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The strategic importance of the Strait of Messina has been recognized since the earliest days when classical Greeks spun tales of Scylla and Charybdis. Throughout its history, control, both of the island of Sicily, and its adjacent territories along the North African coast and the southern half of the Italian peninsula, have accordingly been the site of fierce contention. Charles Stanton’s study focuses upon one epoch in this conflict-ridden history: the eleventh and twelfth centuries, when a series of campaigns wrested lordship over Sicily, Apulia, Calabria—and, very briefly, several points along the Maghreb—from Muslims, Byzantines, and Lombards, transferring them into the hands of a band of mercenary knights, led by sons of the Norman Tancred de Hauteville (d. 1041). Where other studies of Hauteville rule over Sicily and southern Italy have taken up questions of identity and cultural interaction, as well as family networks and the structure of governance among the region’s multi-ethnic and multi-confessional population, Stanton’s focus is upon the rise and impact of Norman sea power. Although Hauteville’s descendants would be absorbed into the Hohenstaufen dynasty little more than a century after their earliest conquests, this shift from Muslim to Christian dominion was, Charles Stanton asserts, a “sea change” both literally and figuratively (p. 223), paving the way for a new, robust western European presence in both the western Mediterranean and the Levant; the onset of the Latin Crusades; and a Muslim maritime decline that would not truly be reversed until the rise of Ottoman sea power in the fifteenth century.\[1\]

“The Hautevilles,” writes Stanton, “had long since forgotten the seafaring ways of their Viking forbearers” (pp. 225-226). The Normans who invaded Sicily built rather upon the best practices of their predecessor Byzantines and Muslims, to establish a “naval supremacy in the central Mediterranean…” that was “far reaching and momentous” (p. 174). Stanton’s study, which originated as a Cambridge dissertation under the direction of David Abulafia, seeks to examine the achievements of the Hauteville dynasty at sea, tracing them from an ascent under Robert Guiscard (1016-1085) and his brother Roger I (1031-1101), through an “apogee” under Roger I’s son Roger II (1093-1154), to a decline under William I “the Bad” (1120-1166) and William II, “the Good” (1153-1189)—although Stanton titles him “William the Worse” (p. 144), to the last Hauteville who briefly and unsuccessfully struggled to stave off Hohenstaufen takeover, Tancred of Lecce (1138-1194).

Much of this book is a meticulously rendered narrative history of battles by land and sea, in which chronicle accounts and secondary literature are scrutinized, confrontation by confrontation, to support Stanton’s judgments and his narrative arc of apex and decline. In this respect, Stanton’s methodology could be esteemed conservative. In several passages, Stanton’s judgments uphold traditional views of medieval Mediterranean history found in Henri Pirenne’s *Mohammed and Charlemagne* and A.R. Lewis’s *Naval Power and Trade in the Mediterranean A.D. 500-1100*. There are even echoes, in some of Stanton’s scholarly focus, of Mahan’s classic, *The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783*, which is cited in Stanton’s bibliography, although Stanton, like John Francis Guilmartin, dismisses the notion that any
body of water could be fully controlled by even a fleet of galleys. Sections of Stanton’s study revisit issues first investigated by his prolific mentor, whose seminal research has shaped current scholarship on the medieval Mediterranean in so many ways. Stanton also acknowledges his debt to John Pryor’s ground-breaking work on the Byzantine Dromon. Stanton’s consideration of the geographic importance of Sicily, albeit from a “strategic” point of view, nonetheless affirms the innovative perspectives Peregrine Horden and Nicholas Purcell have brought to their recent study, The Corrupting Sea. Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean is moreover valuable for the way in which it draws upon a vast array of Latin, Byzantine, and Arabic sources—as well as manuscript illustrations, and the findings of maritime archeology—to consider maritime confrontations and the mechanics of naval organization and design from the perspective of an author who is identified by the Boydell Press editors of the Warfare in History series as “a career naval officer” (end cover).

The book is composed of an introduction, four chapters, and a conclusion, followed by two appendices. Stanton’s introduction discusses ship construction in the age of the Normans. While equipped, most often, with a lateen sail borrowed from Byzantine and Muslim models, medieval galleys lumbered along at little more than two or three knots per hour, and were profoundly vulnerable to bad weather conditions. The oarsmen who propelled them meanwhile sustained “colossal” requirements for water (p. 5). Taken together, these factors rendered coastal navigation (cabotage) a necessity. “Control of the sea,” Stanton asserts, quoting John Pryor, thus required “control of the land” (p. 6). These conditions would have critical implications for the struggle to control the straits of Messina, as they meant that naval power would ultimately hinge not so much upon control of the maritime highway as upon control of its adjacent shores.

