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Between the sterility of the Enlightenment conceived of as a philosophical canon, with its Great Men and the eternal monuments to reason they wrote on the one hand, and the diabolized caricature of this movement developed by its postmodern and post-colonial critics on the other, how do we rescue an Enlightenment that is not only useable but faithful to our scholarly understanding of it? In 2001, two thoughtful English-language edited volumes came out on this very subject: *Postmodernism and Enlightenment* (ed. Daniel Gordon) and *What’s Left of Enlightenment?: A Postmodern Question* (ed. Keith Baker and Hans Peter Reill).[1] The fact that one of the most prominent scholars of the Enlightenment working today has just published a single-authored volume of essays on a similar subject suggests an ongoing preoccupation with the political (mis)appropriation and—perhaps more haunting still—possible irrelevance of the Enlightenment to the contemporary world.

In 2001, when the volumes on postmodernism and Enlightenment came out, the Culture Wars in American academia—which had college students protesting against the Dead White Males who propagated racism, sexism, and Eurocentrism through the presence of their writings in common curricula—had entered into what has turned out to be a temporary lull.[2] The moment was ripe for a reassertion of the value of Enlightenment, but on new terms: both of these volumes explored the ways in which epistemological and cultural open-endedness was itself a constitutive value of the Enlightenment and so could be reconciled to some degree with the insurgent scholarly forces of postmodernism and post-colonialism. Sankar Muthu’s *Enlightenment Against Empire*, which located strongly anti-imperial and culturally relativist currents of thought in a catalogue of very well-known Enlightenment figures, is a prime example of how scholars found a way of asserting the continued relevance of the Enlightenment without making common cause with reactionary defenders of the faith.[3] This more pluralist conception of the Enlightenment has dominated scholarship on the subject for the last couple of decades.

Lilti’s account of the reaction to Islamist terrorist attacks in Paris of January 2015 shows how little purchase the historians’ pluralist version of Enlightenment really has on the public imagination. Instead, in this moment of crisis the French rallied around a decidedly old-school version of the Enlightenment, pressing Voltaire into service as the representative of the French commitment to the universal values of toleration, rationalism, and secularism. The difficulty with the pluralist accounts of the Enlightenment lies precisely in the fact that they openly explore
how the historical conditions of eighteenth-century European society led to a highly selective application of the ostensibly universal values of this movement; the record in respect of race, gender, and religion is not always edifying. The values of Enlightenment were supposed to be an antidote to—not the simple reproduction of—historical patterns of injustice and ignorance. The division of this movement by scholars into a jumble of contrasting national or religious Enlightenments—Poles, Scots, Spaniards, Catholics, Protestants, and Jews can now each claim their own Enlightenment—only accentuates the problem. What are we evoking when we call upon “Enlightenment values”? Scholars may delight in this sort of complexity, but it is hardly the material of a shock-proof machine de guerre against the forces of violent obscurantism. Little wonder then that in 2015 the French dusted off their antiquated manuels on the Enlightenment.

Lilti’s *L’Héritage des Lumières* seeks to reassert the scholarly consensus that the Enlightenment was an irreducibly historical movement in a way that does not blunt its ethical force. Rather than understand the movement as a prescribed set of political, moral or scientific values, the twelve essays in this volume, eight of which were previously published between 2009 and 2016, set out to demonstrate that the Enlightenment is better understood as a topos of sometimes contradictory stances that *philosophes* adopted on a recurring set of questions. Examined as an ensemble, these controversies evince the centrality of historical self-consciousness and critique to all properly Enlightenment thought. It was historical because the Enlightenment understood itself first and foremost as a movement that marked a radical break with the past; the most important changes were inaugurated—and here we detect shades of Paul Hazard—with the expansion of Europe, but their full consequences were only realized, in the dual sense of being understood and actualized, beginning in the late seventeenth century. And it was critical because all of these changes imparted a novel sense of society acting upon itself thanks to new ideas, attitudes, and material resources.

