The emergence from about 1926 of a new literature concerned with immigration into France is surely the first sign that there was a crisis of policy and public opinion in France’s relationship with its foreign population.¹ This “crisis of immigration” was motivated by three distinct issues that converged more or less simultaneously: economic decline and a sharp rise in the number of unemployed; the realization, through the daily experience of many French people of the size of the foreign population; and, through the works of sociologists and demographers, the reminder of France’s demographic stagnation. In the minds of commentators and critics, the interrelationship of all three was clear: while the French population remained stagnant, the French nation itself was in decline, especially in comparison to population growth elsewhere in Europe. As unemployment rose among French workers, popular opinion turned against immigrant workers. It is not an exaggeration to call this a “crisis of immigration,” as the mood of public opinion so well captured and analyzed by Ralph Schor, and the direction of public policy—equally well studied by historians such as Jean-Charles Bonnet and Gary Cross, among others—turned on the urgency with which the “problem” of immigration was perceived in social, demographic and political terms.² The full consequences of this crisis would be realized in the 1930s as France resisted the demands made on it by the refugees from Nazism and experienced a quite profound spread of xenophobia and antisemitism. Yet as early as the mid 1920s there was a palpable sense of vulnerability, of national weakness, and even of social crisis emanating from this acute awareness of the

¹ The more commonly cited authors from this period include Michel Paon, L’immigration en France (Paris, 1926); Georges Mauco, Les étrangers en France (Paris, 1934); and René Martial, who published a series of works on race and immigration in the 1930s, such as L’immigration continentale et transcontinentale (Paris, 1933); and La race française. Le sol. Les racines. La souche. La croissance et les greffons (Paris, 1935).
foreign presence. As a consequence, immigration was pushed forward as a matter of political significance and as an important focus of popular consciousness.

The new literature concerned with immigration articulated this vulnerability, and France’s apparent powerlessness in the face of mounting problems. But more than this, it introduced a new debate about the principles on which France’s status as a nation of immigration and asylum should rest. The threats could only be challenged, it seemed, by the rigorous enforcement of the exclusionary practices at that time taking hold in public policy. Certainly, both public policy and popular opinion faced the rise in unemployment in the late 1920s in quite simplistic terms: the removal of foreign workers could only mean jobs for unemployed French workers. But this conceals the more complex and sometimes contradictory framework of the regulation of foreign labor as new restrictions were imposed on the issue and renewal of identity cards and work permits for foreign workers. The purpose was to remove foreigners from those sectors of the labor market with high levels of unemployment. But foreigners in general, more than just foreign workers, were the targets of exclusion, and they had neither protection from, nor legal remedy against abuses or errors of administrative measures to rescind their entitlements to live and work in France.

Certainly, there is a long history of concern and suspicion over the impact of immigration on France. But from the mid 1920s, foreigners were once more reconceptualized on a number of levels. Recognition of immigration as a problem recast immigrants in the popular imagination and as objects of political and social interest. In popular opinion, they were perceived as competitors for jobs, for housing, limited social welfare and other benefits. Popular antipathies were stirred by economic stress, bringing out attitudes dormant during less stressful times. In public policy, foreigners were redefined to fit into the economic constraints of the labor market. Foreign workers, who were essential in the period of post-war reconstruction, were now impediments to economic progress and the full employment of French workers. Restrictions on work permits, even their revocation, reclassified foreign workers as “undesirables,” which legitimized their exclusion from sectors of the labor market in which there was high unemployment and legitimized their expulsion from the country. Political opinion also shifted its perception of foreigners as they attempted to balance the demands of business, workers and public opinion. Foreigners became the focus of ideological divisions between the left and right over the regulation of labor. As Ralph Schor and Gary Cross have both demonstrated, large business organizations maintained the need for an unregulated labor market and a continued demand for foreign workers, while socialists and trade unions were critical of the lack of protection for French workers. Communists, quite distinctly, viewed the expulsions of foreign workers as evidence of capitalist abuse of the proletariat.