The first chapter, “The Conquest, 827-1101,” traces conditions in Sicily and Southern Italy in the centuries preceding the Norman conquest. Internecine squabbling between local Byzantine and Lombard lords facilitated the opportunistic launch of a formidable fleet from Ifriqiyah (western Libya, Tunisia, and eastern Algeria) that yielded Palermo to the Aghlabids by 831. This development, Stanton asserts, “effectively divided the Mediterranean…in half.” “There is ample evidence to suggest that trade between the Latin West and East persisted,” Stanton concedes, although he does not discuss the hagiographical texts that Michael McCormick considers in Origins of the European Economy: Communications and Commerce A.D. 300-900, a book that is not listed in Stanton’s bibliography (p. 17). Muslim conquest of Sicily, as Stanton presents it, was, moreover, a gradual and often violently contested process.

The Normans first arrived in the region, principally as mercenaries, in the early eleventh century. During this period, Normans exploited opportunities created by competition between and among Muslims, Byzantines, Lombards, supporters of the Roman bishop, and the Holy Roman Emperor. “They changed allegiances whenever it seemed advantageous and fought with one another as much as they did with the Byzantine and Lombard princes who competed for their services,” writes Stanton (p. 27). Among the Norman knights were the first contingent of Hauteville brothers: William, Drogo, and Humphrey. In 1038, their forces were the critical component that delivered Syracuse back to the Byzantines. By 1053, they were extending territorial control at both Byzantine and Lombard expense. By 1057, a fourth brother, Robert, surnamed Guiscard (“the crafty”), and a fifth, Roger, had arrived, and began, slowly at first, and then with greater skill and discernment, to organize naval forays in which knights and horses were transported to launch a Norman conquest of Sicily.

Stanton is at his best when estimating the composition of the Norman fleet and the magnitude of the Norman contingent on the basis of the carriage capacity of chelandia, or Byzantine horse-transport ships. By 1061, the Hautevilles controlled Messina despite fraternal spats, and threats from the rival Zirid emir across the straits at Mahdiyah. And yet, as Stanton stresses, it took the Hauteville brothers some time to marshal the resources and skill needed to conduct a successful maritime siege, which required a port to be completely sealed until a desperate population capitulated. An early attempt to take Palermo,
which did not fall until 1072, was not successful; a siege of Bari lasted three years. The steady amelioration of Guiscard’s skill at maritime siege nevertheless fueled Norman aspirations to Byzantine territory that drove Alexius I Comnenus (1048-1118) to grant the Venetians extensive trading privileges in exchange for a protective alliance, and yielded Guiscard a devastating victory over a Venetian fleet shortly before his death. Roger, meanwhile, countered Muslim maritime raids in Calabria; subdued Trapani, Taormina, Muslim Syracuse, and Malta; and Roger established a catena of seaside monasteries off Sicily that could serve as look-out points, demonstrating a career-long appreciation of the merits of coastal patrol.

Chapter two, “The Apogee, 1101-1154,” argues that Roger bequeathed his insights into naval geographic strategy to his son and namesake, Roger II. Three objectives, Stanton asserts, animated Roger II’s policies: consolidation of Hauteville power over Sicily and the southern Italian provinces against a rebellious nobility supported by the papacy and the Holy Roman Emperor; defense against Byzantine enemies; and control of the North African coast cementing Norman hold upon the Strait of Messina. Roger II’s vision, in Stanton’s view, was overwhelmingly Sicily-centered. “Controlling the central Mediterranean,” Stanton writes, “was the essence of Roger’s naval strategy, and Sicily, with its strategic setting, was his primary means for doing that” (p. 127).

Stanton traces the king’s progress toward this goal in a series of chronologically and geographically organized subsections that would appear to describe an equal mixture of triumphs and setbacks. There were, of course, major victories at Bari in 1129, and again in 1139; over Amalfi and Ravello in 1130; and, most dazzling of all, the chain of conquests along the coasts and promontories of North Africa. And yet this last, and most illustrious set of successes could be said to have arisen, at least partially, from opportunities created by the decay of relations between the Zirid emirs and their Fatimid overlords in Cairo and the resulting dependence of the region’s inhabitants upon Sicilian grain. Elsewhere, Stanton is obliged to concede, “Roger’s fleets did not always prevail…”(p. 126)—as, for example, at Gabes in 1118; at Qasr Ad-Dimas in 1123; and in the unsuccessful Norman bid for Antioch in 1135. In one case, Stanton’s assessment of Norman naval prowess would even seem somewhat conjectural. Stanton’s consideration of the confrontation between the amiratus George of Antioch and the Byzantines off Cape Malea in 1149 argues for a Sicilian victory on the basis of a certain inconsistency in the sources despite the counter-testimony of Venetian and Byzantine accounts, which insist that it was Roger’s fleet, and not the Byzantine force, that was bested.

