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Ian Coller, *Arab France: Islam and the Making of Modern Europe, 1798-1831*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 2011. xi + 288 pp. Figures, notes, bibliography, and index. \$60.00 U.S. (cl). ISBN 9780520260641; \$24.95 U.S. (pb). ISBN 9780520260658; \$20.00 U.S. (e-book). ISBN 9780520947542.

Review essay by Jennifer Sessions, University of Iowa

The confrontation with diversity that has so marked contemporary French society is not a new phenomenon, Ian Coller argues in his fascinating and thought-provoking new book. Opening with the riots that rocked France's *banlieues* in November 2005 and Nicolas Sarkozy's misguided 2009 debate on national identity, *Arab France* sets out to chart a long forgotten, early nineteenth-century effort to carve out the kind of cosmopolitan French identity that has proved so elusive in recent times. Focusing on a small community of several hundred men and women who emigrated to France from Egypt in the train of Napoleon's retreating armies in 1801, Coller sees in their lives and personal trajectories the "making" of an "Arab France" that embraced revolutionary ideals of freedom and equality without rejecting cultural differences. Although never fully actualized—"this is a book about a France that never quite existed," the first line of the Introduction tells us (p. 1)—and quickly foreclosed by the "imperial turn" of 1830, it nonetheless constituted a "space of possibility" (p. 2) in which Middle Eastern culture and Islam could be reconciled with French universalism. Although Coller disclaims any particular positioning in contemporary debates over ethnic and cultural diversity, it is difficult to read his account as anything other than an impassioned plea for the "rich possibilities of exchange and plurality" (p. 218) that he sees in the short-lived world of France's postrevolutionary Arab community.

Coller's book opens up new possibilities for scholars as well, drawing attention not only to a surprising lost episode in what we might call France's global-imperial history but also to important blind spots in that history to which we would do well to attend more closely. While *Arab France* invites many productive lines of questioning, I would like to focus my discussion here on four issues that I found most distinctive in Coller's analysis and that I think will be most productive for readers and for the field of French global-imperial history in general: his focus on the postrevolutionary moment of transition in French imperial and political history, his social historical approach, his resuscitation of "identity" as a useful category of analysis, and his arguments about the role of Islam in defining not only the Arab France of the early nineteenth century but also, as his title boldly claims, the making of modern Europe. These contributions make *Arab France* a ringing response to recent challenges to bring more careful historical analysis to bear on transnational linkages between people, things, and ideas.

The time period covered by *Arab France* is an unusual one, for one of the most significant features of the years 1798-1831 is that they were, as Coller writes, "the entr'acte" between French imperial incursions into the Muslim world and the lives of the French Arab population consequently played out "before, across, and within empire" (pp. 11-12). Falling as it does across and between imperial and immigration history, their story thus calls for an approach similar to those of the now-booming fields of Atlantic World history and what has come to be called the history of the "U.S. in the World." Given the importance of formal empire to the Mediterranean and French iteration of such a field, we might

describe this as French global-imperial history, which, if it does not have the virtue of elegance, may help capture the interlocking of formal imperialism and other forms of long-distance interconnection in shaping it.[1]

The Egyptian emigrants came to France as a direct result of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and, more particularly, the collapse of that imperialist project. As Coller's first two substantive chapters explain, the core of the postrevolutionary Arab community was formed by a group of several hundred men and women from across the Ottoman world who evacuated to Marseille with the remains of the defeated Armée d'Orient in 1801. Although most had cooperated with the French occupiers in some way, Coller argues that the emigrants were more than simple collaborators fleeing reprisals. The short-lived French occupation had given new scope to existing traditions of social and geographical mobility among Egypt's religious minorities (Copts from Upper Egypt, Syrian Melkite Catholics, and Greek Orthodox Christians from across the Ottoman world), and it was attachment to these personal aspirations and to new, French ideas of liberty and national unity that led some of the Syrians and Copts who had served the French, along with a few members of the Muslim elite, to sail for France. There, the self-proclaimed "Egyptian Legation" hoped to continue fighting for Egyptian independence from Istanbul. France's post-Brumaire government, seeking to repair relations with the Porte but holding out the possibility of a future return to Egypt, gave them an ambivalent welcome. The Consulate offered pensions to those it termed "Egyptian refugees" in recognition of their past services but kept them at arm's length by conditioning that assistance (at least initially) on residence in a *dépôt* set up in Marseille.