*L’Héritage des Lumières* is divided into three parts—“Universalisme,” “Modernité,” and “Politique”—that explore the ambivalent attitudes Enlightenment thinkers developed in response to a set of questions that twenty-first-century readers are likely to ask of this movement. Lilti’s selection of themes lies somewhat athwart the historicizing intention of his project: “universalisme” and “modernité” do not enter the French lexicon until the early and late nineteenth century, respectively, and it is not until the postwar period that either term becomes a master concept of the social or historical sciences. The effect is that the reader’s understanding of the irreducibly historical character of the Enlightenment is mediated through categories alien to the movement itself. Reading this choice more charitably, one can gladly accept Lilti’s characterization of this book as a kind of “wager”: to the degree that a coherent picture emerges using these categories, he can affirm the contemporary relevance of the scholarly, pluralist Enlightenment.

Part one, “Universalisme,” deals largely with the problem of Eurocentrism in Enlightenment thought; in a more general sense, the terrain he maps out is formed on the one hand by the colliding intellectual impulses of cultural relativism versus Eurocentric superiority; and on the other, by the sometimes contradictory implications inherent in the concept of civilization—a term first coined by Victor Riqueti Mirabeau in 1756. Enlightenment thinkers conceived of civilization as a process that all societies went through in a set of observable steps—driven forward, for instance, by changes in the means of subsistence. Although this evolutionary (or stadial) understanding implied that all peoples were converging toward a universally attainable endpoint of material and cultural refinement, it was difficult to resist the impulse to range past and present
civilizations in a hierarchy of actual and possible achievement—generally with Europe sitting at the summit. As Lilti demonstrates in his essay on Constantin-François Volney, individual authors often housed within their own oeuvre ambivalences on this question. In a wide-ranging essay at the end of the first part, Lilti convincingly argues that the Annales school of the first and second generations was only able to retain civilization as the organizing concept of its ambitious vision of world history by setting aside a potentially uncomfortable methodological self-examination. The latter might have revealed how an ostensibly pluralist, dynamic notion of civilization was nevertheless grounded in a social-scientific viewpoint that is inevitably Eurocentric. Now that global history again occupies such a privileged position in the profession, Lilti argues that its practitioners should look to—and not down upon—forerunners such as Voltaire, Volney, and Braudel for a sense of the epistemological and political delicacy of their own position.

The highlight of the first section, and arguably of the entire book, is the opening essay entitled “Le Défi postcolonial,” where Lilti squares his accounts with the postcolonial critique of the Enlightenment. Anyone familiar with the postcolonialist construction called “the Enlightenment project” but who actually studies the Enlightenment will almost certainly agree with Lilti’s assessment: “La critique des Lumières est une figure imposée, un lieu commun, mais il s’agit en général d’une critique lointaine qui semble moi s’adresser aux auteurs, aux textes et aux idées du XVIIIe siècle, qu’à un fétiche culturel, ‘Les Lumières’” (p. 45). At least since the publication of Michèle Duchet’s seminal *Anthropologie et histoire au siècle des lumières*, critics of the “Enlightenment project” have tended to assign anthropology—or its proto-disciplinary forerunners—an outsized role in the process of European colonial domination.[5] These claims are speculative at best, particularly when one shifts attention from the allegedly colonialist epistemes rooted out by literary scholars and self-lacerating anthropologists to the institutions that might have given them force in the extra-European world.[6] Lilti recounts some of the debates among cultural anthropologists—notably, the sulfurous exchange between Marshall Sahlins and Gananath Obeyesekere over the meaning of the murder of Captain Cook by his erstwhile Hawaiian hosts. Lilti is clearly on the side of Sahlins, whose method of cultural anthropology he links to “un des courants des Lumières, celui qui valorise la diversité des cultures et rejette toute forme d’uniformité imposée” (p. 83). Well before this academic tempest in a teapot, as Lilti demonstrates, Claude-Lévi Strauss turned to Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s *Rêveries du promeneur solitaire* to ground an anthropological method that would relativize assumptions of moral and intellectual superiority that seemed to underlie so much of occidental social science. Throughout, Lilti rightly emphasizes that some of the most perceptive advocates of subaltern studies have seen the European Enlightenment as a resource; any criticism that seeks to displace or “provincialize” European hegemony, as Dipesh Chakrabarty has argued, derives from and draws upon the self-critical tradition of Enlightenment thought.[7]

