
Response by Dale Van Kley, The Ohio State University.

I wish to thank *H-France Review* for offering me the opportunity to reply to Professor Imbruglio's review of my most recent book on the international suppression of the Society of Jesus in eighteenth-century Europe. The review raises many issues; I propose to take up as many as space allows, beginning with the concept of Reform Catholicism and ending with that of the Enlightenment and its relation to the Revolution.

For the record, I did not use the concept of Reform Catholicism in my first book in 1975 on the suppression of the Jesuits in France, nor even in my first attempt in 2006, in essay form, to address the international suppression. Instead I contented myself with the categories of Gallicanism and Jansenism. I first floated the concept in an extended essay on “Conciliar Reform” in Europe Catholic Europe from 1750 to 1801. What motivated this current experimentation with this wider concept was a growing awareness of the inappropriateness of the categories of Gallicanism and Jansenism outside France, however much influence they might have exerted there. So what is new about this book is the application of this concept to the international suppression as a whole, rather than in France alone.

Because it is difficult to identify Jansenists in Catholic states where would-be benefice-holders and royal officers avoided identifying themselves as such by refusing to subscribe to the various papal condemnations of Jansenism, I chose the term “Augustinianism” to designate those sympathetic to and influenced by that largely French movement. And because Gallicanism is hard to dissociate from things having to do with Gaul, I chose terms such as neo-Cyprianism—“Van-Espianism” might also do—to designate indigenous jurisdictional traditions that, while profoundly influenced by Gallicanism after 1750, predated that influence and similarly tended to limit the temporal influence of the papacy in state affairs and even to curtail its spiritual control over the church as a whole. But the cultural influence of French Jansenism and Gallicanism did not reach a critical mass until after 1750, by which time the two traditions had become inextricably intertwined in France itself and I did not apply the concept of Reform Catholicism to Catholic Europe before that date. Everything else in this book, including the chapter on the largely French origins of Catholic anti-Jesuitism, has to do with the origins of these components.
That leaves a third component of Reform Catholicism, namely certain aspects of the European Enlightenment. In my view, the Catholic Enlightenment—we’ll get to that concept later—did not enjoy a monopoly of enlightenment. The aspects to which I pointed included the Cartesianism that Jansenism found compatible with Augustinian Catholicism. (Too late, alas, for me to use, a theologian colleague pointed out that Descartes’s famous “cogito, ergo sum” can be found clearly stated in Augustine’s *Civitas Dei*, bk. XI: 26.) Lest it be objected that the physics of Newton and epistemology of Locke had relegated Cartesian to history’s dustbin, it should not be forgotten that Cartesian influence long remained deeply entrenched in Enlightenment France and profoundly conditioned the way Newton and Locke were assimilated there.

But even elsewhere in Catholic Europe, a diffuse Cartesian mindset conveyed by Jansenism took the form of a rationalist bias in favor of lettered understanding and against sense-dependent devotional helps that underlay the reformist campaigns against popular superstition or Aberglaube. A radical distinction between reason and extension may well have underwritten Reform Catholicism’s widespread recourse to natural law in order to extend the state ecclesiastical jurisdiction to the detriment of the church’s purely spiritual authority. This entailed the decoupling of the sacramental from the civil components of marriage and with it, a policy of civil toleration of “heretical” Protestants. Inspired as well by the reformist admiration for the example of the early church’s relation to the Roman state—and in the Jansenist case, the experience of a century of intermittent persecution—the resultant liberation of the state from the church represents a literal secularization that, to my mind, is fundamental to the whole concept of the Enlightenment. Had word limitations not prevented me, I would have also pointed out that pristine Jansenism’s elimination of any general grace and consequent discovery of the openly beneficent effects of concupiscence, but enlightened self-interest would be a hallmark of the French Enlightenment’s attempts to formulate a natural morality.[3] If, in the short run, the secularization of this discovery by Bernard Mandeville and Voltaire distanced Jansenists from it, by the end of the eighteenth century, reformist Catholics from Jansenist *parlementaires* in France to the likes of Gaspar Jovellanos in Spain had come to embrace it in the form of physiocratic political economy.