What Stanton’s careful analysis would seem to suggest is that the preeminence of the Norman Hautevilles under Roger II may perhaps be more precisely attributed to an approach that coupled ruthless aggression with pragmatism and tolerance. Roger II’s naval strategy was one strand of an overarching vision that scholars such as Jeremy Johns and Kenneth Pennington—both cited by Stanton—have shown also included the incorporation of Muslim administrative models; the application of Roman and canonical legal precedents; and, as Stanton implicitly suggests through his selection of the mosaic of Roger II’s coronation at the church of Santa Maria dell’Ammiraglio in Palermo as a book illustration, the use of Byzantine imperial iconography.[7] To enlarge his command of Mediterranean geography, Roger II even commissioned the Nuzhat al-mushtaq fi-khiraq al-afaq (The Pleasure Excursion of One Who is Eager to Traverse the Regions of the World) from the Arab geographer al-Idrisi (ca. 1100-1166).

Several of Roger II’s closest confrontations were, meanwhile, resolved with diplomacy rather than naval aggression. In 1137, Roger II negotiated a treaty with the Holy Roman Emperor that deflected a Pisan threat to Norman control over Calabria. Diplomacy similarly forged a strategic commercial agreement that wowed the Venetians away from a menacing alliance with the Byzantines in 1136. Indeed, Stanton writes, “Roger II used military means to achieve his goals only when he felt there was no practical alternative” (p. 128). The coastal watch system the king maintained along Sicily’s perimeter, with towers at roughly three-mile intervals, was yet another strategy adopted to avoid, rather than initiate, conflict.
Stanton argues most forcefully for an overarching vision of Norman sea power, however, where he builds upon the research of Jeremy Johns and Léon-Robert Ménager to study the Norman modification of the office of Muslim *emir* to create the Norman *amiratus*. Stanton—correctly in this reviewer’s opinion—rejects Méneger’s assertion that “the *amirati* are not admirals” (p.260) but demonstrates that Norman kings may well have expanded the *amiratus*’ purview in assigning these royal administrators critical roles as naval commanders.[8] It was Roger II who appears to have fashioned the *maximus amiratus* into a fleet commander, although the full measure of an admiral’s powers would not be explicitly articulated in the sources until a century later. Roger II moreover demonstrated discernment in the selection of the first two men who served him in this capacity: Christodolous, also known in the Arab sources as ’Abd al-Rahmān (d. 1126) and George of Antioch (d. 1151)—both Byzantines and fluent speakers of Arabic. It was, Stanton notes, particularly the latter’s imposition of restraint in the 1148 conquest of Mahdiyyah that won Muslim respect, although Stanton does not discuss Alex Metcalfe’s suggestion that here, too, Roger II may have elected to replicate, in Norman governance, the treatment Muslims had accorded Christians under their dominion as *dhimmis*. [9]

Chapter three, “The Eclipse (1154–1194),” traces a decline under Roger II’s successors that ended with Hauteville cession of power to the Hohenstaufen. William I (a Hauteville), who faced rebellion from his Sicilian lords, as well as papal opposition, and began his reign by imprisoning most of his father’s advisors and relying upon an unpopular admiral, Maio of Bari, who was assassinated in 1160. William I also embarked upon an ill-advised raid against his father’s erstwhile ally, the Caliph of Cairo that would inaugurate an eventual loss of all the dynasty’s North African territories. Between 1156 and 1160, a series of rebellions enabled Jerba, Kerkenna, Tripoli, and finally Mahdiyyah to throw off Norman rule. Stanton draws upon the Arabic sources to furnish a tensely narrated account of several of these engagements, although he does not consider the context these rebellions may have had in episodes of Christian persecution of Muslims that appear to have accompanied baronial unrest during William’s reign.[10] Contests with the Byzantines were more successful. Norman forces resisted an attempted Byzantine invasion of Brindisi and Bari in 1156, which Stanton reconstructs in another effective section (pp. 130-135). In 1157, the Normans won a naval engagement off Euboea, chasing a Byzantine fleet to the walls of Constantinople and compelling the Emperor Manuel Comnenus (1118-1180) to sue for peace.

