of progressive changes. In chapters one and three, these pitfalls are avoided, but here distinctions become value judgements as Butterfield-Rosen denigrates Klinger's *Beethoven*, using adjectives such as "hulking," (p. 118) "commonplace," (p. 124) "conventional," (p. 141), and possessed of "hyperbolic earnestness" (p. 118). While citing Rodin's "withering" comments about Klinger's sculpture, she neglects to mention that they were friends, and that Klinger assisted in organizing a major Rodin exhibition in Germany in 1904. Indeed, other sculptures by Klinger, such as *The Athlete*, are closer to Rodin's, as noted in Klinger scholarship that is not cited here.^[12] Later in the chapter she makes the risible claim that the Beethoven sculpture has been "largely forgotten" (p. 164).^[13]

Significantly, Butterfield-Rosen does not take into account that Beethoven's pose was partly designed to visualize suffering as conceived by Arthur Schopenhauer, who was Klinger's favorite philosopher. According to Schopenhauer, suffering was the composer's plight because music gave expression to the inner nature of the world—a bondage to human drives.^[14] Music, for him, was a "copy of the Will," a term related to the unconscious, which was a blind irrational force opposed to the intellect that secretly determined human behavior. Indeed, it is more than surprising that Butterfield-Rosen does not reference Schopenhauer at all in her book, since he was one of the first to formulate concepts that laid the foundation for the "new psychology" at the end of the century. Beethoven's agony is also symbolized by the inclusion of an eagle, referring to Prometheus (whom the author does mention), as well as Zeus. Additionally, all of Klinger's early graphic art (1870s and 1880s) was conceived to subvert human arrogance in the face of evidence about the unconscious and Darwin. In some of his etchings, figures are even "unfilled" and "ungrounded."^[15]

Butterfield-Rosen's analysis of Klimt's murals is impressive and original. She discusses these paintings as an expansion of formal innovations introduced in his evolutionary-themed mural *Philosophie* (1900), commissioned and later rejected by the University of Vienna. In that work, set in outer space, intertwined figures inspired by Rodin's *Gates of Hell* are offset by two frontal floating female heads, one personifying "knowledge" and the other, resembling a sphinx, titled "the riddle of the universe." Butterfield-Rosen claims that they "float because liberated from thought," on the evidence of outraged critics who labeled them "empty-headed" (p. 132) and "robbed of consciousness" due to an atmosphere (blueish green) resembling ether mixed with chloroform (p. 134). She does not consider the fact that Darwinist Ernst Haeckel's 1890 book on monism was titled *The Riddle of the Universe* or that Klimt's spatial setting recalls Ernst Haeckel's cosmological vision of "vibrating ether atoms" in "immeasurable depths of space."^[16]

These female heads became the prototype for the “hollow, light, and buoyant” women pictured in repetitive alignment in the murals *Choir of Paradise Angels* and *Longing for Happiness* (p. 135). Butterfield-Rosen provides intellectual context for Klimt’s embrace of human levitation and weightlessness in the later philosophy (especially *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*) of Nietzsche, who declared himself an “enemy of the spirit of gravity” and associated elevation with clarity of thought in his quest to “translate man back into nature” (pp. 127, 128).^[17] The hands of the angels (palm open with thumb and finger forming a circle) are innovatively related to the *vitarka murda* gesture of Buddha, concepts of nirvana as “absolute nothingness,” and the popularity of “Buddhist Modernism,” regrounded in Western psychological science and discussed by Klimt’s friend Bahr and Lafcadio Hearn in his book *Gleanings in Buddha-Fields: Studies of the Hand and Soul in the Far East* (1897) (pp. 142-144).

The outlined floating women in *Longing for Happiness* form a frieze-like chain of horizontal figures at the top of the wall which evoke sensations of flying and swimming. In this vein, one critic, Edward Pötzl, described them as an “Assyrian swimming school” (p. 147). Butterfield-Rosen contextualizes this effect in contemporary theories of ascensionism, oneiric experiences of fears of gravity, and memories of floating in water discussed by Viennese physiologist Siegmund Exner and American psychologist Stanley Hall, who associate these sensations with “atavistic experience at the level of both phylogeny and ontogeny” (p. 147). In other words, origins of the human species (water) and individual life (amniotic fluid). It is surprising that the author does not mention Klimt’s painting *Hope I* (1903), which pictures a naked pregnant woman within an oceanic setting of prehistoric sea creatures.

