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Sam A. Mustafa, *Napoleon's Paper Kingdom: The Life and Death of the Kingdom of Westphalia, 1807-1813*. London and New York: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2017. xxi+341 pp. Maps, figures, notes, bibliography, and index. \$99.00 U.S. (hb). ISBN 978-1-5381-0829-1; \$94.00 U.S. (eb). ISBN 978-1-5381-0831-4.

Response by Sam A. Mustafa, Ramapo College of New Jersey.

I thank Dr. Todorov for his detailed critique. His work on the Kingdom of Westphalia has been significant and has greatly informed my own. I am also grateful to the editors of H-France for the opportunity to respond to the critique.

Dr. Todorov's criticism falls into three categories: assertion of factual errors or misunderstandings; allegations that I neglected significant sources; and allegations that I deliberately wrote a polemic for some unspecified ideological reasons. In some cases, the time allowed does not permit me to respond to allegations of misunderstanding, since a review would require returning to archives to examine papers, but a few points bear mentioning. I did not, as Dr. Todorov claims, argue that "Wolffradt was the Minister of Justice and Siméon that of Interior throughout the whole reign of Jerome." The subdivision of the original interior-justice ministry and Wolffradt's subsequent appointment to Justice in late 1808 are discussed on page 131. Nor did I rely solely on Hessian archival sources to estimate rates of desertion and draft-dodging. These numbers were also drawn from the records of the Westphalian Gendarmes, as noted on pages 118-119 and 142-143. Nor did I confuse the cantonal organizations with sous-prefects. I noted that the law of 19 July 1810 revised this organization and stipulated only one sous-prefect per district, because the previous model, as I noted on page 33, "must have confused average people." I am also not convinced that the lands taken by Napoleon following the 1808 *Domänenvertrag* were solely princely, given that the French documents I cited show diverse ownership, as well as the dates on which prior owners acquired their lands (before the French came), and the fates of those properties. That said, it should go without saying that I am responsible for any errors of fact, which I regret. I will devote the rest of my response to the two other criticisms, regarding polemicism and the use of sources.

Any historian dealing broadly with a period of reform should investigate the distance between promised or legislated reforms and the actual impact upon people of those reforms, intended or unintended. Was the abolition of the guilds, for example, recognized by contemporaries as an improvement? Presumably it was for those people whose careers had not depended upon the guilds for income, job security, and other forms of support. I am also interested in the degree to which reforms actually took place or developed as promised, and whether they were received in

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the way that people often receive major top-down political and social changes today; with confusion, misunderstandings, inconveniences, and resistance. *Napoleon's Paper Kingdom* devotes considerable space to these questions and thus I sought to illustrate the ways in which Westphalia's reality fell short of its promises.

I am therefore surprised by the assertion that I deliberately wrote a polemic that prefers discredited nineteenth-century narratives over more recent and nuanced literature. In the historiographic essay that opens the book, I offer a critique of the nineteenth-century German/Prussian consensus history that I describe as, "completely rejected by modern scholars, and for good reasons" (p. xix). The nineteenth-century memoirs of German participants and witnesses, however (the book uses over 120 of them), frequently address themes of national identity, grievance, and resentment that I do not think can or should be ignored. It is certainly the duty of a historian to contextualize such memoirs, and I believe that I have done so within the secondary scholarship of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries, as the notes and bibliography hopefully show. But if we dismiss such recollections then we do a disservice to a period that was obviously fraught with high emotion, even if "old men... remember with advantages," to paraphrase Shakespeare.

I'm afraid I cannot accept Dr. Todorov's assertion that I "decided to avoid seriously engaging with most of the recent scholarly literature." Indeed, the criticism I anticipated was that I had relied too much on modern historiography and not enough on archival sources. Any reader of *Napoleon's Paper Kingdom* will note the numerous references to historical works published in the past three decades, including, of course, those by Dr. Todorov himself. The economic realities of publishing did require trimming nearly 150 pages from the original manuscript, some of which included historiographic elaboration, as well as considerable information from pre-Napoleonic sources, which Dr. Todorov assumes were not consulted. But even Dr. Todorov, when arguing that I omitted "some" recent works, provides only two examples of texts that he believes should have been consulted, out of a bibliography that fills eighteen pages.