Part two of *L’Héritage* is organized around the concept of modernity. The link between Enlightenment and modernity is twofold: contemporary societies not only share novel characteristics whose origins can be traced to the eighteenth century, but the perception of constant and fundamental change begins in this period. Contemporary society is “enlightened” in the sense that its intellectual life is marked by the same sense of rupture that defined the eighteenth century (p. 162). Although he dates its advent to the sixteenth rather than the eighteenth century, readers will easily recognize Reinhart Koselleck’s *Neuezeit* in Lilti’s formulation—thanks in part to generous citation of Reinhart by Lilti.[8] Modernity is characterized by a situation in which a newly discovered collective subject, society, constantly revolutionizes itself. Any meditation on historical change is therefore inherently self-reflexive. It
is for this reason that Lilti calls not for “une histoire sociale des idées,” but “une histoire intellectuelle du social” (p. 165).[9]

The coherence of this second part is not quite as salient as that of the first. The ubiquity of the term “modernity” means that Lilti’s argument enters a field cluttered with readers’ prior understandings of the concept, each bearing a moral charge of variable magnitude and alternating sign. This is one of the inevitable risks of interpreting the Enlightenment through an historically posterior category—particularly one whose meaning has never ceased, since its inception, to be debated. For the purposes of understanding Lilti’s particular intervention on the subject of modernity, it is probably best to begin reading the final essay of part two, “Des Lumières radicales,” a memorable takedown of what has turned out to be a long series of books on the radical Enlightenment by Jonathan Israel. First, reading this essay—the earliest of composition in the entire collection—one senses that Israel’s oeuvre pushed Lilti to the series of methodological self-clarifications we find in this book; second, his strong polemic against Israel serves as a firm point of leverage that allows him forcefully to assert his own view. Lilti’s main criticism of Israel is that the latter reads the Enlightenment as consisting of a set of doctrines—in this case, the radical, egalitarian, and democratic politics that are the supposed consequence of Spinoza’s monist materialism. With this certitude in hand, Israel reads subsequent texts and political movements associated with the Enlightenment, alternatively, as a set of brave implementations, cowardly attenuations, or craven betrayals of Spinoza’s basic program. The similarity of Israel’s treatment to the simplistic but politically useful ralliement around Voltaire—ironically, one of Israel’s despised moderates—after the Charlie Hebdo attacks gives a sense of the wider stakes of Lilti’s criticism. The conclusion he draws is worth quoting at some length: “Plutôt que de définir la modernité à partir de nos préférences idéologiques contemporaines, pour en chercher les sources au XVIIIe siècle, mieux vaut être attentif à la façon dont les auteurs des Lumières ont cherché à rendre compte des transformations qui affectaient le monde dans lequel ils vivaient et qui pas plus hier qu’aujourd’hui, ne se laissent réduire à une formule simple. La modernité n’est pas le résultat des Lumières ; elle en est l’objet….Ici se loge la véritable radicalité des Lumières : une affirmation de la capacité d’action par l’écriture, une ambition collective d’émancipation par le savoir, une prise de risque dans la confrontation avec les autorités comme avec les lecteurs” (p. 257).

