Sixteen years ago, in *The Sexual Contract*, Carole Pateman argued convincingly that the creation of the public sphere was made possible by the creation of the private sphere, and that the public sphere was inherently or intrinsically masculine. The “Sexual Contract” was the implicit—fraternal—understanding between the would-be male citizens that their status as heads of households justified their assumption of the power—patriarchal—of the king; fraternity replaced paternity. This understanding, obviously, was not legal or formal; it was embedded in the modes of thought which made possible the breakthrough into liberal culture. Pateman’s argument has been widely accepted to explain the birth of proto-republican thought in the eighteenth century, but it has not yet been applied to explain the continued exclusion of women in the nineteenth century. That is the point of this paper.

Pateman might have supported her case by referring to Schiller’s “Ode to Joy,” the 1787 poem which Beethoven set to music as the fourth movement of his Symphony No. 9.

\begin{quote}
Wem der grosse Wurf gelungen,  
Eines Freundes Freund zu sein,  
Wer ein holdes Weib errungen,  
Mische seinen Jubel ein!
\end{quote}

[He who knows the great pride  
Of being the friend of a friend,  
He who has a wife to cherish,  
Let him swell our mighty song!]

The dates between the poem and the music—1787-1824—cover the sea change to which Pateman’s argument is most often applied. But if Pateman’s argument is valid, if the exclusion of women was indeed inherent in and not accidental to the democratic

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2 Johann Christoph Friedrich von Schiller, “Ode to Joy” (1787), set to music by Ludwig van Beethoven (1770-1827), as the fourth movement of Symphony No. 9 in D (Choral), op. 125 (1823-24).
project issued from the Enlightenment, then we should expect to find continuity in the exclusion of women.

Why then did the French Revolution fail to grant political rights to women? Why did France lead in male suffrage (proprietary from 1791, universal from 1848) and lag behind other western nations in female suffrage (1944)? Pierre Rosanvallon puts the problem clearly: “The power of the prejudices about women’s nature does not suffice to explain the nearly absurd character that the idea of opening the right of suffrage to women had [for men] during the Revolution.” The key, for Rosanvallon, is that the Revolutionaries did not consider women to be “true individuals.” Instead, they were closed into the sphere of domestic activity.”

Most historians now accept, in Mary Louise Roberts’s words, “the absolute centrality of this view of womanhood to the bourgeois democratic society that rose up in the wake of the 1789 revolution;” they acknowledge that the culture of individual achievement and fulfillment was premised on a new model of gender. Carole Pateman and others demonstrated that formulations of citizenship in this period were based on the exclusion of women. The subordination of women in the writings of the philosophe and their formal exclusion from the new polity were not accidental, but intrinsic in and essential to the new culture. In order to think their way to citizenship, Pateman argues, Enlightenment thinkers (and a fortiori the men of 1789) had to work their way out of a society entirely premised on a patriarchal model of the polity: the king was literally the father of the nation. To imagine, let alone to construct, a society without a king and ultimately to take on the guilt of regicide/parricide, as the English did in 1642, and the French in 1792, was impossible. The solution, Pateman suggests, was to project the patriarchal model of power into the home: if men were the heads of households, little kings in their own domains, then they could represent their households outside and this could justify their taking power as a band of brothers, substitution of fraternal for patriarchal power.

The implications of this argument for the question of citizenship in the nineteenth century have yet to be examined. Geneviève Fraisse and Christine Fauré have, to be sure, argued that eighteenth-century discourse on women conditioned that of the early-nineteenth century, but no-one has asked whether the continued exclusion of women throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth century resulted from its centrality to the world view underpinning liberal democracy. The implication of Pateman’s argument is that the exclusion of women from nineteenth-century liberal democracies like France results directly from the centrality of that exclusion to the premises of liberal democracy. Many who accept Pateman’s argument resist its

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7 Geneviève Fraisse, Reason’s Muse (Chicago, 1994); Christine Fauré, Democracy Without Women (Bloomington, 1991).
logical implications (and a few hardy souls still insist that the exclusion of women was "tactical" or "accidental").