If the Egyptian emigration was a product of French imperialism, the decades in which its members settled into metropolitan society saw no further French aggression in the Middle East or North Africa. By the time of the Bourbon Restoration's invasion of Algiers in 1830, the Arab community was well established in Marseille and Melun, the home of Napoleon's Mamelouk corps, and a second generation of Egyptians had begun to assert itself in Parisian intellectual circles. Even as they developed local social institutions in Marseille—a consistorial council to govern the *dépôt*, an Arabic course at the lycée to educate their children, a Catholic church offering an Arabic liturgy—the emigrants remained tied to the Islamic world through personal and commercial networks that criss-crossed the Mediterranean. French conquest in the Maghreb brought with it a "hardening of cultural and national identities in the face of colonial confrontation" (p. 12) after 1830, but Coller sees the intervening pause in imperial expansion as the critical condition of possibility for imagining a nation in which Arab identity could be conjugated with Frenchness.

These transitional decades have generally been overlooked by historians of French colonialism, largely because of the very pause in overseas expansion that makes them so critical to Coller's Arab France. One of the great virtues of his "postcolonial" history is thus to remind us that modern French imperialism was embedded in pre-existing patterns of "transcultural exchange" that transcended the geographical and chronological bonds of formal empire (pp. 15, 11-12). Although I am less convinced by the claim that expansionist nationalism fell into abeyance in France after 1815 (p. 155)—if militarism was not a pillar of Bourbon ultraroyalism, it was certainly a core tenet of the Romantic Bonapartism that helped to bring it down in 1830[2]—Coller clearly demonstrates the importance of not only bringing metropole and colony into the same analytical frame but also, as Frederick Cooper has recently argued, broadening our views of empire to encompass its imbrication with broader processes of transnational and transcultural relations.[3] Historians of the early modern period and the twentieth century have recognized this for some time,[4] but the lesson applies equally well to *dix-neuvièmistes*, as recent work on pre-colonial French relations with North Africa has begun to show.[5]

Such an approach also challenges us to "internationalize" the political history of nineteenth-century France in new ways. Coller argues that French historians have underestimated the importance of the Egyptian expedition as a "laboratory" for Bonapartist rule in Europe (pp. 29, 32). Recent studies of Imperial rule in Europe have begun to explore the ways that analogous logics of race and civilization

shaped the colonial and continental empires of Napoleonic France,[6] but Collier takes these arguments even further, highlighting significant overlaps in practice and personnel between Napoleon's occupations of Egypt and continental Europe that extended through the postrevolutionary decades into the conquest of Algeria, where the French army relied on the services of translators drawn from the ranks of the Egyptian refugee community and other veterans of the Armée d'Orient. Equally important, although Collier does not make this point himself, his analysis throws the Bourbon Restoration into new and surprising light as a moment of relative cultural openness. The Catholic revival and restrictive political culture that are usually taken as evidence of the Restoration's reactionary character function here as a spur for new forms of cosmopolitanism. Savvy Egyptian intellectuals took advantage of their association with the Holy Land and the postrevolutionary generation's retreat into the cultural realm to make a space for themselves in the national community in the 1820s, and found that space closed down only after the advent of the ostensibly more "liberal" July Monarchy.

These fresh insights into political history are made possible in large part by Collier's social historical approach to the Arab community of postrevolutionary France. On the one hand, his is a recuperative project inspired by the work of E. P. Thompson and Alain Corbin in rescuing the forgotten and the obscure from Thompson's oft-cited "enormous condescension of posterity" (quoted p. 18). Exposing the existence of a community long ignored by historians preoccupied by the larger postcolonial migrations of the twentieth century and "restoring them to their proper role in their own history" (p. 18) is a central concern of *Arab France*. On the other hand, Collier takes methodological cues from recent work in British imperial history by Linda Colley, William Dalrymple, and Maya Jasanoff, among others, that focuses on individual lives in order to reveal the "neglected 'transcultural' dimension within imperial histories" (p. 12) and "a zone of intermediarity, of 'in-betweenness'" "occluded" in cultural histories inspired by Edward Said's influential but Manichean view of Orient and Occident (p. 13).[7] Reversing the perspective of these historians to look not at Europeans overseas but at Arabs in France, Collier uses petitions to the Ministry of War's pension bureau, refugees' private correspondence in French and Arabic, and the published works of Arab intellectuals, as well as scattered police surveillance files and French engravings, to illuminate what he refers to as the "existence" of the Arab community. Tacking between individual experiences, broader social networks, and the shifting cultural politics of the day, Collier seeks to show how Arabs navigated the tricky waters of postrevolutionary political culture and sought to negotiate a place for themselves in French society.