The reconceptualization of foreigners is also evident among historians who have recently become more attentive to the voices of racism among commentators and the participants of political debates. Sometimes with an eye quite consciously looking ahead to the Vichy years, they have revealed a racial purpose during this crisis of immigration, and have exposed tendencies towards racial selection behind the façade

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4 Schor, L’opinion française, 243 and 493; Cross, Immigrant Workers in Industrial France, Chap. 7.
of “civic” and “republican” models of integration, assimilation and naturalization. By stressing one of a number of concerns in popular opinion, these historians have recast the foreigner as a racial “other” in whom the anxieties of the time are invested, and through which racism is brought in from the margins.

The purpose of this paper is to examine one response to the “crisis of immigration,” a draft law to reform immigration policy put forward by Charles Lambert in 1931. Commentators on and critics of immigration agreed on the need for policy reform to overcome its more negative aspects. Both a critic of policy and a political actor with the aim of changing it, Lambert envisaged a coherent and systematically regulated regime based on a statute that set down conditions of entry and residence, and gave a definite legal status to resident foreigners. This would replace the existing system, which was unregulated in law and public administration except by policing and expulsion. His draft law requires critical evaluation because its aims are consistent with the dominant discourse of exclusion and suggests racial sentiments while expressing preoccupations about the decline of the French nation. He recasts the foreigners in exclusionary terms, but the focus of his attention is on reinvigorating the French nation itself, which vitally needed new settlers to fill the demographic gaps. His law therefore poses what seems to be a contradiction. Its intent is the legitimization of exclusion, while it upholds civic and republican models of integration, assimilation and naturalization. How close then were the ideas of exclusion and assimilation? How, indeed, does Lambert reconcile what seem to be opposing tendencies?

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A radical-socialist deputy from the Rhône since 1920, Charles Lambert had gained a substantial reputation for his expertise on immigration matters. As the author of the 1927 naturalization law, the intention of which was to facilitate assimilation by reducing the mandatory period of residency from ten to three years, he was described in Le temps as “the most active, the most eloquent propagandist” on naturalization. He built upon his reputation, firstly by launching the journal L’amitié française to promote his views on immigration, naturalization and assimilation, and by publishing a commentary on the 1927 law, La France et les étrangers, which included further elaboration of his ideas on immigration which shaped his 1931 draft law. In 1929, the radical-socialists in the parliament selected him for the post of president of the Immigration Commission, in which capacity it seems he presented his proposition of 1931. He put his proposition, whose title translates rather awkwardly as “a draft law

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6 Quoted by Bonnet, Les Pouvoirs Publics, 79.


8 Bonnet, Les pouvoirs publics, 79
to introduce a statute on foreigners and to organize rationally foreign immigration,” to the Chamber of Deputies on 11 February 1931.9

This draft law was in two parts. One proposed the creation of a ministerial office, or High Commission, responsible for all matters pertaining to immigration, naturalization and the residence of foreigners. This office of High Commissioner for Immigration, Emigration and Naturalization (Haut commissaire d’immigration, d’émigration, et de naturalisation) would consolidate the diverse activities of the various ministries changed with these responsibilities. The second part was his statute on immigration, which set out a comprehensive legal regime regulating entry conditions and residence entitlements.

