

H-France Salon
Volume 9 (2017), Issue 1, #1

Post-Charlie: Community, Representation, and Terrorism's Foreclosures

Michael O'Riley
The Colorado College

On 14 July 2016 Mohamed Lahouaiej Bouhlel, a thirty-one-year-old delivery-truck driver raised in northeast Tunisia who held a French residence permit, drove a nineteen-ton refrigeration truck into a crowd gathered to watch fireworks on the Promenade des Anglais in Nice. Bouhlel killed eighty-four people and injured over 300 others. According to French Interior Minister, Bernard Cazeneuve, Bouhlel was a recent, but fervent, ISIS disciple. The Islamic State subsequently claimed responsibility for the massacre. Nearly two weeks later, the Nice attack was followed by another in Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray where a priest, Jacques Hamel, was killed in church while saying mass. Like the Nice attack, the Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray attack was also claimed by the Islamic State; it was carried out by two nineteen-year-old men, Adel Kermiche, a resident of Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray, and Abdel-Malik Nabil Petitjean from Aix-les-Bains. Immediately following the Bastille Day attack, President Hollande announced he would seek to extend the state of emergency that had been declared following the Paris attacks in November for another three months. Although that declaration was due to be lifted on 26 July, the French government instead extended the state of emergency for another six months while expanding already broadened police powers of search, detention, surveillance, and identity checks. It would seem that the “state of exception” inaugurated by the declaration of the state of emergency following the November terrorist attacks in Paris has become a protracted and commonplace state within France.¹

Referencing the recent attacks in Nice and Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray and their attendant measures, President Hollande declared that “cet acte abominable” was “une nouvelle épreuve pour la Nation” and that the French government would “appliquer avec la plus extrême fermeté les lois qui nous donnent la capacité d’agir.”² This statement was then followed by another cautioning against a loss of social and national cohesion so germane to the tenets of the Republic: “Restreindre nos libertés, déroger à nos règles constitutionnelles n'apporterait pas l'efficacité et affaiblirait la cohésion si précieuse de notre nation.” I begin these reflections on the special issue of *Contemporary French Civilization* on *Charlie Hebdo* with an evocation of intervening terrorist attacks and Hollande’s statements because they evoke salient social, political, and symbolic underpinnings of the Republic

¹ Giorgio Agamben, *State of Exception*, trans. Kevin Attell (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005). See also, Mayanthi Fernando and Catherien Raissiguier, “The Impossible Subject of *Charlie Hebdo*,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 140.

² François Hollande, “Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: retrouvez le déroulé de la journée au lendemain de l’attentat,” Le Live de l’événement, *Le Monde*, 26 July 2016, <http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/live/2016/07/26/en-direct-attaque-dans-une-eglise-pres-de-rouen>.

addressed both broadly and in detail by many of the contributions to this important special issue. Moreover, they also suggest a certain politics of silence that Mireille Rosello, in her contribution to the volume, signals in relation to such discussions of the French Republic and the spectacular violence of terrorism, one which masks the instrumentality of the nation-state and the struggles that its subaltern subjects face, “those who suffer from forms of chronic violence that the media cannot represent adequately because they last for years, and sometimes centuries.”³ For Rosello, a politics of silence regarding the suffering of some of France’s population cuts through national discourses and, she suggests, touches our own attempts to talk about terrorism and its aftermath. Indeed, Hollande’s statements and the spectacular nature of these most recent terrorist attacks mask a much broader silencing of the victimization and, in my view, the dynamics of victimization that recent terrorist attacks, including those of *Charlie Hebdo*, evince.

Hollande’s statements point to a seemingly contradictory stance of the Republic, generating another version of the “impossible subject” of the special issue on *Charlie Hebdo* of which Mayanthi Fernando and Catherine Raissiguier write. Fernando and Raissiguier point to the complex structural forces that position many subjects, as they say, “outside the national, beyond the reach of full inclusion within Western societies.”⁴ Hollande’s call for France to extend the state of emergency and exercise its authoritarian powers while contemporaneously seeking national cohesion, collective identity, and national stewardship (suggested, for example, by *notre nation*), suggests the inevitable gesture of “internal exclusion” of which Etienne Balibar has written regarding French citizenship’s contradictory exclusion of non-white youth from the Republic.⁵ Fernando and Raissiguier address this very form of treatment in their introduction to the issue on *Charlie Hebdo*: “Despite the republican model of citizenship’s claim to treat individuals as individuals rather than as members of a community, non-white immigrants and their descendants—many of whom are citizens—face systemic discrimination on the basis of their race, religion, and culture in various domains.”⁶ At first glance, Hollande’s cautious statement concerning the undermining of civil liberties can be read as a protection of all national identities and groups, and their rights. However, his initial statement regarding action, along with the extension of the state of emergency, inevitably suggests the promotion of a certain type of national collective subject and consolidates further a national structure promoting a variegated form of treatment of its subjects, an announced yet silent form of instrumentality and power that paradoxically rests on the tenets of civil rights and liberties. Within this structure, non-white

³ Mireille Rosello, “Silence, violence, and the invisibility of dissensus,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 296.

