Bernard Rulof, *Popular Legitimism and the Monarchy in France: Mass Politics without Parties 1830-1880*. Palgrave Studies in Modern Monarchy. Cham, Switzerland: Springer Nature, 2020. Bibliography and index. xi + 350 pp. $31.49 (hb). ISBN 9783030527570.

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This addition to Palgrave's series on monarchy focuses on the little-known story of popular legitimism from 1830 when Charles X, the last Bourbon king lost the throne, to 1880. What legitimism signified changed markedly in these years. The book centers on Montpellier and the department of the Hérault where legitimist sentiment was strong. There were no formal political parties in these years. The French thought formal party structures would divide the nation. Elite and popular legitimist groups existed in Montpellier. These had different objectives and ways of performing. The book is based on a commendably close analysis of official correspondence in departmental and municipal archives and of the local legitimist press. Such evidence reflects the views of the elite. The author admits that his knowledge of about popular legitimism was confined to the same sources (p.16).

There are eleven chapters, the early ones chronological, the later ones thematic. The introductory chapter defines legitimism. In the past, legitimists have been dismissed as "social fossils" out of touch with the modern world.[1] Leading legitimists in Montpellier were wealthy, aristocratic landowners and some rich bourgeois lawyers and merchants. They dreamt of the accession of the miracle child Henri, Comte de Chambord, Charles X's grandson. Memory was a significant nostalgic vector. They looked back to the pre-1789 traditional monarchy and a close association between the Crown and the Roman Catholic Church. In the past historians of legitimism have stressed this link, but this author notes that the Church was divided over its attitude to legitimism and that some clerics were not unfavorable to socialist social-reforming projects.[2]

Other elite legitimists in Montpellier were forward-looking. They invested in local newspapers, voted for legitimist candidates and, in the early 1840s, set up a Droit National group to work with republicans for a democratic franchise. This modernizing group were leading investors in the fast-growing market-orientated wine production. Thus, elite legitimists were far from united. The more radical element looked for support from popular legitimists, modest shopkeepers, artisans, small viticulturalists and other rural workers, some of whom they employed. Rulof points out that traditionally historians have neglected popular legitimists. Before 1830 they had no vote and voiced their politics in noisy *charivaris* or demonstrations, gathered informally in

bars and fought with opponents. Their links with elite legitimists were as much economic as political. 1848 gave them a vote and a voice. This was a turning point for legitimists. The elite soon struggled to accept that popular legitimists could be active citizens.

Chapter two explores space as a defining characteristic of popular legitimism, in particular the Plan d'Olivier Montpellier's eastern neighborhood. Initially supporters of the 1789 Revolution, the community turned to monarchism in opposition to the Revolution's hostility to the Church. They backed the Restoration, but after 1830 clashed with Orleanists, often violently. Montpellier legitimists supported the declaration of a republic, but elite legitimists were shocked by the June Days. They gained a majority in Montpellier's new municipal council. On 27 August around a hundred or so republicans and socialists "invaded space owned by legitimists," notably the Plan shouting "Down with the rich, Down with the aristocrats" (p. 56). Their opponents reacted with "Long live Henri Five, Down with the Republic" (p. 56), and drove the republicans away. The following day republicans again marched on the Plan, but again were driven back by residents. A squad of gendarmerie appeared. One gendarme was shot and died later. It was not clear from which side he was shot. The new prefect, Requier, a Parisian tradesman, who was unsympathetic to the legitimists, used a section of the local regiment to restore order and replaced the legitimists in the municipal council with republicans. Both sides blamed each other for the fighting but the enquiry set up by the prefect charged five poor residents of the Plan. The court of appeal later acquitted them and they were honored by a banquet, but elite legitimists were alarmed at the violent behavior of their followers. The Affair of the Plan exacerbated divisions among local legitimists.

Chapter three describes the emergence and development of legitimist culture, both elite and popular. The guillotinings of Louis XVI and Marie-Antoinette were regularly mourned. Royal saints days, such as Saint-Louis (25 August), Saint-Charles (4 November) and especially Saint-Henri (15 July) were important celebrations. They involved feasting, dancing, fireworks and processions. Such celebrations sometimes indicated divisions among legitimists. On 15 July 1850, popular legitimists invited republicans to join their celebrations to complain that elite legitimist parliamentarians had voted for the removal of poorer voters from the new universal suffrage electorate. Later celebrations were confined to the wealthy elite and lost their political edge. The fee for the banquet on 15 July 1879 was 20 francs, the police report commenting that it had a "gastronomic rather than a political character" (p. 95).[3] The next chapter describes the electoral politics of legitimism, noting the emergence of the Droit National legitimist-republican alliance before the 1848 revolution in favor of universal male suffrage. The new republic introduced universal suffrage and ten elections, national and local followed, in quick succession. At first legitimists experienced electoral success. Elite legitimists were soon disenchanted with democracy, fearing the demands of popular legitimists, whom they had previously considered their submissive followers.