In the remaining murals, *Hostile Forces* and *Ode to Joy*, there is a stylistic shift to greater ornamentation which Butterfield-Rosen relates to Darwinian sexual selection. The jewel-like decorative patterns of *Hostile Forces*, depicting a gorilla as the mythological Typhon with female personifications of Lust, Unchastity, and Excess, have been previously traced to biological and microscopic forms of cells and tissues, especially those associated with human sexuality, by art historian Emily Braun, who is cited, and other Klimt scholars. Butterfield-Rosen, referencing writings by Alois Riegl and Darwinist Wilhelm Bösch, focuses on the creation of ornament as an elementary drive and aesthetics/beauty as a functional tool for attracting mates in the animal kingdom. Specifically, she analyzes Klimt’s inclusion of peacock plumage and ocellia (eyespot) of the argus pheasant, central to Darwin’s theory of sexual selection. These have also been discussed extensively by scholars on Darwin and visual culture.^[18] Here, however, a Viennese context is provided, where the peacock is mentioned by art critic Ludwig Hevesi and related to imagery associated with the Secession; plumage evokes Klimt’s imagery of flight; and the mural was labeled “*psychopathia pictoria*” in reference to psychiatrist Richard von Krafft-Ebing’s book and his observation that “sexual feeling” awakens “aesthetic sentiments” (p. 155).

Ode to Joy, the concluding mural, depicts the back of a couple in a passionate embrace surrounded by opulent gilded ornamentation and the angels from *Choir of Paradise*. Butterfield-Rosen’s most original contribution is to convincingly reinterpret the gold circles with schematic faces, previously regarded as a sun and moon, as stylized New World monkey faces. In tandem with the “comet tail” shapes, now identified as sperm, Butterfield-Rosen contextualizes these dual references to astronomy and human reproductive biology within Bölsche’s book *Love Life in Nature* (1898-1901), which portrays egg-*semen* fertilization as an “event occurring in the solar system” (p. 160). It might have been mentioned that this derives from Haeckel’s belief in a monist universe uniting a “star world” and a “cell world.”^[19] She concludes that this “cosmic vision of

impregnation” vividly demonstrates the sexual implications of the frieze’s “overarching repudiation of a ‘spirit of gravity’” (p. 160).

The final chapter, centered on Nijinsky’s ballet *Faune*, presents a penetrating analysis of the choreography and performance as “closely aligned” with Freud’s theories of the unconscious (p. 167). First performed on May 29, 1912 in Paris, *Faune* was described as a “choreographic picture,” less a ballet in the traditional classical sense than a series of static poses, like *tableau vivants*, activated by stiff movements of dancers combining frontal (torso) and profile (head and feet) postures and expressionless faces (p. 171). Nijinsky instructed them to look “asleep with your eyes open,” a description that could also be applied to Seurat’s figures (p. 166). Visual images were ascendent over the music (many viewers noted that the orchestra seemed to accompany the dancers, rather than figures dancing to the music), parallel with Freud’s assertion that dreams are seen and not heard. This observation typifies Butterfield-Rosen’s interpretation, which is formulated by paying close attention to the perceptive comments of critics and to Nijinsky’s diary. While it is beyond the scope of this review to recount all of the nuanced details, her contention is that the atypical nature of the ballet revealed a “theory of mind” and “functioning of the human psyche” similar to Freud’s (pp. 169, 170). Central to this was the revelation of desires in dreams, a regressive pre-conscious state traced back to infantile sexuality and primitive thought processes. Unlike the poem by Stephan Mallarmé which was the impetus for the ballet, the dance stages only the faun’s dream.