⁴ Fernando and Raissiguier, 128.

⁵ Etienne Balibar, “Uprising in the Banlieus,” *Constellations* 14 (2007): 49. Mayantha and Raissiguier also reference Balibar. His conception of interior exclusion becomes all the more important in relation to Michel Wieviorka’s notion that terrorism is an incarnation of the failures of decolonization and integration. In this way, the terrorist attacks in France could be seen as visual representations or returns within the state of its exclusionary policies and exceptional stances. See Michel Wieviorka, “Le terrorisme global comme anti-mouvement,” 18 March 2015, last modified 11 May 2016, <http://wieviorka.hypotheses.org/363>. I address Wieviorka’s work in more detail below. One could extend this idea of terrorist events in France as a return of state policies of exclusion further to suggest a haunting of the metropolis by contemporary incarnations of its colonial histories. See Michael O’Riley, *Cinema in an Age of Terror: North Africa, Victimization, and Colonial History* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2010).

⁶ Fernando and Raissiguier, 139.

citizens and others become suspect elements of a national discourse and surveillance predicated upon a certain Republican ideal.

One of the great strengths of the ensemble of articles on *Charlie Hebdo* in *Contemporary French Civilization* is the portrait that emerges of the French Republic. The contributions taken as a whole seem to say (albeit in different ways) that the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks and the reactions and implications surrounding them underscore some of the mechanisms by which the French Republic creates a discourse of collective identity, what Fernando and Raissiguier refer to as the “national we,” through a discourse of new republicanism.⁷ As they point out, this national collective is predicated on secular values, and one might argue that those values ultimately presume a long accretion of heritage and tradition, one that is steeped in Christianity.⁸ Given that the recent attacks took place against the backdrop of two central symbolic components of French national discourses on identity, Bastille Day and the Church, the contributions to the *Charlie Hebdo* issue seem all the more prescient.

In his remarks following the two most recent attacks, Prime Minister Valls confirmed just such a conflation of the symbolism of national roots, identity, secularism, and Christianity in national discourses by the state: “On s’attaque à un symbole, hier le 14 juillet, aujourd’hui une église, un prêtre, un homme âgé. On s’attaque à une part de l’identité de notre pays, à nos racines. C’est la République laïque qui est touchée profondément.”⁹ While this conflation of national roots, the symbolism of a deeply-rooted Christian identity, and secularism, is not the primary focus of my reflections, it is only fitting to point out how the recent terrorist attacks and immediate reactions to them by Hollande and Valls reflect some of the central points addressed in the special issue on *Charlie Hebdo*.

A predominant undercurrent that unites the essays in this special issue is that of community and representation and, namely, the specific question of inclusion and exclusion. While many of the contributions do not necessarily directly organize themselves around this idea, it nonetheless presents itself in various ways. Damien Stankiewicz problematizes the facile notion that Muslim readers could not understand *Charlie Hebdo*’s representations of Islam and of the Prophet because they are so culturally different. The transcultural nature of the cartoon in Stankiewicz’s article broadens the readership community to include Muslim readers.¹⁰ Manus McGrogan also probes

⁷ Fernando and Raissiguier, 139.

⁸ See Fernando and Raissiguier’s succinct but powerful overview of some of the scholarship on new *laïcité* and how it positions itself against Islam: 135-137. Here, I am making the claim that the symbolism of Christianity in Valls’ comments serves as an anchor point of French national identity and *laïcité*.

⁹ See Manuel Valls, “Saint-Etienne-du-Rouvray: retrouvez le déroulé de la journée au lendemain de l’attentat,” Le Live de l’événement, *Le Monde*, 26 July 2016, <http://www.lemonde.fr/societe/live/2016/07/26/en-direct-attaque-dans-une-eglise-pres-de-rouen>. Both Valls and Hollande make reference to national unity and identity in the wake of the attacks. According to Valls, “On voit bien quel est l’objectif : jeter les Français les uns contre les autres et provoquer une guerre de religion. Ce qui doit faire notre force, c’est notre capacité à dépasser nos divisions. Plus que jamais nous devons faire bloc.” Hollande echoed Valls in stating, “Ce qui est visé, c’est notre démocratie. Elle est la cible, elle sera notre bouclier. Notre unité fait notre force.”