Lilti’s examination of modes of sociability in the first essay, “Vies privées, espaces publiques,” gives a sense conditions of possibility of Enlightenment critique.[10] Here again society—a set of nested public and private spaces with rules and interests apart from the state—emerges as both subject and object of Enlightenment. The inherent dynamism of society validates its principal claim against fixed hierarchies of power; reducing the Enlightenment to one original and unchanging form of radical criticism, as Israel does, considerably diminishes its adaptability to new circumstances and therefore the durability usually attributed to its timeless universality. Lilti’s essay on credit—originally written as an extended review of Clare Haru Crowston’s Credit, Fashion, Sex: Economies of Regard in Old Regime France—teases out some of the ironies, for social scientific inquiry, of the growth of commercial society that helped to bring about the Enlightenment in the first place.[11] Crowston’s book demonstrates the interpenetration, in old regime French society, of notions of credit derived from relations of social dependence and increasingly prevalent understandings and practices linked to market exchange. Lilti’s treatment is generally quite favorable, but he parts ways with Crowston in her dismissal of the “explicit theories” of credit and money explored in the political economy that was, after all, the paradigmatic social science of the Enlightenment (p. 214, citing Crowston, Credit, Fashion, Sex,
As Lilti recounts, the growth of commercial transactions as well as the metastasis of state debt financing during this period called forth any number of “explicit theories” of money, credit, and their effects upon the real economy. But the mastery of complexity through abstract modeling—one of the crowning achievements of Enlightenment social science—was achieved at the price of disembedding the economy and hence obscuring the social relations it was intended to describe: “Le capitalisme financier et global actuel est à la fois l’héritier des Lumières et la négation de leurs idéaux, le débat est sans fin et la question n’est pas là. En revanche, ce détour nous offre des outils pour penser l’interdépendance des phénomènes économiques, sociaux et culturels, afin de conjurer la malédiction des sciences sociales lorsque celles-ci s’évertuent à décrire, avec des concepts purifiés, les mécanismes hybrides de la modernité” (p. 221). Approached as the “intellectual history of the social,” the study of the Enlightenment makes us aware not only of the critical apparatuses we have inherited from it, but of their persistent blind spots.

The third and final part of L’Héritage des Lumières, “Politique,” explores the philosophes’ ambivalent relationship to the thing that differentiates mere knowledge from the progressive ambitions of the Enlightenment: publicity. The five essays here have a more intimate feel than the previous two thirds of the book, and Lilti’s close reading of the cases of Diderot and the Marquis de Sade demonstrate how indispensable a fine literary sensibility is to certain kinds of historical writing.

One facet of the problem Lilti addresses is the relationship of the philosophe to the public. Thinkers like Kant, Condorcet, and Voltaire never quite trusted either the people whose enlightenment they sought, or the markets that ensured (at times) their livelihoods through the diffusion of their work. Ignorance, demagoguery, obscurantism, a taste for the ephemeral, and simple indifference—none of which are particularly unfamiliar today—were some of the hazards they confronted. This diagnosis influenced their understanding of the social basis and mechanisms of progress, which often evinced equal measures of elite pessimism and democratic optimism. As a result, a not inconsiderable number of philosophes sought the protection of state institutions—learned academies, universities—and the intellectual authority that membership in them conferred.

A second facet concerns the reaction of the philosophe to state repression. A long tradition of libertine prudence encouraged intellectuals to restrict the circulation of their heterodox views to a discreet network of fellow elites. In “Adieu Socrate,” Lilti offers a touching portrait of Diderot’s vacillation between a vision of the heroic philosopher speaking truth to power regardless of consequences and a comfort-loving family man who, traumatized by his stay in the fortress at Vincennes after the publication of the Lettre sur les aveugles (1749), chose the safety of libertine prudence. Group editorial projects like the Encyclopédie and the Histoire des deux Indes promised a sort of herd immunity to Diderot when he wanted to publicize his more inflammatory views, but he also chose systematically to circulate manuscripts privately in the manner of the seventeenth-century libertine, hoping that they would achieve their most transformative impact in a distant posterity. This may indeed have been the case for an exceptional writer like Diderot, but the fact does not erase, for Lilti, one of the deepest contradictions of the philosophe’s intellectual life: “une vision idéalisée et théâtrale d’un combat pour la vérité, et la réalité plus prosaïque de leur réussite sociale et culturelle, de leur intégration au sein de la bonne société” (p. 319). Bourgeois-bohemian professors take note.