The resulting account follows a roughly chronological structure in two broad parts that are focused on the period of the Consulate and Empire, and the Restoration and early July Monarchy, respectively. The first two chapters describe the emigration of 1801 and the creation of the Marseille *dépôt*. Chapters three and four then turn to the Egyptians' fate during the Empire and the Hundred Days. With the relaxation of restrictions on their movements and the establishment of a pension office in Paris in 1811, the capital began to attract individuals seeking economic opportunities and social freedoms unavailable in Marseille, along with demobilized veterans of Napoleon's Mamelouk corps headquartered at Melun. There were limits to the growing cosmopolitanism of Paris's "Arab milieu," however, as younger Arab intellectuals found when they sought to realize the promises of egalitarian rationalism that they associated with the French enterprise in Egypt. Instead of Enlightened modernization, Collier argues, they found in Napoleonic France a "repressive cosmopolitanism" (p. 117) that fostered cultural difference only insofar as it glorified the Empire and enhanced the Emperor's ability to rule his farflung empire.

Their success in adapting to this unexpected situation and building the networks of personal patronage necessary to succeed under the Empire left the Egyptian refugees vulnerable when Napoleon was finally overthrown. In chapter five, Collier explains how their visible foreignness and prominent ties to the Imperial regime made them a target for legitimist gangs in 1815. During the White Terror, Marseille's Egyptians fell victim to a vicious anti-Bonapartist pogrom in which an unknown number were killed, the neighborhood in which the poorer Egyptians had settled was burned, and hundreds were incarcerated by local authorities ostensibly concerned for their protection. Collier concludes that the

violence, sparked by an attack on two Egyptian “*négresses*,” revealed the racialization of the Egyptians in French eyes, but also helped to foster a greater sense of solidarity within the Arab population. In the ensuing years, the Egyptians’ ethnic, sectarian, and social divisions dissolved into “an increasingly multilocal existence characterized by mobility” (p. 136) between Marseille, Melun, and Paris that proved critical to their physical and political survival at moments of crisis.

The remaining chapters adopt a biographical approach, each focusing on one individual—Franco-Egyptian Arabist Joseph Agoub, Egyptian scholar Rifa’a al-Tahtawi, and military translator Joanny Pharaon—to trace the experience of the second generation of Arabs born and raised in France. Under the influence of Tahtawi, the religious adviser to an educational mission sent to Paris by Egypt’s modernizing governor Muhammad ‘Ali in 1826, intellectuals like Agoub embraced their linguistic and cultural particularities as the basis for a new, mixed Franco-Arab identity. This creative negotiation of their intermediary position opened new opportunities for the young men of the second generation, whose work Collier wants to reconsider as a “common project” to valorize their shared Arabic language and “Islamicate culture” (p. 159). They found literary success in appealing to the pluralist exoticism of Restoration intellectuals, who embraced them as “both French and Egyptian at once” (p. 158). Collier sees this strategy as a double-edged sword, however. In capitalizing on their Egyptian backgrounds they marked themselves out as different, and that difference could just as easily be associated with the “barbarian” states of Ottoman North Africa as with the civilization of ancient Egypt when cultural and geopolitical winds shifted. Neither fully Egyptian nor fully French, their Franco-Arab identity was dangerously indeterminate when “alongside the ‘civilized’ Egyptian and the ‘noble’ Arab lay the ‘barbarian’ threat of Islam associated with North Africa” in increasingly rigid French racial thinking (p. 163).

The invasion of Algiers in 1830 transformed the second generation’s ambivalent position into a stark choice between the two parts of their hybrid identity, as Joanny Pharaon, the son of Napoleon’s head interpreter in Egypt, discovered. Pharaon, described as “the first truly French Arab” by virtue of his classical French education at the Lycée de Marseille and his tutelage in Arab culture by Tahtawi in Paris (p. 193), had claimed membership in the French body politic by mounting the barricades during the July Days. Just two short years later, however, his new position as head interpreter for the French expeditionary army in Algiers forced him to decide between his French citizenship and Arab cultural belonging. Pharaon himself opted for the French colonizers, Collier tells us, while the Arab communities in France disintegrated under the pressure of a similar choice. Some Arabs remained in Marseille but turned their faces to the Mediterranean, while others moved to Algiers for its new professional opportunities and Arab cultural environment. But what Collier calls the “Arab milieu” in Paris fragmented into a small, largely underground presence. The racialized and exclusionary logic of colonial nationalism had eliminated “that space in which it was possible to be both French and Arab at once,” and Arab France had become a colonial space in which “the Franco-Arab identity that seemed possible for a moment during the late Empire and early Restoration was now definitively unmade” (pp. 208-9).