In this paper, I want to focus on the early Third Republic as a case study for my argument that the exclusion of women from the vote was inherent in the origins of republican thought. Accepting the implications of Pateman’s argument and extending it through the nineteenth century explains why, as I put it (laconically, I fear) in my general history, “[In the debates over the ‘Constitution of 1875,’] no one raised women’s suffrage, as some had in 1848.” No one would dispute that the Third Republic excluded women from the formal (political) public sphere (it of course extended education to girls). The issue I wish to address is whether that exclusion was inherent in the Republican project, or accidental, resulting from the need for Republicans to conciliate Orleanist elites and from the generally conservative tenor of public life after the Commune.

The argument of this paper is that Pateman’s argument should lead us to reconsider the exclusion of women from the suffrage, to cease viewing it as the result of neglect or accident and to view it instead as inherent in republicanism. It is no accident, I contend, that women were most firmly excluded precisely when a working Republic was finally put into place. The discourse of Third Republic republicanism continued to reflect a family model on which republicanism based itself, a model in which the separation of spheres justified male political activity by female inactivity, male public life by female private life.

To argue this position, the present paper opens two lines of inquiry. First, it aims to analyze the discussion (or lack thereof) of women’s suffrage during the 1870s, with particular reference to Léon Richer and Maria Deraismes’s aborted 1872 campaign for the suffrage. (It would be useful to extend the argument by a comparison with debates surrounding the Constitution of the an III and that of 1848, but that is beyond the scope of this paper.) The discourse around women’s suffrage, such as it was, and the silence of most republicans, reinforce the notion that the exclusion of women was not accidental. If it were, one would expect to see some republican politicians paying at least lip service to women’s suffrage.

Second, the paper opens the question of the nature of the silences surrounding women’s suffrage, especially the silence from the republicans. These silences are based in a concept of woman’s nature as anchored in the family. The constant iteration of family metaphors, especially among republicans, suggests that for republicans it remained essential for women to be kept in the private sphere and out of the public. To the extent that republican discourse was saturated in family metaphors, it repeated and prolonged the discourse of the eighteenth-century philosophes.

I

There is never total silence, though there was total silence from Republican politicians: women’s suffrage was discussed during the 1870s, but not by Republican

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8 Anne Verjus argues that the exclusion of women was a by-product of the property–based suffrage [suffrage censitaire] because it was based on the family and not on the exclusion of women. But while the cens was based on family tax payments, Verjus’ examples of the cases in which this led to recognition of women as heads of household or as voters are, to say the least, unconvincing. See Anne Verjus, Le cens de la famille. Les femmes et le vote, 1789-1848 (Paris, 2002).
9 Charles Sowerwine, France since 1870: Culture, Politics and Society (Basingstoke, 2001), 31.
politicians. Several women had courageously raised the issue of women’s rights in the Tivoli—Vauxhall Debates in the liberal empire. One of these—Paule Mink—could not speak in the 1870s since she was exiled. But memory of the Commune and fear of the pétroleuses did not prevent all mention of the issue. In 1871, Léon Richer and Maria Deraismes revived the Association for Women’s Rights and its newspaper, *Le droit des femmes*; the reference to “rights” seemed too radical in the period of martial law and occupation: the newspaper was restyled *L’avenir des femmes*; within a few months, the group was similarly restyled.\(^{10}\)

Despite their moderation, Richer and Deraismes organised—in June 1872—a banquet of 150 supporters of women’s emancipation, held at the Corazza Restaurant in the Palais Royal.\(^{11}\) The keynote speaker was Victor Schoelcher, who had signed the 1848 decree abolishing slavery. The highlight of the evening was a letter from Victor Hugo. Women, he argued, were virtual slaves: “There are citizens, THERE ARE NOT CITIZENNESSES. This is a violent fact; it must cease.”\(^{12}\)

Richer and Deraismes seem to have believed that they had put the issue of women’s suffrage back on the agenda. They devoted an entire edition of *L’avenir des femmes* to a report on this banquet. Richer wrote, “Who can now be afraid of being ridiculous when [one is] in the company of Victor Hugo, with Louis Blanc, with H. de Lacretelle, with Naquet, with Lemonnier, [with] the director of *L’opinion nationale*, Adolphe Guérout, and with the director of *Le siècle*, Louis Jourdan.”\(^{13}\)