Immigration policy, Lambert complained, had hitherto been administered to serve industrial and agricultural purposes, but lacked any grounding in law and was not guided by general principles for the benefit of French national interests. The High Commission would turn these priorities around. When examined critically, however, it is apparent that Lambert’s statute had only one purpose, that of legitimizing the barriers between foreigners and the French state that had been consolidated over the previous years of restrictive and exclusionary directions in public policy. Indeed, Lambert’s language is consistent with the dominant public discourses of exclusion. “The efficacy of the existing barriers are weakened,” Lambert explained, because there was no screening at the border. This led to the “invasion” of “disparate elements” from which France was protected only by the “most imperfect system of identity cards, which does not permit the actual eviction of undesirable arrivals.”10

Lambert’s statute would therefore set exclusion on more secure foundations than the arbitrary nature of policing and the restrictions on work permits. Two identity cards only would replace the existing system, thereby rationalizing residence entitlements and benefits. One card would be issued to those “who live without work,” and another to those who “occupy paid employment.” These simple classifications, Lambert emphasized, would benefit the state because they would provide the government and its administration with the ability to eject “undesirables, suspects, and the useless (inutilisables).” The system’s main purpose therefore was quite explicitly to aid the work of the municipal and prefectural services in removing these foreigners without the constant intercession of associations and organizations acting on their behalf. That, he said, only caused delays and incurred costs.11

One striking feature of Lambert’s proposition is the degree to which he set apart foreigners, linguistically as well as conceptually—striking because his reputation on immigration policy, his advocacy of assimilation in his journal L’amitié française, and his recognition in 1928 by the president of the Lyons section of the Ligue des droits de l’homme, an organization that intervened on behalf of foreigners facing expulsion for his assistance to foreigners all suggest a more inclusive approach to the question of immigration.12 Lambert described the frontiers as barriers, and those who crossed them as “invaders” and a “threat” (menace). The state’s function in

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9 AN, C 14963. Dossier, Étrangers: Projet de loi tendant à donner un statut aux étrangers et à organiser rationnellement l’immigration étrangère (session de 1931, séance 11 février 1931).
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Lambert was made honorary member of the Foyer national pour la protection et la naturalisation des étrangers created in Lyon in 1928, among the founders of which was the president of the Lyon section of the Ligue des droits de l’homme, and the President of the Lyon Chamber of Commerce. Bonnet, Les pouvoirs publics, 82.
regulating immigration should therefore be that of implementing selection and screening to identify and eliminate undesirables.

Control of entry was only one part of a solution to the problem of immigration; another was the implementation of a means of legitimate discrimination so that undesirable foreigners already living in France could be removed more expeditiously. Therefore, a second striking feature is the manner in which Lambert proposed strengthening the barriers between France and its foreign population. As a result, discrimination would be set into law and in the function of state institutions. The two broad permit categories, those employed and those not employed, would give the state greater authority over a foreigner’s conditions of residence. Evidence of desirability, and therefore of an entitlement to remain, would be based on personal worth, either through wealth, allowing one to live independently, or, more importantly, by the ability to work in an occupation where there was a need for labor. Otherwise, there was no entitlement to residence, and a foreigner would therefore face expulsion. The aim, quite simply, was administrative convenience and the facilitation of removal.

The administrative structures Lambert proposed would therefore have brought discriminatory and exclusionary practices into the arms of the state and would have even deprived those subject to its force the protection of individual rights against abuses. Lambert, in fact, was silent about the increasing evidence of abuse through indiscriminate expulsion and the arbitrary exercise of police powers against foreigners in the application of harsh regulations pertaining to the renewal of work and residence permits. Instead, he was critical of the delays and costs incurred by representations made on behalf of individuals facing expulsion. As his statute set exclusionary measures on surer legal ground, the lack of protection seems a significant omission, and is seemingly contrary to the civic and republican model of integration, assimilation and naturalization on which his reputation rested. How can this be explained?

Exclusionary migration practices, it must be noted, had become the international norm by 1931. Lambert’s preference for selection and screening was consistent with new trends in the immigration policies adopted in the United States during the 1920s. Indeed, Lambert looked to the US quota system as his model for selection and screening. The US model, Lambert believed, was far preferable to France’s indiscriminate policy as it ensured better outcomes, and was now much more necessary since the US had closed its doors to the mass migrations of earlier decades. Europe had fewer outlets for its peoples, and protective barriers had spread during the late 1920s as other countries experienced deteriorating economic conditions, and imposed controls to restrict immigrant arrivals. Immigration restrictions were therefore a broad international reaction against the movement of peoples in this time.