The third part, and the book as a whole, closes with an exceptionally rich essay on what many have taken to be Foucault’s final intellectual testament, his 1984 essay “Qu’est-ce que les
Lumières?” There has been no lack of commentary on what at the time seemed a surprising volte-face on the part of an arch anti-humanist. But the recent publication of so many of Foucault’s Collège de France lectures, which document the emergence of his concept of governmentality through an intense engagement with a range of philosophes, and in particular eighteenth-century economists, diminishes this sense of rupture.[12]

From this point of view there are no surprises in Lilti’s account. But his focus on two elements of the essay—Foucault’s implicit positioning vis-à-vis Jürgen Habermas on the one hand, and his frequent and surprising references to Charles Baudelaire on the other—clarifies the parti pris of Lilti’s book as a whole. Habermas’s Philosophical Discourse of Modernity—which originated in part as lectures at the Collège de France—denounced on a number of grounds the totalizing critique of the Enlightenment offered by poststructuralism. Notably, it failed to offer an account of the origins of its own criticism. If it is will to power all the way down, how do we offer a valid critique of Enlightenment reason—i.e., one that is not itself an oppressive expression of will to power?[13] For Habermas, the genealogical critique of Enlightened, humanist knowledge amounted to a performative contradiction: “The genealogy of knowledge makes use of those disqualified modes of knowledge from which the established sciences set themselves apart; it provides a medium for the uprisings of the ‘subjugated knowledges.’” Habermas was rankled that proponents of the genealogical critique assumed that taking the part of subaltern groups by documenting their struggles against established power conferred an automatic epistemological validity. For Habermas, this basically unargued claim amounted to a cryptonormativity at the heart of an avowedly anti-foundationalist philosophy.[14]

Habermas’s own solution to the challenge of anti-foundationalist philosophy was not less Enlightenment, but more: reasoned speech in the context of his theory of communicative action. It is telling that in affirming the values of the Enlightenment, Lilti leans heavily on the Baudelaire-inspired version of modernity advanced by Foucault in 1984: “Là, où Habermas y voyait un approfondissement de l’autonomie du sujet, dans la lignée du rationalisme des Lumières, Foucault y cherche plutôt un rapport au temps, une attitude ambivalente et critique à l’égard du présent” (p. 367). For Lilti, it is the attitude of critique and the understanding that all criticism is historically situated, and hence potentially relative, that defines the Enlightenment. Throughout L’Héritage des Lumières, Lilti is far less insistent upon the means of Enlightenment critique—reason—so central to Habermas’s understanding of the public sphere and his theory of communicative action. Lilti’s discussion of the “postcolonial challenge” to the Enlightenment might well have led him to observe that these critics are caught up in the same type of performative contradiction described by Habermas: in rejecting the Enlightenment, they generally employ the critical tools developed by it.[15]

This choice is partly a function of Lilti’s understanding of the public sphere: Figures Publiques styles itself, at least in part, a refutation of Habermas’s “rationalist” depiction of this domain.[16] Beyond an understandable desire not to have his own plea for the relevance of the Enlightenment confused with that of Jonathan Israel, I think—although this is admittedly no more than an intuition—that there is also a politically conciliatory impulse at work here. As someone who writes about and teaches Montesquieu often, I find Lilti’s pluralist, culturally relativizing vision of the Enlightenment deeply resonant with my own; at the very same time, it is worth insisting that Montesquieu’s œuvre is incomprehensible apart from the strongly normative impulse that animates it. It suffices here to cite his discussions of despotism, slavery, and polygamy. Each of these institutions is found within a coherent cultural system, so we can describe how they come
about and persist: they are reasonable in a highly circumscribed sense. However, since they can never promote human flourishing, they degrade human nature; they are not useful and hence bad in themselves. They are unreasonable in a broader, normative and universalizing sense that can be discovered through reason: collection of facts, comparison, analysis, judgement. Montesquieu’s normative claims are grounded in linked appeals to reason and nature that were widespread among the philosophes and foundational to their collective enterprise. To understand the Enlightenment as critical reflexivity or a sense of historical contingency and leave it at that is perhaps a bit generic because it makes it difficult to properly account for the normative basis of the philosophes’ missionary zeal. As answers to the question “What is Enlightenment?” become more and more expansive, it may be necessary to write a clarifying manifesto: “What isn’t Enlightenment?”