Far from having put the issue of women’s suffrage back on the agenda, however, Richer and Deraismes had raised it for the last time in at least a decade. Conservatives were now talking the post-revolutionary (as well as counter-revolutionary) language of de Maistre and Bonald. In a leader by Albert Wolff, *Le Figaro*, well to the right then as now, railed at “[the supposed demand for] the suppression of paternal authority … [which] would be the dissolution of the family.” It was simple: “of the two spouses, one must govern as absolute master [il faut que l’un gouverne en maître absolu].” There was no choice: either the wife obeys the husband or the husband obeys the wife. The latter alternative was so unthinkable that it was not even addressed.\(^{14}\) *Le courrier de France* agreed: “Wives and mothers, no more baby clothes; just a flag. No more pots-au-feu; just the ballot box: Woman the voter and soldier.”\(^{15}\)

Conservatives were thus adamant in their opposition to women’s suffrage. That is not surprising. What might be surprising, at least from the perspective that women’s exclusion was accidental, it that no voice was raised in its favor from among the ranks of Gambetta’s republicans, the “radical republicans” who would effectively establish the Republic and become known as “opportunists.” They were then intent on a deal with Thiers to assure the future of the Republic and were unlikely to go out on any limbs. But beyond the conjuncture, did their silence not represent a position on women’s role which effectively excluded women from the public sphere?

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\(^{10}\) *Le droit des femmes*, 1860-70; *L’avenir des femmes*, 1871-1879; *Le droit des femmes*, 1879-1891.


\(^{13}\) *L’avenir des femmes*, 8 July 1872.


II

What does the nature of the discourse (or silence) surrounding women’s suffrage tell us about whether exclusion was inherent or accidental? Eugène Pelletan, father of Camille (the Third Republic radical about whom Judith Stone has written\(^\text{16}\)), wrote in 1869 that woman’s place was “at home, directing, administering the house and above all constantly forming those young souls which Providence has confided to her, making them one day citizens worthy of their country. Thus, to define marriage … I would call it a constitutional government. The husband minister of foreign affairs, the wife minister of the interior, and all household questions decided by the council of ministers.”\(^\text{17}\)

While stating that this passage supports Pateman’s argument, Judith Stone suggests that “since Pateman’s main concern … is to demonstrate the patriarchal character of liberalism, she devotes less attention to the increasing dissatisfaction with liberal theory after 1850. She concludes that Pelletan’s “metaphor [that marriage was like a constitutional government] indicates that many nineteenth-century social commentators were no longer content with the sharp distinction between domestic and public realms.”\(^\text{18}\) It does not seem to me that one can find any such “dissatisfaction with liberal theory” in regard to gender issues. One can find it in regard to social issues—culminating no doubt in Léon Bourgeois’ notion of “solidarism” in the 1890s—though even on social issues the radical republicans were remarkably laissez-faire until the 1890s. Gambetta’s Belleville Program of 1869 called only for “the study” of social questions and its general tone was thoroughly liberal.

To be sure, the most obvious reading of Pelletan’s metaphor would lead us to contrast republican imagery with the paternal metaphors which dominated conservative thinking. Compared to conservatives, many republicans were moderate about women’s rights. Pateman’s argument, however, is not about moderation, but about a shift from paternal to fraternal metaphors. I would suggest that the language of the radical republicans, including Pelletan’s, works around metaphors which are consonant with fraternity. The language of Pelletan, of Jules Michelet and of Victor Hugo, did indeed draw on fraternal metaphors, as Judith Stone herself has argued. (These texts are well known enough not to need citation here.) Most Republicans, during the second half of the nineteenth century, drew on Michelet and Hugo, for their discursive structures.\(^\text{19}\)

In her memoirs, Juliette Lambert Adam noted how her husband Edmond Adam, one of Gambetta’s closest friends, confided to his wife the need for women to support the next generation of Republican leaders:

> “But do you know what worries me, Juliette? That in the tide of our young friends, I don’t see any women following them: Gambetta, Challemel, Spuller, Ranc, have no wives. . . . Cafés may maintain the


\(^{19}\) Ibid., 32-40.
spirit of opposition, but once the Republic is founded, I look in vain for the hearths [foyers] which will preserve it.”