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13 Introduced in 1921 and revised in 1924, the US quota system restricted immigration to a percentage of the resident foreign population. Originally 3 percent of the figures of the 1910 census, then in 1924 the quotas were set at 2 percent of the 1890 census. Not only did the quota system dramatically reduce migrant numbers, it also changed the source of immigrants from southern and eastern Europe, which dominated the later figures, to the more traditional countries of northern Europe. John Higham, Send These to Me: Immigrants in Urban America, revised ed. (Baltimore and London, 1984), 54-5; John Torpey, The Invention of the Passport. Surveillance, Citizenship and the State (Cambridge, 2000), 117-21.

14 A contemporary study of the trend towards immigration restriction in the 1920s was made by Egidio Reale, “Le problème des passeports,” Recueil des cours de l’académie de droit international (Paris, 1934), 91-188.
of economic stress. France was particularly vulnerable to new migration flows excluded from the US because of its indiscriminate policy.

Lambert’s intent, therefore, was to remodel French immigration policy after US policy, by changing unregulated entry to selection at the point of departure, and by introducing post-arrival screening to test health and character. His proposal for a High Commissioner to administer immigration would have revived his short-lived post of 1926 as High Commissioner for Immigration and Naturalization under the premiership of Edouard Herriot, an office quite consciously modeled on the American Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization. 15 His draft statute was shaped by what he believed to be the beneficial outcomes of US immigration restrictions. 16 It was a system that above all distinguished the relative worth of immigrants and their potential benefits to the country.

This is one explanation. Another is that Lambert’s reputation on immigration matters rested almost entirely on the issue of assimilation, which is as much to do with exclusion as integration. The purpose of his 1927 naturalization law was to aid the assimilation of long-term foreign residents in order to replenish the French nation after the bloodletting of the Great War. 17 His draft law of 1931 was the next step in assimilating France’s foreign population. By better regulating immigration and therefore selecting the better elements—separating the wheat from the chaff, as it were—and by encouraging their assimilation, public policy would better serve French national interests. The two laws of 1927 and 1931 can therefore be seen as two steps in the one direction, that of strengthening the French nation not by ridding itself of its foreigners, but by making them French.

This process could only begin through measures for selection and screening. Lambert, however, does not detail how this would be implemented, nor does he suggest criteria for selection apart from his vague classification of undesirable foreigners. Perhaps he believed that the deputies would be familiar with the ideas he had put forward in his publications. These show that he envisaged, firstly, selection on socio-economic grounds. The removal of foreign workers was a response to high unemployment among French workers, but there remained serious shortages of labor in important sectors of the economy, above all in agriculture. France, therefore, could not do without foreign workers and was mistaken in an indiscriminate policy that saw to their removal.

Moreover, foreign workers could resolve a serious demographic problem in the countryside. Rural depopulation, Lambert observed, was a “calamity” that had spread with “terrifying rapidity.” The settlement of young people who would work the land and therefore fill the demographic gap must therefore be the aim of sound migration policy. The young would bear families and through them France would be renewed. “France,” Lambert said on another occasion, “has no need for bankers with

15 Cross, Immigrant Workers in Industrial France, 173. Cross comments that this office existed for only six weeks, falling with a change of government, and therefore had no time to change the direction of French immigration policy. Nevertheless, it had existed long enough to demonstrate how inconsistent the American model was with the French model, as it ignored France’s unique nature as a country of immigration with long land borders that made it extremely difficult to apply external controls on entry or screening at entry.
16 Lambert, La France et les étrangers, 95-107.
17 Ibid., 48-9.
an international outlook; it needs young people and farmers. With them, it will become again a great country.”