¹⁰ See Damien Stankiewicz, “The Politics of the cartoon in anthropological context: *Charlie Hebdo* and the Legibility of Genre,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 147-166.

the question of prejudice and assumption, but from a slightly different angle. Discussing *Charlie Hebdo*'s evolution towards an Islamophobic stance that attacked or outright dismissed Islam and a concomitant alignment of the newspaper with French Republicanism, McGrogan's contribution underscores—much like Kathryn Kleppinger's contribution on rap—how modes of representation align with a state-sponsored discourse of Islamophobia, one which excludes the Muslim community from the same treatment accorded others.¹¹

Kleppinger points out how some forms of representation are protected and others such as those of rap artists critical of the French Republic are prosecuted: “While these differences in the treatment of rap and *Charlie Hebdo* do not justify or even explain why the Kouachi brothers chose to attack the magazine's offices, it does reveal further fault lines in French society's treatment of its ethnic and religious minorities and its ability to listen to social and political critiques raised by minority populations.”¹² Echoing the rapper Booba's comments concerning French society, Kleppinger states that “it is difficult, if not impossible, for *banlieu* dwellers of immigrant heritage to feel included in post-*Charlie* French society.”¹³ Issues of representation related to *Charlie Hebdo* become larger signifiers of a national discourse of exclusion that consolidates one version of community and forecloses certain types of critique directly related to its composition.

In a similar turn to issues of representation and the dyad of inclusion/exclusion, other contributors question the underlying representational tenets that generate the idea of community. Etienne Achille and Lydie Moudileno examine the mythology of French hexagonal identity that excludes the French Caribbean's solidarity in the wake of the attacks. Like the above contributors, Achille and Moudileno point to the limits of community and representation in relationship to national discourses of identity: “...la question est de savoir qui a le privilège de la parole patriotique et la possibilité de chanter, pour paraphraser Langston Hughes, ‘Moi aussi, je suis...’”¹⁴ Simon Rousset and Adrien Maret examine how media representation and circulating discourses of inclusion and secularism function to exclude: “le nouveau durcissement post-*Charlie* des positions politiques sur la laïcité perpétue des phénomènes anciens de domination sur la “communauté musulmane”, d'autant moins légitime que des terroristes s'en réclament.”¹⁵ Of the post-*Charlie* discourse on secularism and its symbolic violence, Rousset and Manret write, “Très présent après les attentats, celui-ci alimente la violence symbolique et les rapports de domination envers des personnes perçues quasi uniquement selon leur appartenance religieuse, réelle ou supposée.”¹⁶

¹¹ See Manus McGrogan, “The politics of provocation *Charlie Hebdo*, then and now,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 167-196.

¹² Kathryn Kleppinger, “When parallels collide: social commentary and satire in French rap before and after *Charlie Hebdo*,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 199.

¹³ Kleppinger, 210.

¹⁴ Etienne Achille and Lydie Moudileno, “*Mwen sé* Charlie: le JT, les Antilles et la représentation d'une réaction “française,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 231.

¹⁵ Simon Rousset and Adrien Maret, “L'attaque de Charlie ou le drame social: comprendre les raisons du choc émotionnel et analyser les répercussions socio-politiques après les attentats de Paris en janvier 2015,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 246.

¹⁶ Rousset and Maret, 245.

Like Achille and Moudileno, Rousset and Maret point to the exclusionary limits of 5th Republic discourses related to victimization and the nation, discourses which only further reinforce a national imaginary of what can and cannot be part of the hexagonal fabric of identity. The dominant political mode of secular discourse, they conclude, forecloses any real possibility for a truly inclusive community: “nous pensons que les orientations politiques dominantes exprimées dans notre corpus ne laissent pas présager un renforcement du ‘vivre ensemble.’”¹⁷ For Rousset and Maret, the question of community is completely threatened by the fracture that the post-Charlie discourses of the Republic impose.