Based on the description of the ballet by the critic Charles Méryal as a “cinematography of bas-relief” (p. 216), Butterfield-Rosen compellingly proves that Nijinsky combined two of Freud’s chief metaphors: ancient archaeology (in the form of poses resembling those on sixth-century BCE relief sculptures) and a “modern mechanical apparatus” that activates the dream process (Freud described a “primitive psychical apparatus” similar to a camera or microscope) (p. 178). In Nijinsky’s case, the jerky movements, as well as the dissonance with Debussy’s music, recalled early forms of cinema from the 1880s, considered primitive by 1912. As Butterfield-Rosen explains, “If archaic bas-relief serves as the formal structure through which the ballet materialized the impulses ascribed to infantile sexuality, cinematography serves as the means of expressing...the dynamic function of infantile sexuality,” which is the “driving force” of dreams and the human psyche—and in the ballet, the source of movement (p. 235). Those “impulses” of infantile sexuality are the subject of much discussion in the chapter. They include exhibitionism, enhanced by the archaic poses that allow the full exposure of the male body, autoeroticism (the faun’s action which concludes the ballet), repetition (the ten-minute ballet was performed twice, and it opens and closes with nearly identical reclining bodies), and fixation and arrested development (steps were taken by Nijinsky to ensure that the dance would always be “identical to itself”) (p. 235).

Buttressing these associations with infantile sexuality is the identity of the faun as a “juvenile animal” (rather than hybrid), referred to by critics as a “*petite faune*,” which, as Butterfield-Rosen notes, unmask the homophony between faun (*faune*), the mythological god, and fawn (*faon*), the baby deer. Both derive from the Latin *foetus* (p. 187). Nijinsky took steps to make his character appear young, casting taller female dancers as the nymphs. The final insight of Butterfield-Rosen’s analysis is the claim that *Faune* implicates the audience in the “psychic process” occurring on stage through its assumed desire, like children, to see the experience repeated. The only additions to this excellent chapter might have been a contextualization of the dance with other styles that also rejected classical forms, such as free movement practiced by, among others, Grete

Wiesenthal, and the popularity of pantomime, about which Harry Graf Kessler, who had been involved with soliciting Rodin's recommendation for *Faune*, had written an essay.

This book is to be commended for its brilliant hermeneutic exploration of the human body in a selected group of art works and texts. Within these parameters, there is little left to be discovered. Readers, however, might be interested in having additional insight on the implications of this study for portraiture, for gender identity, and for art which offers different models for portraying the biological and psychological self.

NOTES

[1] George L. Mosse, *Nationalism and Sexuality: Middle-Class Morality and Sexual Norms in Modern Europe* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1985), pp. 48-65.

[2] Her dissertation, "The Disposition of Persons: Conventions of Pose and the Modernization of Figural Art, 1886-1912," was completed at Princeton University in 2015.

[3] As Butterfield-Rosen acknowledges, the studies by Mark Johnson were formative in shaping her conceptions about "the bodily basis of metaphors for consciousness" (p. 265).

[4] Warburg's *Pathosformel* (pathos formula) is a concept that refers to body poses and gestures in art used to convey particular heightened emotions. According to Warburg, these postures originated in Greco-Roman antiquity and were repeated, beginning with the Renaissance, throughout Western art history. Butterfield-Rosen notes that Warburg's ideas appeared at a time when this tradition was dying out in European art (which supports her own thesis) and that Warburg's interest in it evidenced anxiety over its threatened existence.

[5] Studies of the body, gesture, and Viennese Expressionism include Alys X. George, *The Naked Truth: Viennese Modernism and the Body* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2020), Nathan J. Timpano, *Constructing the Viennese Modern Body: Art, Hysteria, and the Puppet* (London and New York: Routledge, 2017) and publications by Gemma Blackstone, such as "The Pathological Body: Modernist Strategising in Egon Schiele's Self-Portraiture," *Oxford Art Journal*, 30/3 (2007): 377-401.

[6] Butterfield-Rosen notes that Gabriel Tarde published a paper in 1884 titled "Qu'est-ce qu'une société?" which was reprinted in his book, *Les Lois de l'imitation: étude sociologique* (Paris: Félix Alcan, 1890). She also cites Johnathan Crary for his discussion of Tarde's influence on Seurat. See Jonathan Crary, *Suspensions of Perception: Attention, Spectacle, and Modern Culture* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 240-244.

[7] This material is based on her article, "Mannequin and Monkey in Seurat's *Grand Jatte* (1884)," in Justine de Young, ed., *Fashion in European Art: Dress and Identity, Politics and the Body, 1775-1925* (London: Bloomsbury, 2019), pp. 150-177.