By now, it should be clear that I understand the term “Reform Catholicism” to refer to a reformist movement conscious of itself as such, and that is what I detect in the form of the international correspondence on behalf of the “good cause” maintained in Paris, Pistoia, Rome, Utrecht and elsewhere from the 1750s on. In the case of a Catholic Enlightenment, that is also what I am looking for, rather than a collection of Catholics who contributed to or allowed themselves to be influenced by the Enlightenment in one way or another, and such a network existed in the wide ranging correspondence of Muratori, Mayán y Siscar, and others during the pontificate of Benedict XIV. But my contention is that such a Catholic Enlightenment broke up in the course of the 1750s and that this fissure is nowhere more apparent than in the group of enlightened Catholics such as Giovanni Bottari and Cardinal Domenico Passionei known as the Archetto.

Had I (as I should have) availed myself of the authority of Émile Appolis’s (admittedly diffuse) book about the Catholic “third party” between Jansenists and anti-Jansenist zealanti, I could have fortified this thesis with his similar contention that his third party underwent a “fragmentation” (éclatement) circa 1758.[4] Since his characterization of a third party precisely matches current descriptions of the Catholic Enlightenment in Italy, there is good reason to suppose that the fragmentation he has in mind coincides with the fissure in mine. But while he attributes it to a falling out between the Augustinian and Dominican orders, I see that “falling out” as the result
rather than any cause of the turn against the Jesuits, which for its part originated in the Archetto’s reaction to their opposition to Benedict XIV’s attempt to bring a third-party-like peace to a France torn apart by the pro-Jesuit episcopacy’s policy of publicly refusing the sacraments to Jansenists. This controversy was then at its height, and it was precisely then, in 1755, that Bottari and Passionei et al. struck up a systematic correspondence with Jansenists such as the abbé Augustin Clément in France in a quest to mobilize the most virulent anti-Jesuitism that Catholicism had produced.

That virulence was the product of an experience unique to France among the expelling Catholic states: namely, that of the religious civil wars of the second half of the sixteenth century. Gallican opposition to the monarchy’s admission of the new companions of Jesus in France coincided with the beginning of that civil war, and ended with Jesuit proximity to some of the regicidal attempts on the life of the Protestant Bourbon heir, Henri IV. The first phase of the Jansenist controversy of the following century replayed some of the theological issues of the French Reformation within Catholicism with Jansenists in the role of Protestants against a royally favored Society of Jesus while, in the eighteenth century, Jansenists revived and added the whole Gallican gravamen against the Society in a case that provided the public rationale for expulsion in all the states that did so, beginning with Portugal in 1759 and ending with the Duchy of Parma-Piacenza in 1768.

Professor Imbruglia and I may agree that the real reason for the expelling states was to further nationalize their Catholic churches vis-à-vis the papacy by means of more a thoroughgoing Gallicanism—as Campomanes and Moñino disarmingly put it—than in France itself. Yet there is no reason to doubt the reality of the belief that the Jesuits aimed to establish a despotic transnational empire at the expense of all thrones, plus the papal Tiara by means of the blind obedience of its fifth columnists and the slippery ethics of Molinist-empowered probabilism, including the justification and practice of regicide if necessary.

But the more compelling reason for abandoning the concept of a Catholic Enlightenment after the 1750s is that, while any concept of an all-Catholic—or generically catholic Catholic Enlightenment—has to include at least some Jesuits, the Reform Catholicism that emerged from the internal schism in the mid-1750s not only excluded Jesuits, but directed itself against the whole Society as such. But that exclusion did not mean that all Jesuits thereby ceased to be enlightened in some sense. What eventually emerged on the philo-Jesuit side of the mid-century fissure is something that might be called “enlightened conservatism,” or even an “enlightened” Ultramontanist International, as Dries Vanysacker is willing to call it. As described by him, this International had all the characteristics of a self-conscious movement as I have defined it, including an international web of correspondence largely put together by the future cardinal Giuseppe Garampi. It also originally emerged out of the much the same Muratorian reformist milieu as did Reform Catholicism. This Ultramontanism was new in its militancy and would come to define the so-called “intransigent Catholicism” of post-revolutionary Europe.