In a similar manner, Osman Balkan’s examination of mourning and the funerals of both perpetrators and victims underscores the delineation of communal boundaries in the aftermath of the attacks. Illustrating different discourses surrounding the funerals and strategies of mourning that were a part of public and political memorialization, Balkan’s contribution argues that “the Republic does in fact distinguish between its citizens and shows how the creation of a hierarchy of French subjects is predicated upon differential practices of mourning.”¹⁸ In death as in life, the Republic can be seen to distinguish between its subjects. For Balkan, the memorialization process itself in the wake of the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks illustrates the staking out of territory and claims to “communal boundaries and collective identities.”¹⁹

This undercurrent of representation, identity, and community that one can identify throughout the different contributions of the special issue continues in the vignettes that follow the articles. Azouz Begag points to the central fracture and alienation in the community of the *banlieu* caused by an absence of communal memory: “Ainsi, les jeunes des banlieues ont-ils été spoliés de leur propre histoire. C’est l’une des explications à leur errance identitaire. De leur colère, aussi, voire de leur haine contre le système. Aujourd’hui, la plupart d’entre eux ignorent tout de l’histoire urbaine de leurs grands frères.”²⁰ For Begag, the failures of integration have led to a search for community for some that has led them to terrorism. Taking up terminology used by Valls at one point, Begag writes that, “Ce qui s’est passé dans les banlieues et à *Charlie Hebdo* en janvier 2015 est le résultat de quarante années d’apartheid social, territorial et économique...”²¹ In a similar manner, Gayle Zachmann examines the situation of the Jewish citizen and community in response to the attacks. She points out that the subject of Jews and anti-Semitism was notoriously absent from media reports during the attacks despite the presence of the Kosher supermarket in which a hostage situation unfolded. Reporting and events in the aftermath of the attacks lead us to return to a larger and historically inflected question of the place of the French Jewish citizen.²² Although she focuses

¹⁷ Rousset and Maret, 247.

¹⁸ Osman Balkan, “*Charlie Hebdo* and the politics of mourning,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 254.

¹⁹ Balkan, 266.

²⁰ Azouz Begag, “La France en panne d’intégration,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 274.

²¹ Begag, 276.

²² See Gayle Zachmann, “The happy Jew: legacies, crises, and post-*Charlie Hebdo* conscience,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 279-286.

on aesthetics and the question of the freedom of artistic expression, Claire Bitoun's contribution also encompasses the question of community in its probing of the limits of representation and the question of aesthetic judgment and readership.²³ How does a community judge aesthetics and who influences this community? The pedagogical contributions of Katherine Dauge-Roth and Charlotte Daniels, as well as of Mame Fatou Niang, all turn on the central question of identity and community in relation to the attacks as well. Both contributions seek to interrogate the boundaries of communities and identities in the aftermath of the attacks.²⁴

My intention in identifying a common thread in the many diverse contributions to this special issue is not to be intentionally reductive. Clearly, the contributions approach a wide range of questions and complex themes in many different ways that this short space will not allow me to address adequately. However, in reading through them, one cannot help note that questions of community and identity arise throughout in many of the same ways. This is, in some ways, completely understandable. The focus on the dyad of inclusion and exclusion that one finds in many of the articles underscores the failures of decolonization, integration, and attempts at social cohesion (with its attendant divisions) in France; it calls attention to the discourses of the Republic and the issues of identity and community that accompany them. Indeed, I began these reflections with a similar focus. It is necessary and important that discussions like these take place. It is perhaps important for us to note, however, that such a focus might also divert our attention away from what one might identify as a central aspect of the very dynamics of terrorism.

Terrorism in France inevitably forces us to ask such questions about the Republic and to have discussions about the nature of community—of inclusion and exclusion—and the failures of “Western” society. In so doing, however, we are perhaps confronted with an incapacitated critical perspective—a perspective that is muted by the politics of silence that accompany the event of terrorism. To bend Mireille Rosello's formulation to my own purposes, here, we might say that there is a silence in the inevitable and necessary discussions of community and identity and their representation in the wake of terrorist events that does not address the material questions that create variegated forms of treatment and continued forms of institutionalized apartheid (following Begag's terms). This occurs in different ways and for various reasons, and we might conjecture that terrorism actually forecloses such discussions.

First, a concern with identity in critical discourses and in responses to terrorism frequently and inadvertently contains an affirmation that carries with it a form of territorialism. The “Je suis Charlie” slogan and its variant forms (“Je ne suis pas Charlie”; “Je suis juif”; “je suis Ahmed; the complete absence of solidarity; etc...) are one such example of an affirmation of identity, one that stakes out identity space. A concern with inclusion or exclusion in relationship to these competing identities, too, suggests the positioning of identity within territory and therefore a concomitant concern with territory itself, in terms of both physical and ideological space.