Chapter five describes how even radical legitimists lost confidence in universal suffrage after president Louis-Napoléon's coup in December 1851 and his declaration of an Empire. On the orders of Chambord, they refused to participate in elections until 1868 when the regime began to reform. By then they had begun to lose control over popular legitimists who thought they could improve their economic position better by supporting the republican opposition. The Empire fell in 1870 when the Prussian army invaded. Although the majority in the National Assembly elected during the armistice in February 1871 was monarchist, Chambord's

intransigence meant a restoration of the monarchy was highly unlikely by 1873 and impossible after his death in 1883. With no heir legitimism was finished as a political movement.

The remaining chapters deal in an enlightening way with thematic aspects of legitimism. Chapter seven discusses family and economic aspects, describing the presence of the same individuals in different elite organizations. The next chapter, "Imagining the Bon Roi," notes how the elites revered the sixteenth-century ruler, Henri IV. Popular legitimists on the other hand hoped Chambord would be altruistic, a good king who would look after his people and that they would be full citizens. Chambord, who spent all of his life abroad until 1871, found the idea of sharing sovereignty inconceivable. The book goes on to describe how the four local legitimist newspapers were backed by wealthy local legitimists. Despite high subscription rates, none were successful. Many popular legitimists were illiterate but were aware of the local press. They might hear articles read aloud. Some might read papers in reading societies. It would have been useful if this chapter evaluated the degree of literacy of popular legitimists. Legitimist societies, clubs and sociability are the focus of chapter ten. Popular legitimists formed numerous small informal groups, based on bars and cafes. Some elite associations focused on politics, others increasingly confined themselves to charity, in the frequent crises in viticulture, notably the impact of phylloxera. After Chambord's death, charity and sociability were their sole preoccupations. Their wives organized groups attached to their local church to help poor mothers.

Apart from this brief mention, the volume has very little to say about links between legitimists and the Church, which is quite surprising given the influence of the Church on right wing movements in the Dreyfus affair a few years later. Another puzzling blank in these thematic chapter is education. The Third Republic actively sought to reduce the influence of the Church in education. The Ferry Laws, 1881-1882, established state primary schools. The boys and girls of elite legitimists would have been educated in church-run schools, the boys in expensive boarding schools run by religious orders. Resistance to republican educational policy was surely an issue of concern to all legitimists. The author should also note that the Bourbons were the elder, not the eldest, branch of the royal family; the other was their Orleans' cousins, whose head, Louis-Philippe, ruled from 1830-48. Rulof might have documented the role of legitimists in elections in the Hérault more systematically as well, because recent accounts of the period offer very little information.[4]

This volume will attract the attention of scholars and university students working on French nineteenth-century political and social history. It provides rare insights into how poor right-wing voters responded to the opportunity to participate both peacefully and violently in democratic politics. Equally it suggests that their elite brethren may have abandoned the idea of a Bourbon restoration less because of Chambord's intransigence, than because they became alarmed at the behavior and increasingly radical tendencies of their popular followers. Legitimist sovereignty and mass politics proved to be incompatible, leaving an observer in 2021 to ponder the current appeal of populism in modern democracies.

NOTES

[1] David Higgs, *Ultraroyalism in Toulouse from its Origins to the Revolution of 1830* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1973), p. 170, p. 140.

[2] Edward Berenson, *Populist Religion and Left-Wing Politics in France, 1830-1852* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), and Pamela Pilbeam, *French Socialists before Marx. Workers, Women and the Social Question in France* (Teddington: McGill-Queen's University Press, 2000), pp. 47-53.

[3] Police report, 30 September 1879, Archives départementales, Hérault, 1M1052, quoted in Rulof, p. 98.

[4] Quentin Deluermoz, *Le Crépuscule des revolutions 1848-1871* (Paris: Seuil, 2012), pp. 43-44.

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