In what respect can Jesuits said to have been enlightened? Roughly for the same reason that Jeffrey Burson’s work on the Lockian-Malebranchian theological enlightenment of Parisian Jesuits associated with the Journal de Trévoux reminded me of the Jesuits portrayed by my mentor, Robert Palmer, in his work, Catholics and Unbelievers in Eighteenth Century France, as well as my first book’s derivative description of the relatively enlightened way in which the Jesuits publicly defended themselves when the parlements put their Society on trial in France. Akin to that of philosophes, the Society’s vastly more benign view of the integrity of post-lapsarian
human nature together with a more empirically oriented view of the path to truth and understanding inherited from Thomist scholasticism, made Jesuits more open to the advances in the physical and biological sciences of their century than their opponents on the Augustinian side. Their view of the wisdom garnered by accumulated experience also enabled Jesuits to believe in the gradual progress of modern culture and institutions with respect to the those of the ancients, even in the structure of the church and its understanding of divine revelation.

Now, much of Professor Imbruglia's description of the relative modernity of the Society of Jesus and its spirituality rings true, and I readily grant that his may be better than mine. His formula for its spirituality as mysticism transformed into asceticism and freedom reconciled with the "anxiety of obedience" seems right, although I would prefer to substitute "method" or "discipline" for "asceticism" and "will" for "freedom." Much also recommends his attribution of the Society's appreciation, if not discovery, of human "culture" as a collective layer between individuals and governance, seemingly akin to Keith Baker's conception of the French Enlightenment as the divination of human "society."[8] Surely, however, the Jesuits did not similarly divinize human "culture," although they indeed appreciated it as intrinsically religious and deserving of respect as such, wherever they encountered it in their missions. In the emerging field of cultural anthropology, the Jesuits had no competitors. Hence the Society's signature missionary tactics of replacing force with persuasion, of finding common ground between their own and pagan faiths, and tolerating idolatry outside Christendom, as well as popular superstition within it. (My own account of their encounter with Confucian China was meant to be sympathetic, and I hope it is read that way.) But I see no reason for prolonging these attributes as a continuation of a Catholic Enlightenment beyond the 1750s, by implication demoting Reform Catholicism as unenlightened.

Beyond this point, however, I find it difficult to accept Imbruglia's argument. Although Jesuits did not hesitate to invoke the aid of the "secular sword" when available—in particular against heresies such as Jansenism in Europe—I cannot attribute to them a plan to replace temporal with a unified "spiritual" authority on the Paraguayan model without endorsing the direst diatribes leveled against them by their reformist detectors, something it never crossed my mind to do. Nor did the papacy willingly leave the Jesuits to the mercy of the expelling states in order to keep the temporal and spiritual separate. To the contrary, Clement XIV's successors spent the next forty years attempting to preserve and restore the Society, a goal Pius VII finally achieved in 1814. That French philosophes regarded the Society's "accommodating" Christianity as a more dangerous competitor for a popular constituency than Jansenism may be granted, as also d'Alembert's prediction that philosophical reason, rather than Jansenism, would have reaped greater rewards from the Society's suppression in France. But the closest any of the actual perpetrators of the international suppression came to being a d'Alembert-like philosophe—one of the actual arguments of the book—is the first minister Guillaume du Tillot in Parma, who alone decried despotism, even in secular states, if not the one he administered. But if he kept faith with his mentor, the abbé Condillac, a good Catholic he would have remained.

Last but not least, I have never seriously entertained the idea of denying the French Enlightenment a role in the coming of the Revolution, much less in the direction it eventually took. I have, of course, argued that the Jansenist controversy also prepared and largely conditioned that revolution, but not that it "caused" it. One of the ways in which this belatedly interminable religious controversy conditioned the Revolution was to have produced the most virulently anti-clerical enlightenment in Catholic Europe. One of the main points of the counter-
factual experiment of a revolution in 1771 was to show how much difference another fifteen years of post-suppression enlightenment made in the way the real Revolution turned out.

One of those ways was to have so inflected the shape of the Revolution’s reform of the Gallican Church as to split the reform-minded community of Catholics who might otherwise have overwhelmingly supported it. The result was the Revolution’s well-known turn against religious fanaticism, as well as against aristocracy, and a de-christianizing interlude that came lastingly to cling to the reputation of the Revolution in France, as well as to accompany it wherever it went, by word or arms. But in provoking an inevitable religious reaction to it, that Revolution inflected an already existent Catholic-wide polarization. It did not create it.

NOTES


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