For historians of French colonialism in North Africa, steeped in two decades of work on the cultural construction of categories and identities, Collier’s attention to the lived experience of the Egyptian refugees is refreshing. While he insists on the constructed nature of Arab identity, that identity is not a purely or even primarily discursive one. It is firmly grounded in the “shared reality” (p. 5) of individuals operating in a “social world” (p. 19) defined by migration, family, and social networks that carried people, patronage, and goods—including some particularly memorable and well-traveled coconuts—around the Mediterranean basin. This makes *Arab France* a welcome addition to a field that has become accustomed to talking more about representations and discourses than about people and only recently has begun to turn to the lives and experiences of those whose movements, relationships, and ideas helped to constitute French empire.[8] One might wish that Collier had brought to the impoverished majority of the refugees settled in the “Egyptian village” of Marseille’s Cours Gouffé the same close attention he does to the experiences of literate Arab intellectuals. The fragmentary archival record understandably

offers greater purchase on those able to write letters, compose petitions, or publish books, but would the registers of refugee pensions allow greater investigation of the sectarian, family, and economic circumstances of this largely silent majority? A broader, aggregate portrait of the Arab community, in terms of its numbers—given variously as “several hundred” (p. 22), 752, 230 plus, (p. 42), and 317 (p. 130)—demographic features, and sectarian and professional backgrounds, would also help readers to contextualize the biographies and identity claims of individuals like Joseph Agoub and Joanny Pharaon. These are, however, perhaps unfair quibbles with a book whose biographical method is necessarily focused on the lived experiences of identifiable individuals and already covers an enormous amount of that ground in a scant two hundred pages. We know little as yet about those who made and were made by French relations with North Africa, and *Arab France* marks an important step forward in the renaissance social history of French empire.

Coller’s commitment to doing social history from the ground up underpins his defense of identity as a category of analysis, as well. Acknowledging the criticisms that have been leveled against the term in recent years, most sharply by Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker who claim that it has become “too ambiguous, too torn between ‘hard’ [essentialist] and ‘soft’ [constructivist] meanings, essentialist connotations and constructivist qualifiers, to serve well the demands of social analysis,”[9] Coller seeks to redeem “identity” as a way of describing the social bonds that connected the “delocalized” Arab community in France. To this end, he proposes a “strong constructivist” conception of identity “as a *project* of configuring cultural practices, group relations, and articulated self-understandings across a particular space” (p. 18). Identity in this view is not something that comes into being when it takes some definitive form, but is rather something that exists only in the process of its own “making.”

This formulation—which quite closely resembles the term “identification” put forth by Cooper and Brubaker to describe the “*processual*, interactive development of collective self-understanding”[10]—is quite effective as an antidote to overly static visions of identity and yields an analysis of Arab France as a space that was continually made, remade, and, ultimately, unmade in response to changing social and political circumstances. This approach is exemplified by the discussion of “the making of Arab Paris” in chapter three. A seemingly insignificant run-in between Georges Aïdé, a former Syrian customs official who became one of the leaders of the Egyptian Legation, and Joubran Mehenna Tadi, a former cavalryman in the Armée d’Orient, becomes the point of entry for a fascinating investigation of the differences between the Marseille *dépôt* and the growing Arab community in the capital. Starting with a single letter in which Aïdé complained to the Minister of War about Mehenna’s insistent demands for financial assistance during an afternoon stroll in the Tuileries and demanded that the younger man be punished for his disrespectful behavior, Coller pieces together the patterns of mobility and settlement that brought them each to Paris and the social networks that linked them to Marseille and the wider Muslim world. These then provide the framework for a close reading of the incident in the Tuileries as a “conflict of identities” between a individualistic, cosmopolitan identity developed by Parisian Arabs like Mehenna and the “perspective framed by custom, communal norms, and propriety” (p. 92) that Aïdé brought with him from the more parochial confines of Marseille.