Dr. Todorov and I have a very different reading of the period of Westphalia's collapse in 1813. He goes so far as to put the word "collapse" in quotes, and argues instead that a functional Westphalia was simply occupied by the Coalition armies after their victory at Leipzig. Even if we assume that many memoirs from this period amplified the grievances or inflected them with subsequent nationalist rhetoric, how would we explain the responses of the Napoleonic authorities themselves? When a departmental police commissioner, for example, writes that he expects the kingdom to collapse within a few weeks, or when the head of the gendarmes sends a circular criticizing disloyalty and desertion and demanding a renewed commitment to duty from those who remain, or when an infantry regiment takes yet another loyalty oath to the king with the assertion that they are "still" loyal and faithful, or when the king writes that he is concerned that his troops will switch sides at the least provocation, we see in these observations, I believe, confirmation of the sentiments expressed in the memoirs of the inhabitants. Marshal Louis Nicolas Davout, whom nobody accused of being overly dramatic, informed Napoleon on 9 May 1813 that, "Everywhere I have found that our enemies are being received with enthusiasm and the inhabitants, indeed even the local officials, have torn off the Westphalian colors and replaced them with the Prussian" (p. 271). One does not have to rely upon nineteenth-century German memoirs to conclude that Westphalia collapsed in 1813, and that German national sentiment was expressed in the concurrent uprisings against the state. Even a loyal Westphalian officer like Franz Morgenstern was forced to conclude that, "a singular and great impulse of German

nationality grew: the desire to throw off the chains of foreign domination” (p. 276). Napoleon’s Westphalian court observer, Karl Friedrich Reinhard, informed the emperor (with a tone of surprise) “that German patriotism is displayed publicly.... This plant has sprouted up from the ground” (p. 200). There are dozens of other examples.

I think it is hard to argue that all of the sentiments expressed by the Westphalian civilians and soldiers as they defected to the Coalition side in 1813 were exaggerated or isolated cases, amplified by subsequent nationalist rhetoric. Given their numbers, and that these men often acted in ways that could have gotten them killed and their families severely punished, one has to conclude that their high emotions were backed by some level of serious resolution.

Dr. Todorov asserts that I “systematically selected only those facts in both the old and new scholarly literature that support [my] theory of Westphalia’s complete failure.” First, that assertion is itself fairly selective, given the book’s praise for Westphalia’s legal system, program of vaccination, engineering and public works projects, and the modernizing intentions (albeit not always the reality) of its religious policy, education policy, and of institutions like the *Reichsstände*.

Second I am not sure that I would classify my conclusion of Westphalia’s failure as a “theory.” It is hard to argue that a state is something other than a failure when it never exercised sovereignty, never managed to come anywhere near balancing a budget or paying its debts (or even creating enough currency to pay its employees), failed to deliver on many of its specific or implied reforms, or when its government ignored the legislative process mandated by its constitution because that process had produced results undesirable for the regime.

Westphalia promised its people a number of things, some of which were radical changes. It delivered fully on only a few of them. It delivered *partially* on others, such as religious liberties for minorities that nonetheless came with new state supervision and control or, in the case of Jews, eventual re-introduction of fines and special fees. The abolition of feudal obligations was also only a partially-fulfilled promise, as the state (perhaps unsurprisingly, given the prominence of landowners) retained many ways for aristocratic employers to continue demanding unpaid labor from the peasantry. Westphalia promised (and to a large degree, delivered) a new, modern, streamlined legal code. But its people were often at the mercy of French martial law and could be arrested by the High Police for suspicion of disloyalty, every bit as arbitrarily as in their predecessor states. The correspondence of the police and prefects, particularly in the wake of the 1809 uprisings against the state, shows repeated concerns about the suspect loyalties of both civilians and soldiers.

If Westphalia was not a failure then I am not sure how to describe it. The obvious alternative, i.e. that it was a “success,” is unsupportable. Dr. Todorov offers anecdotes from the Napoleonic and post-Napoleonic period in which there were instances of people expressing nostalgia for things like a written constitution. I do address such sentiments in chapter thirteen but I am not sure how they constitute success for Westphalia, or how they are less selective a method of proof than those recollections I cited.

Dr. Todorov also argues that the existence of local administration, well-staffed by non-professionals, is an indication of enthusiastic participation in the new polity and its institutions. While there is no doubt that many people were excited by the changes promised in late 1807 and early 1808 (discussed in chapter two and summarized on page 313), it is significant that many of Westphalia’s local, low-level administrators simply remained in positions analogous to the ones

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they had held before Napoleon's arrival, and that local councils had also existed in various forms in the pre-Westphalian lands. Even if we believe that these men were more enthusiastic to participate after 1808 (which is debatable, given how many years it took Westphalia to fill these positions), Dr. Todorov seems to discount the most obvious and practical reason for their participation: they needed jobs, preferably similar to the ones for which they had prior experience. I addressed a number of such examples on pages 35-39, using the applications men filled out for administrative positions in the new regime.

It is not unusual for historians to examine the same sources and reach different conclusions. I see no reason, however, to polemicize. The distance between us and the Kingdom of Westphalia is great enough that these disagreements can remain academic.

Again, I thank the editors of H-France for providing me the opportunity to respond. I also wish Dr. Todorov much future success in his research, which has revealed Westphalian sources in places that no scholars had yet examined. He is to be commended for his extensive work in this field.

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