William II, who began his reign as a minor, was similarly able, through his *amiratus* Margaritus of Brindisi (1149-1197), to successfully attack the Byzantine port of Thessaloniki; to intervene in the dynastic struggle that followed the overthrow of the Byzantine Emperor Andronicus I (1183-1185); and to preserve Latin Antioch and Tripoli in the wake of Saladin’s recapture of Jerusalem (1187). Stanton is nevertheless critical of several “large scale risky offensives” (p. 149) that did not end as felicitously, as for example, an ill-fated attempt to take Alexandria in 1171 and a disastrous expedition to attack Majorca a decade later. William’s efforts to secure the Holy Roman Empire’s support for the Byzantine expedition moreover led to the marriage between his aunt Constance and Henry VI Hohenstaufen, paving the way for a dynastic struggle when William II died without issue. Within a year, the English Plantagenet Richard the Lionhearted had burned Messina and destroyed the Sicilian fleet in ostensible defense of the interests of Richard’s sister Joanna, William’s widow, against William’s cousin, Tancred of Lecce. At Tancred’s death in 1194, the kingdom fell at last to the Hohenstaufen dynasty.

The fourth chapter, “The Impact,” considers the broader implications of the Norman invasion of Sicily. Norman naval supremacy, argues Stanton, facilitated the rise of western European sea power and commercial growth, especially the expansion of Genoa and Pisa in the wake of the crusading movement, as well as the alteration of Muslim commercial and navigational patterns across the Mediterranean basin and a resurgence of Sicilian pre-eminence under Frederick II. These conclusions allow Stanton to explore a few subjects he considers less elsewhere, such as Hauteville interaction with Pisa and Genoa; naval operations during the crusades; and Mediterranean commercial patterns in the wake of the
Norman invasion. Stanton draws upon Goitein’s study of Geniza records to briefly consider the consequences of the shift away from Muslim commercial and naval preeminence for Muslim and Jewish merchants in the dār-al-Islām. The most profound loser, however, appears to have been Amalfi, which declined precipitously in importance.

Stanton closes with a consideration of the career of the Emperor Frederick II (1195-1250), whose agenda, he argues, was a re-establishment of the maritime hegemony his Norman ancestors had enjoyed. Frederick II’s naval preeminence allowed him to conduct the sixth crusade and fueled his embattled relationship with Pope Gregory X. But Stanton discerns the firmest evidence of continuity with Sicily’s older Norman tradition in the Emperor’s *Capitula pertinentia ad Officium Ammiratae* (1239), the first document to explicitly set forth the parameters of an admiral’s purview.[11] Stanton breaks the *Capitula* into four broad categories: equipping and manning the fleet; policing the sea; maritime adjudication; and compensation. Citing Kenneth Pennington’s conclusions regarding the influence Roger II’s *Assizes of Ariano* appear to have had upon Frederick II’s *Liber Augustalis or Constitutions of Melfi* (1231), Stanton hypothesizes that the *Capitula* may also have been drawn from Norman models. Stanton makes less, however, than he perhaps might of an important shift in who served Frederick II as an admiral.[12] Roger II and his successors had appointed amirati native to Sicily, or the southern Italian peninsula, men whose command of Greek and Arabic reflected the pluralistic society Sicily had been in the eleventh and twelfth centuries. By contrast, Emperor Frederick II’s ammirati—Nicolo Spinola, Enrico di Malta, Ansaldo di Mare—were all Genoese mercenaries. Restored though it might have been, Sicilian sea power, like the commercial shift it had inaugurated, was now dependent upon Italian know-how. This may well be the reason, as Lawrence Mott has argued, that “the *Capitula* show that while the office of the admiral held considerable power under Frederick II, it did not approach the authority of the office under William II.”[13]

Appendix A, “The Fleet (ships, sailors, shipyards, and strategies),” is a learned and detailed consideration of the various types of ships used in the medieval Mediterranean that expands upon the author’s introduction. It is based upon shipwreck research undertaken in Turkey, as well as manuscript illustrations, hagiographical texts, and other narrative sources. Lauding the Normans as “masters of...adaptation” (p. 225), Stanton notes that the Norman practice of requisitioning ships from conquered towns meant that their vessels were almost certainly of Byzantine design, while the organization of arsenals for shipbuilding was a Muslim practice. Building upon Pryor’s research, Stanton discusses the *dromon*, *chelandion*; and *galea: the cattus/gattus* (an oared fighting ship); the *navis* (a supply ship); and the *sagitta* (the “arrow”, so named for its swiftness), which was favored for sea-raids. None of these ships were capacious by modern standards. Some had capacity to bring horses back and forth, testimony to the way in which ships were not only dependent upon coastal supply, but utilized to assist warfare in ways that imagined the sea from a territorial perspective, and fashioned fleets, as Pryor has written, primarily into “*adjunct[s]* to land armies.”[14] “The Normans strove, as much as possible, to replicate land-based battle conditions where their fighting skills gave them an edge,” writes Stanton (p. 272).