The strengths of this approach are many, and include not only revealing the divergent and changing trajectories that were possible for Arabs in Napoleonic France but also allowing the author to draw significant insights from a fragmentary historical record. This is just one of many instances in the book where he imaginatively combines the traces left by an individual’s “momentary collision with power” with a reconstruction of that person’s broader “spatial and temporal horizon” to illuminate an ill-documented life (p. 3). Like the proponents of the “new biography,” who have argued that “cultural politics are most easily examined as well as empathetically imagined in the individual life” and that the individual life sheds vital light on “the construction of identities,”[11] Coller makes excellent and instructive use of those individuals he can trace. He does not consider identity as a *performance* of self, a central tenet of the new biography that scholars of gender, in particular, may miss in his reading of incidents such as that between Aïdé and Mehenna—indeed, gender itself is entirely absent as a

component of French Arab identities—but this is consistent with his desire to reconceive identity in a way that can withstand criticism of constructivist accounts as overly fluid and elusive. Although he acknowledges that Aïdé and Mehenna, like other Egyptian petitioners and writers cited in the book, appealed to the Minister of War in terms played strategically on prevailing French views of Arabs, Collier largely takes their letters as reflecting actual self-understandings.

Readers more skeptical about the transparency of such self-representations may well take issue with this treatment, but to me, the most significant question raised by Collier's handling of refugee letters and petitions has to do with the role of the French state in defining French Arab identities. As Collier points out in several places, the pensions provided by the Ministry of War were essential to both the community's survival and its members' sense of common affiliation: "it offered a consistent incentive to maintain a communal identification and reinforced bonds between individuals even as it created conflicts and jealousies" (p. 61). Yet the history of the pensions, the ministerial office that administered it, and the relationships between pension recipients and the military bureaucrats in that office remains fragmentary and opaque. We get only intermittent glimpses of the number of individuals eligible for pensions, the amounts paid to various kinds of refugees at various times, the operations of the pension bureau, and the evolving criteria for inclusion in the pension rolls. Considering that "the patient action of the state in applying and reinforcing its categories, combined with the unusually close link created by the structure of pensions accorded directly from the Ministry of War, consistently encouraged those so categorized [as Egyptian refugees] to consider their interest as mutually connected" (p. 214), the institutions involved in creating and administering the refugee pensions deserve closer attention.

The largest questions that arise from *Arab France*, however, come out of its claims about the role of Islam in defining the postrevolutionary French Arab community and in the "making of modern Europe." As he explains in the introduction, Collier sees Islam and Europe as central, if not "determining" to the development of Arab France. "[A]s interlocking spaces rather than as substantive categories," they stand as "two great transnational concepts" against which Arab France evolved (p. 10). The space of Arab France itself "was primarily constituted by the specificity of the Arabic language" (p. 1), the "only commonality that could provide a point of unity" for the heterogeneous Egyptian immigration (p. 73). But this linguistic glue "carried with it another, more complex set of relationships with Islam" (p. 1), because "behind the commonality of Arabic language and culture lay the structures and traditions of what Marshall Hodgson called an Islamicate society" (p. 10).^[12]

It is on this linkage of language and culture that Collier's argument about Islam's place in Arab France hangs, in large part because Muslims and the Islamic faith itself seem to have played a secondary, if any role in the formation of Arab France. Of the dozen individuals profiled here, only two were Muslim: Muhammed 'Abd el-Al, former aga of the Janissaries of Cairo who appears only sporadically—and, like other Muslim emigrants, converted to Christianity in the 1820s—and Rifa'a al-Tahtawi, imam of Muhammad 'Ali's educational mission and thus not fully part of the French Arab community, although of significant influence on young French Arab intellectuals. The majority of the key figures in Collier's account, however, are Christians, whether Syrian Melkite Catholics or Egyptian Copts. Collier acknowledges this fact but maintains that their roots in the Muslim world and their shared Arabic language made them part of a broader Islamic culture (p. 10). Yet there is little sign in the lives of French Arabs of Islamic institutions, practices, or ideas, except in the case of Joseph Agoub who wrote early poems condemning the Muslim invaders of Egypt and then later embraced the Qur'an as a foundational text in Arabic culture. And even here, although this respect for Islam is presented as a key legacy of Tahtawi's *École Égyptienne*, language looms much larger than religion in the passages cited from Agoub's work. Collier explains this absence as a product of Muslims' minority status within the Egyptian emigration and the Restoration's increasing hostility to Islam. Given the apparent lack of direct engagement with the Muslim faith among the Egyptians Collier discusses, however, the effort to highlight their Islamic connections seems rather forced and borders on the confusion of culture with

religion against which Hodgson himself cautioned in proposing the term “Islamicate” to designate an Islamic world civilization. [13]