From where would these young people be drawn? On this question certain racial sentiments emerged, but it must be stressed that Lambert was no advocate of racial selection, nor did he go so far as Georges Mauco shortly afterwards to propose a hierarchy of more or less assimilable people. Certainly, Lambert stressed how selection must be judicious, so as to avoid “mixing races that can’t mix.” This excluded Asians and Africans (des asiatiques ou des africains), as the “renovation” of the French race required the “assimilation of similar individuals.” They would therefore come from Europe: Latins—Spaniards and Italians—were ideal, but so too were other Europeans, Belgians and Dutch, Scandinavians and Slavs—Czechs, Poles, Russians. They were all “prolific and strong,” and would have a beneficial influence on the French race.

This was not so much a hierarchy as a catalogue of peoples who already made up sizable proportions of France’s foreign population. It is indeed noteworthy that Lambert’s proposals, so consciously modeled on US immigration policy, which set quotas for racial selection, should stop short of a French policy itself based on overt racial discrimination. Lambert, in fact, rejected the “brutal hostility” displayed in the US selection. Nevertheless, French policy was exclusionary, and Lambert sought to consolidate this, so that some implication of discrimination between more or less desirable peoples is unavoidable.

Lambert’s dismissal of Asians and Africans as unassimilable exposes an issue of immigration in this period that is still poorly understood. He notes that indigenous peoples of the colonies were excluded from the total number of foreigners resident in France, although there were some 120,000 North Africans employed in mines, factories and other manufacturing industries. They were, however, outside his interests and had no role to play in his ideas of rejuvenating the French people. This immediately opens up problems of race, empire and colonialism and their influences on republican thought in the interwar period. For the purposes of this paper, it would suffice to identify two problems of the consciousness of the empire: one, that of considering colonials at the same time as assimilated and excluded, so that migration from the colonies was of an altogether different character to migration from other countries; second, and more fundamentally, that of identifying who could and who

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18 Quoted by Bonnet, *Les pouvoirs publics*, 83-84.
19 Weil, “Racisme et discrimination,” *passim*; Weil, *Qu’est qu’un français*, 82-5; Lawrence, “Naturalization,” 11; Vicki Caron, *Uneasy Asylum: France and the Jewish Refugee Crisis, 1933-1942* (Stanford, Calif, 1999), 79.
21 Ibid., 47. Lambert provides a table of resident foreigners by national origins at 1 Jan. 1925. Out of a total foreign population of 2,845,214, the six most represented nationalities were Italians (807,695), Spanish (467,156), Belgian (460,352), Poles (310,265) Swiss (146,273) and Russians (91,461). Czechoslovakiens (39,591) were ranked tenth, other Slavs (Serbs, Croats and Slovenes 20,555, Bulgarians 2,874) combined ranked fifteenth, Dutch (14,727) eighteenth, and Scandinavians (11,908) twentieth.
22 Ibid., 75.
23 Lambert simply says that they need not concern him: “nous n’aurons pas à nous occuper au cours de cette étude” (Ibid., 46.) On colonial immigration at this time see Cross, *Immigrant Workers in Industrial France*, 123; and Schor, *L’opinion française*, 164.
could not become French, a problem which by its nature characterized assimilation and exclusion on racial grounds.  

Even though racial sentiment is evident, Lambert’s idea of selection turned ultimately on the identification of undesirables, the criteria for which, in the economic and demographic conditions of the time, was largely socio-economic. In this way, Lambert holds firmly to the civic and republican models of integration, assimilation and naturalization and avoids too great a shift to racial selection that historians have noted in other critics of immigration. In this socio-economic context, undesirable foreigners were those who could not make a contribution to the nation; it was, therefore, necessary that they be removed while the assimilation and naturalization of the more desirable elements were encouraged. There was no conflict, therefore, between Lambert’s advocacy of exclusionary measures and the republican values upheld by the Ligue des droits de l’homme, for example. Both upheld key republican principles, as Jean-Charles Bonnet notes: the uncontested superiority of the French political regime over the regimes of immigrant source countries, the pre-eminent dignity of French thought, and the universal character of French culture.