²³ See Claire Bitoun, “L'art pour l'art en 2015: pour une défense du jugement esthétique,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 287-292.

²⁴ See, Katherine Dauge-Roth and Charlotte Daniels, “Teaching the impossible subject of *Charlie Hebdo*,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 301-318. See also, Mame Fatou Niang, “Être our ne pas être Charlie: conversations avec de jeunes habitants de la Grande Borne,” *Contemporary French Civilization* 41 (2016): 319-324.

In the immediate aftermath of the November attacks in Paris, the overwhelming social response became one of asserting identity and one's freedom to do so. As had been the case in January after the *Charlie Hebdo* attacks, the Place de la République became a focal point of mourning and tribute. Newspaper headlines such as that of the *New York Times*, "At Place de la République, a defiant gathering to mourn," were commonplace. Such articles featured images and narratives of defiant Parisians paying tribute and "occupying" public space. Many newspapers ran images of people draped on the statue of the Marianne, symbol of the French Republic and nationalism. As the article from the *Times* stated, "[t]here was a pervasive sense of defiance among those at the square on Saturday. They believed the attacks were intended to curtail their way of life."²⁵ Images such as the iconic and illuminated "Not Afraid" slogan carried by the mass of Parisians in the square on 14 November became synonymous with such defiance, as did the slogan and hashtag, "Occupez la terrasse," referring to the massacres that took place on the terraces of cafés.

On 4 December 2015, one of the afflicted cafés, the *A la Bonne Bière*, reopened, adorned by a giant banner with the slogan "Je suis en terrasse." Such slogans resonate with the defiance of the "Je suis" or "Nous sommes Charlie" slogans that adorned the Place de la République, much of urban Paris, and the rest of France, as well as social media.²⁶ The danger in such reactions and concerns is perhaps not in the provocation that they present, but in the focus on identity and its territory rather than on a certain underlying ideology of terrorism that functions in a spectacular, defiant, and territorialist manner. The focus on identity diverts critical attention from that.

Second, a focus on identity, community, and belonging can at times lead to a fixation on victimization—who is victimized; which group, ethnic identity, or community is excluded, or collaterally damaged?; which nationalist discourses victimize some but not others? Here, there is perhaps more of a concern with the deictic gesture of exposing victims and perpetrators and less emphasis on overarching material conditions and the ideological dilemmas of victimization that are posed by terrorism itself, as well as the responses it solicits.

In an interview on his recent book, *Notre mal vient de plus loin: penser les tueries du 13 novembre*, Alain Badiou gestures to the underlying material conditions that create what he calls a "désir d'Occident."²⁷ According to Badiou, intellectuals and politicians have neglected to attend to material conditions in the wake of the failures of global capitalism. Consequently, there has been no ideological alternative offered in France, or elsewhere, to the failed promises of capitalism that could potentially enable would-be terrorists to find a space. According to Badiou, this failure leads

²⁵ See "At Place de la République, A Defiant Gathering to Mourn," 14 November 2015, <http://www.nytimes.com/live/paris-attacks-live-updates/in-place-de-la-republique-a-defiant-gathering-to-mourn>.

²⁶ Joann Sfar, a cartoonist for *Charlie Hebdo*, had a similar reaction when, in response to the international #prayforparis slogan, he penned a series of drawings of Paris championing life and existence. The caption for his cartoon read, "Friends from the whole world, thank you for #prayforparis, but we don't need more religion. Our faith goes to music! Kisses! Life! Champagne and Joy! #Parisaboutlife." Like the defiant reactions of others, Sfar's slogan also aimed at filling or occupying the void of fear left by the terrorist attacks, and it also focused on identity. See Joann Sfar, 14 November 2015, <https://twitter.com/joannsfar>. See also, "Charlie Hebdo cartoonist doesn't want you to pray for Paris," 14 November 2015, <http://nypost.com/2015/11/14/charlie-hebdo-cartoonist-doesnt-want-you-to-pray-for-paris/>.