In the end, the place of “Islam” in the book’s title gives it a prominence that seems out of keeping with its place in the book’s pages, whose central historical arguments and concerns have primarily to do with cultural diversity in France and relatively little with either Islam or Europe. The stimulating novelty and significance of these arguments, however, far outweigh questions about Islam’s importance to what Collier calls, after all, “Arab” rather than “Muslim” France. Whether interested in the trans-Mediterranean dimensions of postrevolutionary French political culture, the social history of “France in the world,” or the heuristic value of “identity,” historians will find much food for thought and provocative new questions to guide future research. For this, Collier must be applauded, and *Arab France* should become required reading for students and for scholars of modern France and its global-imperial history.

NOTES

[1] For recent reflections on the relationships between national, imperial, and global histories, including in the U.S. context, see *The Nation and Beyond: Transnational Perspectives on United States History*, special issue, *Journal of American History* 86, no. 3 (1999); Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005), esp. chapters 4 and 6; C. A. Bayly, Sven Beckert, Matthew Connelly, Isabel Hofmeyr, Wendy Kozol, and Patricia Seed, “AHR Conversation: On Transnational History,” *American Historical Review* 111, no. 5 (2006): 1441-64. Recent works that might be considered French global-imperial history include J. P. Daughton, “When Argentina Was ‘French’: Rethinking Cultural Politics and European Imperialism in Belle-Époque Buenos Aires,” *Journal of Modern History* 80 (2008): 831-864; and Julia Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans: North Africa and Europe in an Age of Migration, c. 1800-1900* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011).

[2] Alan Spitzer, *Old Hatreds and Young Hopes: The French Carbonari Against the Bourbon Restoration* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971); Sheryl Kroen, *Politics and Theater: The Crisis of Legitimacy in Restoration France, 1815-1830* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000); and Sudhir Hazareesingh, *The Legend of Napoleon* (London: Granta, 2005).

[3] Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*.

[4] Recently, see Alison Games, “Atlantic History: Definitions, Challenges, and Opportunities,” *American Historical Review* 111, no. 3 (2006): 741-757; Bernard Bailyn and Patricia Denault, eds., *Soundings in Atlantic History: Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2009); Mark Bradley, *Imagining Vietnam and America: The Making of Postcolonial Vietnam, 1919-1950*, New Cold War History (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000); and Matthew Connelly, *A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002).

[5] Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans*; and Gillian Weiss, *Captives and Corsairs: France and Slavery in the Early Modern Mediterranean* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011).

[6] Michael Broers, *The Napoleonic Empire in Italy, 1796-1814: Cultural Imperialism in a European Context?* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); and Stuart Woolf, “French Civilization and Ethnicity in the Napoleonic Empire,” *Past and Present* 124, no. 1 (1989): 96-120.

[7] William Dalrymple, *White Mughals: Love and Betrayal in Eighteenth-Century India* (London: Harper Collins, 2002); Linda Colley, *Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850* (London: Jonathan Cape, 2002); and Maya Jasanoff, *Edge of Empire: Conquest and Collecting in the East, 1750–1850* (London: Fourth Estate, 2005).

[8] Among recent works that foreground the social dimensions of imperialism, see for example, Clancy-Smith, *Mediterraneans*; Sarah A. Curtis, *Civilizing Habits: Women Missionaries and the Revival of French Empire* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), part II; and George R. Trumbull IV, *An Empire of Facts: Colonial Power, Cultural Knowledge, and Islam in Algeria, 1870–1914* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

[9] “Identity,” in Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 60.

[10] “Identity,” in Cooper, *Colonialism in Question*, 65.

[11] Jo Burr Margadant, “Introduction: Constructing Selves in Historical Perspective,” *The New Biography: Performing Femininity in Nineteenth-Century France* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000), 7, 9.

[12] Hodgson spells out his rather loose conception of an Islamic civilization in *The Venture of Islam: Conscience and History in a World Civilization*, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1974).

[13] Hodgson, *The Venture of Islam*, 1:57.

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