We must be cautious, however, that this socio-economic dimension is not interpreted in such a way as to conceal racial imperatives. Lambert’s emphasis on the rejuvenation of the French nation through the selection of the better immigrants who would fill important socio-economic gaps can clearly be read in a racial way. The very idea of selection itself suggests racial considerations, whether they are consciously expressed or deeply unconscious. Certainly, within a couple of years, with the advent of the Jewish emigration from Germany from 1933, as Vicki Caron notes, this socio-economic dimension acquired a distinct racial character, and indeed Lambert’s own comment that France had no need for international bankers when its rural population was in decline would then have assumed quite a different meaning to that which this paper suggests he originally intended.

It is the contention of this paper, however, that race was not a dominant idea shaping Lambert’s proposals, and indeed more broadly on proposals for immigration policy. Racial ideas are nevertheless suggested in many ways, often unconsciously, and can appear to us like so much static in the background that interferes with our perceptions of this period. If we must be cautious, it is to avoid too anachronistic an interpretation of contemporary attitudes of race.

Sensitivity to France’s foreign population implied anxieties for the French nation itself, whose decline seemed symptomatic of racial weakness. Assimilation was essential to France’s struggle against demographic stagnation, and therefore these anxieties carried over into certain anxieties about the racial composition of its foreigners. Lambert committed himself to selection of the finer elements. Their

24 Elizabeth Ezra states that the colonial dilemma in interwar France rested the internal conflict between the inclusiveness of assimilation and the exclusiveness of association. The difference of the colonies—that they were not and could not be made French—separated them, and separated the colonials from peoples of other nationalities. Elizabeth Ezra, The Colonial Unconscious. Race and Culture in Interwar France (Ithaca and London, 2000), 6-7. Ralph Schor observes furthermore that the inclination of conceiving of immigration as a means of strengthening the French nation made the French resistant to peoples from distant lands and particularly to peoples of a different physical appearance (type physique national). Schor, L’opinion française, 164.

25 Bonnet, Les pouvoirs publics, 73.

26 See also Vicki Caron, “The Antisemitic Revival in France in the 1930s: The Socioeconomic Dimension Reconsidered,” Journal of Modern History 70 (March 1998): 24-73, on how language such as this assumed an antisemitic character in the 1930s.
selection and their assimilation were vital, and this, Lambert believed, should be the aim of sound policy as only this would reinvigorate the French nation. The alternative was invidious and destructive xenophobia, which discouraged potentially fine citizens. “Instead of a stupid policy of xenophobia,” he once commented, “let us welcome with an open heart, after taking all precautions, those who come to us. Let our land not be ungrateful, but let it extend a warm smile ([*qu’elle soit douce et souriante*]) and tomorrow … these millions of foreigners will be millions of good French men and women.”

The three key problems that Lambert’s proposed law sought to remedy—the insufficient barriers at the frontier, the lack of screening and the menace of indiscriminate foreign arrivals—describe a France in trepidation behind frail borders, suspicious of those who approached it. His is one anxious voice among many that were raised in response to the immigration crisis of the late 1920s and 1930s. Attention to assimilation, however, generated its own anxieties, and these were further propounded by Lambert’s conceptual framework of national weakness and the need for the reinvigoration of the French nation. By separating foreigners from the state behind the barriers of a legal statute that would aid the identification and elimination of undesirables—a vague and undefined term that was nevertheless deeply rooted in France’s history of immigration—he had legitimized the classification of immigrants as a ‘threat’ and their entry as an “invasion.” He had therefore constructed a rationale for xenophobia since the relative worth of all foreigners could be judged with suspicion.

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27 Quoted by Bonnet, *Les Pouvoirs publics*, 84.