So, recorded Juliette Lamber Adam in her memoirs, her husband Edmond spoke of the need for women to support the next generation of Republican leaders. This was the discourse of Michelet, the discourse of Republican fraternity. It was markedly different from that of Bonald and de Maistre, the discourse of conservative paternalism, but it excluded women just as effectively, if more gently, so gently that even politically-minded women like Adam did not even notice the implicit exclusion. And, taking the point a step further, this suggests that the exclusion of women ran so deep in nineteenth-century thought that even a politically active and involved woman like Adam could not bring the issue to the surface. The exclusion from formal politics simply led her to informal political participation, initially through her salon and as the confidant of Léon Gambetta, the leading Republican statesman of the day.

To discuss his political thought, Gambetta depended on his relationship with Juliette Adam and with his lover, Léonie Léon. Edmond Adam had introduced Juliette to Gambetta on their wedding day. Gambetta became the leading light of Adam’s salon and for the next ten years they remained close friends, though not sexually involved. In a series of long, often deeply intellectual letters, Gambetta discussed everything with her. She had made her reputation by her determined attack on Proudhon. But while she could see and respond courageously to Proudhon’s paternalism (not to say misogyny), she does not appear to have been in any way troubled by her husband’s assumption that women’s role was to maintain Republican foyers. She reports his statement in language which is at least implicitly favorable. Yet this was the Republican version of Michelet’s argument: women’s role was nurturing in the home. Feminists of the 1890s would oppose the soft cocoon of Michelet as much as the harsh prison of Proudhon, but for the moment only a courageous few saw the difficulty of Republican discourse confining women to the private sphere.

The avenues that women did find for participation in politics were the égerie and the salon. Juliette Adam was typical of politically-minded women of this period in exercising influence through her salon, to which she invited only men: “My true nature,” she wrote, later, “would have been that of an apostle preaching the good word and reconciling men between each other.” “My activity needs to oblige [my friends],” she wrote later. “That’s perhaps because I am from Picardy, the women of that province are women who wear trousers, men are nothing there.”

Léonie Léon, Gambetta’s mistress from 1872 until his death in 1882, was an example of the other role open to women: the égerie. Léonie played the role of

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21 Juliette Lamber, *Idées anti-proudhoniennes sur l’amour, la femme et le mariage* (Paris, 1858). Lambert dropped the “t” from her name to prevent her husband from taking the profits from her book, but in vain: the second edition appeared under her married name, Juliette La Messine. After her marriage to Edmond Adam (the man of her choice, her first husband having been imposed on her), the third edition appeared under the name Juliette Adam, which she used for all her subsequent—extensive—publications.
23 “Mon activité a besoin d’obliger. Ça tient peut-être à ce que je suis Picarde, la femme de cette province est une femme qui porte les culottes, l’homme n’y est rien.” Goncourt Journal, quoted in Guichard, 38.
discreet counselor in the background and, to her occasional chagrin, never sought the public stage. A perusal of their correspondence—we have had access to 1187 extant letters—reveals no mention of women’s suffrage among the myriad of political issues and dealings they discuss.  

Women were firmly excluded from the public sphere, particularly firmly with the advent of Moral Order. Following the 1872 banquet, the Minister of the Interior prohibited the groups’ meetings: they were “only a pretext for the assembly of numerous women who are too emancipated.” Richer and Deraismes cancelled plans for a feminist congress in 1873. Even so, the group was banned in 1875. 

By the time Léon Richer published his major book, La femme libre, Richer devoted, as Steven Hause tells us, “an entire chapter … to explaining why feminists should not seek the vote,” asking, in effect, for them to silence debate. His major argument? The clerical peril: “Among nine million women …, only several thousand would vote freely; the rest would take their orders from the confessional.” So even the leading male supporter of women’s rights had shifted his fundamental position to that of the Republicans by the time they came to power. Richer is here using what we know as “the clerical argument,” the assumption among Republicans that women had remained under the tutelage of the Church (while men had been emancipated?) and thus would vote according to the dictates of the Church. The clerical argument is not, of course, the same as that of fraternity, of raising Republican children, but in Michelet the two are so deeply intertwined that it is almost impossible to pick them apart: the two stand in for each other.