Stanton’s appendix also includes a summary discussion of maritime theft, or piracy, referred to at various times throughout his study. In general, loot was a portion of the pay both mercenary knights, and warriors at sea, might expect as compensation. “Piracy—state-sponsored or otherwise,” writes Stanton, “was a burgeoning business of the period eagerly pursued by the inhabitants of all seafaring cities” (p. 260). Coastal raiding was a form of amphibious warfare that extended power, intimidated enemies, and richly compensated participants. Stanton enlarges here upon his discussion of Frederick II’s *Capitula*, where he notes that ammirati were charged with “the management of piracy: either its promotion or prevention” (p. 219). The *Capitula* indicated that the conduct of maritime raids (*piraticam exercere*), should be regulated so that no captain sailed without the admiral’s sanction (*sine licentia predicti ammirati*) earned by tendering a pledge deposit to the admiral that no allies would be attacked.[15] The passage highlights a paradoxical issue that this reviewer has considered elsewhere: that the definition of maritime raiding as legitimate or criminal was a politically inflected question in the Middle Ages. On
the one hand, maritime raiding could be nearly indistinguishable from naval operations as understood in the pre-modern period, as numerous historians, from Braudel to Abulafia, have shown. On the other hand, piracy could also be a capital crime.[16]

Throughout this study, however, Stanton frequently characterizes Muslim maritime raids as piracy (note, for example, pp. 9, 58, 75, 90, 175), while varying the way in which he characterizes Norman, Venetian, Pisan, Genoese, and Byzantine sea-raids (note, for example, pp. 47, 84, 179). Stanton’s terminology may be more elegant variation. Certainly he notes the use of subjective language for maritime raiders in his sources, as when the Byzantine chronicler Niketas Choniates terms the *amiratus* Margaritus of Brindisi “mightiest of pirates” (pp. 156-157).[17] Yet, Stanton’s consistent references to Muslim piracy would seem to undermine a solid point he makes in this appendix, consistent with recent scholarship on piracy: that sea-raiding was the preferred tactic among all actors in the medieval Mediterranean, narrowing the distinction between those hostilities Stanton characterizes as “battles” and those he refers to as “raids.” Coastal raiding was safer—at least for the raiders—because of the delicate build of early medieval shipping, which could not always withstand aggressive forays into the open sea. For all that Muslim maritime raids may have been one expression of *jihad*, they were also a result of the way in which the Arab invasions of the seventh and eighth century had destroyed North Africa’s late antique agricultural base, stranding inhabitants in a depleted economy. And Norman conquest could exacerbate matters, as when Roger II’s fleet conquered the “pirate enclave” at Jerba (p. 207) but demanded an annual tribute that compelled inhabitants to keep raiding.

Appendix B is a synopsis of sources and literature for the history of the Norman kingdoms. It is particularly useful for its comprehensive treatment of the Byzantine and Muslim texts, which suggest that the Arabs were no less indebted than the Normans to Byzantine maritime experience.

Stanton may not be well-served by the editorial decision to reserve his appendices until after his narrative. This reviewer would rather recommend that anyone who purchases Stanton’s book might read these sections first, as they represent his study’s most valuable contribution. Whether considered first or finally, however, a review of the sources underscores the point that many of the incidents Stanton narrates are stories his sources considered worth recording. Even where its practical disposition lay well beyond reach, sea power mattered to many medieval chroniclers, whether they were Arabs or Byzantines, Western European monks, or historians of their civic or feudal polity. Sea power matters to Stanton as well, and in the best parts of *Norman Naval Operations in the Mediterranean* he does his sources justice.

NOTES


[15] Note *Historia diplomatica Friderici Secundi*, p. 578: “..priusquam per eos personis aliquibus concedatur licentia, recipiant ab eis idoneam et sufficientem fidejussoriam cautionem de non offendendis amicis fidelibus et devotis nostris….”


Ménager also quotes this passage, p. 100.

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