Lilti is probably aware of all of this, but it seems to me that the implied audience of this book—liberal French academics—would prefer to set this fact aside for the sake of a truce with the identitarian left (or gauche morale), which is becoming increasingly prevalent in France. The implicit wager of Lilti’s L’Héritage is that pluralizing the Enlightenment will secure it a more legitimate and lasting relevance in public debate. Experience on the other side of the Atlantic, from whence this wind has blown, suggests that this bet is excessively optimistic. Lilti claims, very much in passing (p. 9), that the election of Donald Trump has led to a reassertion of the value of Enlightenment in the United States. This may be the case in some closed precincts of the American commentariat, but what is most striking is the utter irrelevance of the Enlightenment to our present cultural moment—that is, unless one counts Thomas Hobbes as an early Enlightenment thinker. It was he who aspired to a political theory capable of settling conflict in a post-truth society; Leviathan pulsed with fear at the prospect of a wealthy, civilized society sliding into the anarchy of civil war over rival symbolic claims.

We are all familiar with the denigration of institutionalized expertise, facts, and reason on the right. We are also familiar with the sense of victimization that agitates white identity politics; this syndrome has its counterpart, though not its exact equivalent, on the identitarian left. The two feed off of one another, even if the former is a response to the prospective loss of white privilege while the latter responds to historically verifiable patterns of injustice. Within academia, left victim culture increasingly appeals not so much to rights claims that are empirically or logically judicable than to the inherent validity of individuals’ emotional expressions of suffering.\[17\] Having accepted standpoint epistemology, expressions of empathy, outrage, or claims to membership in an oppressed group constitute eo ipso claims of intellectual authority. Students assert veto power over the assignment of texts or discussion topics because they might cause or revive trauma. Some insist that excessively intellectualized rather than therapeutic modes of discussion denigrate the suffering of past and present victims of oppression. Not wanting to appear in any way sympathetic to the racism or sexism that their students oppose, many professors—in any case not always reliably supported by their administrations—opt for self-censorship over confrontation. In this atmosphere it is costly to assert the transcendent value of free, reasoned debate. This leftish, pluralist vision of the Enlightenment, shorn of any stronger epistemic or normative claims, is incapable of resisting the kind of emotional coercion that is pervasive in the American academy. Having succumbed to that, it can hardly pivot in order to read lessons on reason and empiricism to the right.

At times, Lilti’s L’Héritage des Lumières reads like it could have issued from the same lost cultural moment of the early 2000s that produced the volumes on Enlightenment and postmodernism
cited at the beginning of this review. This is not a criticism of Lilti’s learned and engaging collection of essays; it is another way of observing the proverbial twenty-year lag between cultural and economic developments in the United States and their appearance in France. I wager that events are going to catch up to Lilti’s volume sooner than that.

NOTES


[2] Some (admittedly unrefined) quantitative evidence confirms this intuition. Google n-gram plots for the following terms from 1980-2008—the latest possible date—show clear peaks at the following years: “Eurocentrism,” “Dead White Male,” and “political correctness” (1995); “Great Books” and “Enlightenment” (1997). Lilti himself offers criticism of this type of lexical data-mining (pp. 207–211).


[6] As Talal Asad writes, “The role of anthropologists in maintaining structures of imperial domination has, despite slogans to the contrary, usually been trivial; the knowledge they produced was often too esoteric for government use, and even where it was usable it was marginal in comparison to the vast body of information routinely accumulated by merchants, missionaries, and administrators. Of course, there were professional anthropologists who were nominated (or who offered their services) as experts on the social life of subjugated peoples. But their expertise was never indispensable to the grand process of imperial power. As for the motives of most anthropologists, these, like the motives of individuals engaged in any collective, institutional enterprise, were too complex, variable, and indeterminate to be identified as simple political instrumentalities.” Talal Asad, “Afterword,” in Colonial Situations: Essays on the Contextualization of Ethnographic Knowledge, ed. George W. Stocking [Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991], p. 315. See the more general discussion of science and empire in Loïc Charles and Paul Cheney, “The Colonial Machine Dismantled: Knowledge and Empire in the French Atlantic,” Past & Present 219 (2013): 127–63.


Lilti cites Dipesh Chakrabarty’s *Provincializing Europe*, pp. 59–60, as a way of demonstrating how central European thought has always been to the subaltern critique of European imperialism.


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