In the lead-up to the banquet, Richer invited Gambetta to join the Association for Women’s Rights: he had, Gambetta replied, “little familiarity with such complex problems.” And he added, “Women’s rights would be near to being resolved, once the rights of the citizen were established and legally recognized: ‘We shall reach this goal, Sir, by firmly maintaining the Republican constitution and by extending education in floods [à flots] to the new generations. That is why I have consented to become a member of the Ligue de l’Enseignement.’” “Maintaining the Republican constitution” was code for anticlericalism and thus, in this context, for the exclusion of women.

Interestingly, the closer one looks at the actual behavior of political women, the less one finds the clerical peril. Jules Ferry, whose name became synonymous with anticlericalism, had been prepared to follow the expedient course of being married or at least having his marriage blessed by a priest, but his fiancée, Eugénie Risler, insisted on a civil marriage. They were both committed republicans, but this...
did not prevent Ferry from seeing her in terms that sound like Michelet’s. He wrote to her, praising “your grace, your childlike gaiety, all your feminine art of rendering me happy.” She gave him, he wrote in another letter, “such a noble confidence, which revives mine when it tires.”

Famously, as Steven Hause and I have both discussed in earlier work, Deraismes also became reticent about the suffrage. It has been argued that she was acting for tactical reasons, given that the group had been banned, but Steven Hause and I have both concluded that she shared with Richer a deep anguish about women’s subjection to the confessor. In 1878, Richer and Deraismes organized a women’s congress in conjunction with the Universal Exposition, but they excluded the issue of the suffrage. Hubertine Auclert reacted violently; she then sought and gained support from the socialists at the Congress of Marseilles in 1879.

This incident demonstrates the depth of silence which continued to surround women’s suffrage into the 1890s. After the banquet, the only discussion of women’s suffrage, even among feminists and republicans, was Richer’s and Deraismes’ efforts to silence discussion of the suffrage. Auclert’s appeal to the socialists shows the depth of her despair. The socialists were a tiny sect well outside legitimate politics until the 1890s. The Congress of Marseilles was a founding congress that brought together two sects and defined socialism by excluding the anti-feminist Proudhonians. So for Auclert, in no way a socialist in terms of her political positions (she was a liberal), to go to the socialists demonstrates that she had no recourse among the Republicans who by this time had come to dominate politics.

So Republicans did not support the suffrage. Woman’s place was as wife and mother. It was there, from the private sphere, that she was to contribute to the regeneration promised by the Republic. There was no place for women in the Republican public sphere, a point James Lehning has established from another perspective.

Clearly, in the stock phrase, more research is needed. But I think it is time that we grasped the nettle and saw that the exclusion of women was not accidental to the establishment of the Republic but inherent in Republicanism and it the establishment of the Third Republic. Let me conclude with a speculative argument that might fuel discussion. My colleague Pat Grimshaw pioneered work about the origins of women’s suffrage, work since taken up by Louise Newman. Grimshaw’s main conclusion derives from a key fact often overlooked: all the places that gave women the vote before 1900 were frontier lands: New Zealand, two Australian states (South Australia and Western Australia) and four American states (Colorado, Idaho, Idaho.

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29 “Ta grâce, ta gaieté d’enfant, tout ton art féminin de me rendre heureux.” “Tu as mis en moi une si noble confiance, qui ranime la mienne quand elle se lasse.” Jules Ferry, Lettres de Jules Ferry, 1846-1893 (Paris, 1914), 280, 304.
Utah, and Wyoming). These were states on the periphery. They were not the vanguard of republican progress. They were settler states involved in struggles for law and order and for the land they were taking from indigenous peoples. The vote for women was granted for many motives, including the creation of a coalition against frontier lawlessness and against the indigenous peoples whom white settlers had displaced.

If the exclusion of women was inherent in the Republican project, then the quarter century between women’s obtaining the vote in America and Britain and their obtaining it in France may well indicate a French advance. Contrary to the implicit teleology in the idea of a “French lag” in the suffrage—do we speak of an American lag because blacks were disenfranchised in the American south until the 1960s?—we need to consider the possibility that it was precisely because Republicanism had deeper roots in France than elsewhere that the exclusion of women from the public sphere, from politics, was more deeply rooted there than elsewhere.