[8] Different interpretations focusing respectively on gender and Wagnerian idealism were presented by Linda Nochlin, "Body Politics: Seurat's Poseuses," *Art in America*, 82/3 (1994): 71-79 and Paul Smith (whom she does not cite) *Seurat and the Avant-garde* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1997), pp. 11-116.

[9] Nancy Locke, see *Manet and the Family Romance* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2003), pp. 23-31.

[10] André Dombrowski, *Cézanne, Murder, and Modern Life* (Berkeley CA: University of California Press, 2012), p. 43.

[11] As evidence, she cites comments (Max Nordau) and caricatures alluding to constipation as the cause of the seated physical exertions (p. 119). Klinger's work, however, is branded as a cliché rather than parody, despite similar satirical drawings (bottles of laxatives) that are illustrated in the book.

[12] See Conny Dietrich and Ina Gayk, eds., *Max Klinger: Auf der Suche nach dem neuen Menschen* (Leipzig: E.A. Seemann Verlag, 2007); Claude Keisch, "Rodin im Wilhelminischen Deutschland Seine Anhänger und Gegner in Leipzig und Berlin," *Forschungen und Berichte*, 29 (1990): 251-301; and Thomas Strobel, "Beethoven - das Kunstwerk der Zukunft im Geiste Richard Wagner," in Pavla Langer, *Max Klinger: Wege zur Neubewertung* (Leipzig: Plöttner Verlag, 2008), pp. 236-150.

[13] Butterfield-Rosen's source is music historian Anna Harwell Celenza's statement that *all* of Klinger's work "is largely forgotten today" (See "Darwinian Visions: Beethoven Reception in Mahler's Vienna," *Musical Quarterly*, 93/3-4 [2010], p. 535). This is remarkably ill-informed, considering that in 2007 there were numerous exhibitions in Germany on the occasion of the 150th anniversary of his birth. In 2010, Klinger was featured in the exhibition, *The Darker Side of Life: The Arts of Privacy 1850-1900* (ed. Peter Parshall) at the National Gallery of Art in Washington. D.C. Celenza's article was obviously appealing to Butterfield-Rosen because it framed the Viennese Beethoven exhibition as a contrast between the "intellectual" and "instinctual" (p. 535).

[14] Arthur Schopenhauer, *The World as Will and Representation*, Vol. 1, trans. E.F.J. Payne (1818; New York: Dover, 1969), p. 267.

[15] Butterfield-Rosen mentions this in an endnote (p. 236, n. 35) and adds that her interpretation "will seem to contradict" the argument in *Max Klinger and Wilhelmine Culture: On the Threshold of German Modernism* (Farnham: Ashgate, 2014) by the author of this review. I agree with Butterfield-Rosen that Beethoven does not continue many of the earlier directions in Klinger's prints, but they do need to be noted in the body of the text. Etchings such as *Spring Awakening* and the *Title page of Etched Sketches* (both 1881) depict women in outline who are freed from gravity.

[16] Ernst Haeckel, *Natürliche Schöpfungsgeschichte*, 3rd ed. (Berlin: Georg Reimer, 1872), pp. 285-287.

[17] It was Klinger, however, who was considered to be the German artist most suited to illustrate Nietzsche's writings. His etching, *Prometheus Freed* (1894), was reproduced in the journal *Pan* in 1896 next to a passage from *Zarathustra*, while Harry Graf Kessler commissioned the artist to sculpt Nietzsche's bust in 1903.

[18] Cited are writings by Lawrence Shafe, Eveleen Richards, and Richard Prum. Oddly, the author does not mention the pioneering exhibition, *Endless Forms: Charles Darwin, Natural Science*

and the Visual Arts, edited by Diana Donald, Jane Munro, Fitzwilliam Museum Cambridge (Fitzwilliam Museum, Cambridge and Yale Center for British Art, New Haven, 2009) which includes major relevant essays by Jane Munro, “More Like a Work of Art than of Nature: Darwin, Beauty and Sexual Selection,” pp. 253-291 and Jonathan Smith, “Evolutionary Aesthetics and Victorian Culture,” pp. 237-251.

[19] Ernst Haeckel, *Die Welträtsel*, 13th ed. (1890; Leipzig: Alfred Kröner, 1925), p. 365.

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