²⁷ Alain Badiou, *Notre mal vient de plus loin: penser les tueries du 13 novembre* (Paris: Fayard, 2016).

to a frustrated desire for the Occident and its illusive comforts that manifests itself in the form of terrorism:

Il y a à l'évidence chez ces jeunes assassins les effets d'un désir d'Occident opprimé ou impossible. Cette passion fondamentale, on la trouve un peu partout, et c'est la clé des choses: étant donné qu'un autre monde n'est pas possible, alors pourquoi n'avons-nous pas de place dans celui-ci? Si on se représente qu'aucun autre monde n'est possible, il est intolérable de ne pas avoir de place dans celui-ci, une place conforme aux critères de ce monde: argent, confort, consommation... Cette frustration ouvre un espace à l'instinct de mort: la place qu'on désire est aussi celle qu'on va haïr puisqu'on ne peut pas l'avoir.²⁸

Badiou's acknowledgement of the failures of Western capitalism in France as well as elsewhere, and of the unfulfilled desires and absent alternatives in relationship to terrorism, implores a focus on the underlying material conditions that inflect issues of identity, territory, and community. Badiou's critique, however, much like other responses in the wake of the terrorist attacks in France, stops short of providing specific alternatives of how a new form of community might inhere given these underlying conditions. For Badiou, specifically, there remains the question of how his alternative community of youth rising up in the face of the failures of global capitalism might constitute itself.²⁹ Badiou's response, like many responses in the wake of the recent terrorist attacks in France, including this one, evokes issues of representation, community, and spaces of identity. Ultimately, such responses generally go far to point to issues of representation and the failures of inclusion and community within France, but struggle to confront the specific ways that identities are circumscribed by underlying material conditions and might negotiate the social divisions those conditions present.

Sociologist Michel Wieviorka suggests that terrorists in France have come to embody the schism of a society marked by the inability to engage in debate and conflict that might lead to the possibility of community: "Le terrorisme global n'est pas la folie meurtrière de quelques fous de Dieu, c'est l'action devenu inhumaine de ceux qui, de par le monde, sur fond de décolonisation ratée et d'absence de perspective, incarnent l'échec à construire les débats et les conflits

²⁸ "Alain Badiou, "La frustration d'un désir d'Occident ouvre un espace à l'instinct de mort," *La Libération*, 11 January 2016, http://www.liberation.fr/debats/2016/01/11/alain-badiou-la-frustration-d-un-desir-d-occident-ouvre-un-espace-a-l-instinct-de-mort_1425642.

²⁹ It is perhaps unfair to suggest that Badiou does not conceive of an alternative. He sees the uprising of a communist alternative to the broken promises of global capitalism as a way forward and as the only pattern of resistance. His conception of this type of resistance is, as Peter Hallward has pointed out, a "matter of course," with no intervening compromise or liberal communication. According to Hallward, "Badiou, like Lenin, like Fanon, like all great revolutionary thinkers, maintains a strictly classical form of political logic: either p or not p, with no possible compromise in between. Badiou conceives of politics precisely as a matter of what Rimbaud called 'logical revolt', a matter of clearly stated principle—the sort of principle incarnated by the great intellectual *résistants*, Jean Cavailles and Albert Lautman (AM: 12). The political subject acts or resists as a matter of course, and not thanks to a reasoned affiliation with a particular group, class, or opinion. He resists, not as a result of communication or consensus, but all at once, to the exclusion of any 'third way' (AM: 15)." See Peter Hallward, "Badiou's Politics: Equality and Justice," *Culture Machine* 4 (2002), <http://www.culturemachine.net/index.php/cm/article/viewArticle/271/256>.

insitutionnalisables qui permettent de vivre ensemble.”³⁰ Although Wieviorka does not explicitly mention them, the material conditions underpinning the absence of such debates and institutionalized forms of conflict are germane to their creation and to the formation of a possible livable community within a functional Fifth Republic. Perhaps the greatest danger of terrorism is its capacity to direct our response toward issues of inclusion, community, identity, and representation, while diverting our attention away from—in the case of France—the underlying material conditions that make the Republic possible and even for all. In the interim, those conditions continue to erode such possibilities, leaving us lurching forward without further response.

Michael O’Riley
The Colorado College

Copyright © 2017 by the H-France, all rights reserved. H-France permits the electronic distribution of individual reviews for nonprofit educational purposes, provided that full and accurate credit is given to the author, the date of publication, and the location of the review on the H-France website. H-France reserves the right to withdraw the license for redistribution/republication of individual reviews at any time and for any specific case. Neither bulk redistribution/republication in electronic form of more than five percent of the contents of H-France Salon nor re-publication of any amount in print form will be permitted without permission. For any other proposed uses, contact the Editor-in-Chief of H-France.

H-France Salon
Volume 9 (2017), Issue 1, #1

³⁰ Michel Wieviorka, “Le terrorisme global comme anti-mouvement,” last modified 11 May 2016, <http://wieviorka.hypotheses.org/363>.